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Abstract
The main purpose of my thesis is to bring together two seemingly unrelated topics 
in the philosophy of science and extract the philosophical consequences of this 
exercise. The first topic is Bayesianism - a well-developed, and popular, 
probabilistic theory of confirmation. The second topic is Scientific Realism - the 
thesis that we have good reason to believe that our best scientific theories are 
(approximately) true. It seems natural to assume that a sophisticated probabilistic 
theory of confirmation is the most appropriate framework for the treatment of the 
issue of scientific realism. Despite this intuition, however, the bulk of the literature 
is conspicuous for its failure to apply the Bayesian apparatus when discussing 
scientific realism. Furthermore, on the rare occasions that this has been attempted, 
its outcomes have been strikingly negative. In my thesis I systematise and critically 
examine the segmented literature in order to investigate whether, and how, 
Bayesianism and scientific realism can be reconciled. I argue for the following 
claims: 1) that those realists who claim that Bayesians lack a proper notion of 
‘theory acceptance’ have misunderstood the nature of Bayesianism as a reductive 
account of ‘theory acceptance’; 2) that it is possible to reconstruct most of the 
significant alternative positions involved in the realism debate using this new 
account of ‘theory acceptance’; 3) that Bayesianism is best seen as a general 
framework within which the standard informal arguments for and against realism 
become transparent, thus greatly clarifying the force of the realist argument; 4) that 
a Bayesian reconstruction does not commit one to any particular position as 
ultimately the right one, and, 5) that this result does not amount to succumbing to 
relativism. I conclude that the attempt to apply Bayesianism to the realism issue
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enjoys a considerable amount of success, though not enough to resolve the dispute 
definitively.
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Introduction
This thesis concerns scientific realism and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. 
Scientific Realism is a celebrated and also intuitively plausible doxastic attitude 
towards the theories of modem science. Realists claim that there are good reasons 
to think of these theories as (approximately) true descriptions of the physical world. 
Their belief is standardly supported by the No-Miracles argument, which suggests 
that the empirical success of modem science is so extraordinary that it would be a 
miracle if our well-confirmed, empirically successful theories failed to be at least 
approximately true descriptions of the world. Bayesian Confirmation Theory (or, 
simply, Bayesianism), on the other hand, is a quantitative analytical approach to the 
issue of theory-confirmation, which refers to the way that the evidence bears on our 
assessment of the merits of theoretical hypotheses. Bayesianism has received 
increasing attention recently and by now it is safe to assert that it at least counts 
among the dominant approaches to confirmation.
It might seem natural to suppose that Bayesianism offers a rigorous 
framework within which the question of realism can be investigated anew and that, 
as a result, advances in Bayesian Confirmation Theory are a welcome extension to
9
the analytical resources we possess in debating the issue of realism. After all, the 
very basis of the No-Miracles argument is the extent to which our best theories are 
well-confirmed on the grounds of their empirical success. What else could be better 
suited for the analysis of the argument and the debate that stems from it than a 
theoretical approach whose very subject matter is the concept of ‘confirmation’?
Quite paradoxically, this presumption is denied by many realists and by many 
Bayesians, each for their own reasons. Realists argue that Bayesians lack the 
conceptual resources to construe the debate properly, and this is why they think 
Bayesianism is insufficient as a framework within which the realism debate ought 
to be recast. While Bayesians utilize the conceptual resources offered by Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory only to reach the other extreme and suggest that both the 
realist argument and the ensuing debate are fundamentally flawed, marred by 
elementary logical errors and bound to lead us astray.
This situation struck me as really paradoxical, no less because both realism 
and Bayesianism have, independently of each other, received considerable attention 
and have been investigated with great care and subtlety. The foundational merits of 
Bayesianism are significant, resting as they do on seemingly compelling arguments. 
Intuitively, a rigorous analysis of partial belief ought to shed light on the ampliative 
inferences we perform to the (approximate) truth of our theories. Similar thoughts, 
however, apply to the realism debate. Many arguments and counter-arguments have 
been put forward during the last 30 years or so and many alternatives to realism 
have been entertained. The level of analysis has reached impressive depths, which 
it sounds just too far-fetched to think of as straightforwardly logically flawed and 
misguided.
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In researching the topic, the belief that a Bayesian rendition of the realism 
debate will yield important intellectual benefits became stronger. Hence, I here 
defend the compatibility of the Bayesian mode of analysis with the aims and 
objectives of the epistemic dimension of the debate regarding scientific realism. In 
the first half of the thesis, I reconstruct and neutralize the various incompatibilist 
positions that have been put forth so far and only then (in the second half) present 
my positive proposal and analyze its contribution to the debate. In final analysis, I 
hold that employing Bayesian Confirmation Theory in the discussion of realism 
yields important benefits. As so often happens in analytical philosophy, 
Bayesianism primarily contributes clarity and rigor. Occasionally sloppy and 
obscure language is substituted by the more precise probabilistic idiom, thus greatly 
clarifying the concepts and arguments employed in defence of the various 
positions. Moreover, though primarily a neutral framework of analysis capable of 
accommodating all versions of the realist argument, Bayesianism also helps to 
bring out the realist claim in its sharpest form, thus offering further service to the 
realists.
At the same time, however, looking into the way that Bayesianism bears on 
the question of realism also reveals its limitations. I argue that these stem from the 
recognition of the fact that, for all its rigor and clarity, Bayesianism cannot offer a 
definitive resolution of the question of realism, at least any more definitive than the 
informal treatments already at hand allow for. I do not think that this qualification 
renders the application of Bayesian techniques to the question of realism redundant 
or pointless. On the contrary, it helps bring out in another way one of the salient 
features of all genuine philosophical problems, namely their open-ended, seemingly 
eternal character. Being a reflection of this inherent characteristic of all
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philosophical problems, the inability of Bayesianism to settle the question of 
realism once and for all becomes more of an underlining of an obvious limitation 
on philosophical analysis in general than a powerful argument against Bayesianism 
in particular.
So far I have only hinted at the contributions of Bayesianism to the treatment 
of the realism issue. Yet, I think there are gains to be found when looking at the 
converse direction too. More specifically, the application of the Bayesian apparatus 
on a problem as vexing as realism leads to a better appreciation of the character of 
Bayesianism and particularly its most widely accepted and, at the same time, most 
controversial version, i.e. Subjective Bayesianism. Chapter 5 contains, among other 
things, an analysis of the relationship between Subjective Bayesianism and 
‘scientific rationality’, which I think is much more faithful to the fundamentals of 
the subjectivist position than the ‘demonized’ received view one frequently 
encounters in the literature. Overall then, there is much to be gained from applying 
the Bayesian apparatus to the question of realism, both with regards to our 
understanding of the realist argument as well as our appreciation of the character of 
Subjective Bayesianism.
In more detail, the structure and content of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 
1 I introduce some of the fundamental ideas underlying Bayesian Confirmation 
Theory. The presentation is not exhaustive; it is rather tailored to what follows in 
subsequent chapters and the ensuing discussion. Chapter 1 is sub-divided into two. 
In the first part particular emphasis is given to betting behaviour and the Dutch- 
book arguments that aim to establish the connection between probabilities and 
rational degrees of belief, and also to the related question of the role of Bayesian 
Conditionalisation within Bayesian Confirmation Theory. In the second part, the
12
focus shifts to the character of the prior probabilities and the various attempts to 
find rational constraints moving beyond the axioms of probability. Once more, the 
presentation is provisional and commits the analysis that follows to no particular 
interpretation; it merely sets the stage for the main discussion in later chapters.
The treatment of the dialectic between realism and Bayesianism begins in 
Chapter 2. There I discuss and disarm the first main challenge to the project of 
bringing these two ‘isms’ in contact, namely the claim that Bayesianism is ill- 
equipped to enlighten the realism debate because it lacks an appropriately strong 
notion of ‘theory acceptance’. Realists, it is often argued, accept the theories of 
modem science on the basis of an argument for their approximate truth. Bayesians, 
however, cannot use the concept o f ‘theory acceptance’ meaningfully, except in the 
extreme circumstance when a hypothesis is assigned probability 1 (and this is 
inapplicable to scientific theories). As against this view, I argue that Bayesianism 
already serves as a reductive theory o f  'theory acceptance ’, which allows us to 
replace the somewhat primitive idiom of ‘theory acceptance’ with the more 
advanced and precise language of probabilities. In addition to this, I show that the 
Bayesian conception of probabilities as degrees of belief best conveys the essentials 
of the epistemic dimension of the realism debate and, finally, go on to reconstruct 
the various alternative positions according to my proposed reductive analysis. The 
upshot of this chapter is that Bayesians possess sufficient conceptual resources to 
make sense of the realist thesis and contribute creatively to the debate regarding its 
validity.
If Bayesianism is an adequate analytical tool, however, might it not be the 
case that it helps us reveal major flaws in the informal statement of the most 
prominent realist argument? In Chapter 3 I explore the various forms of this
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accusation. I start by explicating what the No-Miracles argument for realism 
amounts to, noting the two markedly different ways in which it has been standardly 
understood; namely as a plausibility consideration and as an Inference to the Best 
Explanation. Although my sympathies lie with the former, at this stage I do not 
take sides. My primary interest is to investigate two important challenges to the 
argument, which purport to show that Bayesianism decisively defeats some or all 
versions of it. The first is Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) claim that a Bayesian rendition 
of the No-Miracles argument qua Inference to the Best Explanation shows it to be 
incoherent’, while the second is due to Colin Howson (2000) and suggests that the 
No-Miracles argument, in any of its forms, is a straightforward probabilistic 
fallacy. My criticism of van Fraassen’s incoherence charge makes heavy use of the 
discussion regarding Bayesian Conditionalisation and its status as a principle of 
rationality found in Chapter 1 .1 argue that van Fraassen assigns the wrong role to 
Bayesian Conditionalisation and conclude that his argument does not go through 
even if we grant all his premises. Howson’s argument, on the contrary, is valid. 
Rather than showing that the No-Miracles argument is fundamentally flawed, 
however, it merely points to the right way in which the argument should be 
probabilistically reconstructed. Hence, instead of offering an argument for 
incompatibilism, Howson ends up merely (but correctly) stressing the significance 
of prior probabilities in any Bayesian rendition of the No-Miracles argument.
A careful assessment of Howson’s conclusions ultimately reveals how the No- 
Miracles argument can be faithfully captured in Bayesian terms. In Chapter 4 1 take 
up the positive task of arguing for the compatibility between Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory and the realist claim. Taking my cue from Peter Lipton’s 
(2004) reconciliatory approach between the Bayesians and the explanationists, I
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show how Bayesianism serves as a neutral framework within which both versions 
of the No-Miracles argument can be probabilistically reconstructed. I think that 
such a reconstruction conduces to clarity and reveals all the hidden presuppositions 
that the No-Miracles claim contains. At the same time, it brings to the surface from 
a different angle the notorious problem of the subjectivity o f  the priors. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Subjective Bayesianism is deemed the most adequate 
interpretational stance for the prior probabilities involved in our reconstruction. 
This means, however, that the strong claims to objectivity that the explanationist 
version of the No-Miracles argument makes are untenable. ‘Inference to the Best 
Explanation’ cannot provide the realist with the powerful argument he hopes to 
offer. Nonetheless, Subjective Bayesianism fares much better in conveying the 
essence of the No-Miracles claim construed as a plausibility argument. This I take 
to be direct evidence that, in the end, the No-Miracles consideration is just another 
plausibility claim. Consequently, Bayesianism also helps us discern the true 
character and reach of the realist argument, thus adjudicating a long-standing 
disagreement within the realist camp.
Even if Bayesianism can help in this way, however, can the same be done 
with respect to the dispute between realism and the various competing positions, 
like constructive empiricism or epistemic structural realism? Here the situation is 
more complicated. Prima facie it might seem that the allusion to what is plausible 
and what is not precludes any kind of objective treatment of this question. In the 
second part of chapter 4 1 discuss the extent to which Bayesianism helps us decide 
between the various alternative options. Unsurprisingly, a Bayesian rendition of the 
situation will not settle the issue definitively. It helps illuminate, nonetheless, the 
interplay between the various considerations that can be adduced in favour of or
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against realism and the way each might turn the balance one way or the other. 
Prominent among the anti-realist arguments is the ‘pessimistic induction’. It, too, 
has been accused of probabilistic invalidity by Peter Lewis (2001). Chapter 4 also 
includes a discussion of Lewis’ claim and concludes that his assessment fails to do 
justice to the import of the argument. Properly understood, a probabilistic reading 
of the ‘pessimistic induction’ brings out with remarkable precision the ways that 
the historical record can influence our belief or disbelief in realism. Ultimately, 
from a Bayesian viewpoint no definitive winner will be found. What will be found 
is an explanation of why this is so. Chapter 4 concludes by explaining why the 
inability of our Bayesian reconstruction to settle the debate is merely a reflection of 
the nature of the philosophical problem of realism per se rather than a deficiency of 
the Bayesian framework of analysis.
Chapter 5 focuses on the general epistemological presuppositions behind the 
two versions of the realist argument. In very general terms, its main aim is to 
substantiate what was implicitly assumed in chapter 4, i.e. a) that Subjective 
Bayesianism is in a position to capture the normative force of the No-Miracles 
argument consistently with its own principles; and b) that the normative force of the 
plausibility version of the argument, sanctioned by our probabilistic reconstruction, 
is in fact significant despite its appeal to intuition. The need for the defense of these 
two claims arises out of the following, commonly held, views: I) that a Subjective 
Bayesian reconstruction of the No-Miracles argument by definition undermines its 
strength, due to the (alleged) relationship between Subjective Bayesianism and 
relativism; and II) that plausibility considerations alluding to intuition, irrespective 
of whether they take a probabilistic expression, are utterly unconvincing, since 
‘intuitiveness’ is a subjective notion.
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I tackle (I) and (II) in order: first, I deny that a sensible construal of the nature 
of the Subjective Bayesian interpretation of probabilities brings with it any 
consequences with respect to the issue of relativism. The problem of relativism is 
independent of one’s stance towards the probability calculus and has to be 
countered on general epistemological grounds. Appreciating this point, however, 
means that one has to delve into the basic epistemological presuppositions of the 
No-Miracles claim, in its various forms, in order to locate the way in which it 
aspires to defeat the relativist challenge. My second task, then, is to examine 
various alternative ways this has been attempted and evaluate their merits. By 
defending a foundationalist answer to the problem of relativism based on the notion 
of ‘inductive intuition’, I directly deny that plausibility considerations are 
powerless. Quite to the contrary, on mature reflection they are our only hope in the 
battle against the relativist.
The last important issue which is brought out by the investigation of the 
epistemological fundamentals of the realist argument is the way in which the 
various proposed answers to the relativist challenge have an impact on our ways of 
interpreting partial belief and probability. Even if it is the case, as I argue it is, that 
Subjective Bayesianism is neutral with respect to the problem of relativism, an 
adequate answer to this problem is expected to influence our ways of interpreting 
prior probabilities. Consequently, my last concern is to show how and why 
Subjective Bayesianism best conveys the essentials of the ‘intuitive’ foundationalist 
answer I embrace.
In sum, this thesis contains an argument that the Bayesian and the realist 
should be friends. They should be friends because they both possess adequate 
conceptual means to tackle effectively the question of realism; because bringing
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Bayesianism to bear on the realist’s worries clarifies the logical structure of the 
realist argument and its potential rejoinders; because Bayesianism helps settling a 
long-standing debate within the realist camp as to the proper form of the No- 
Miracles argument; because the inability of a Bayesian reconstruction to settle the 
debate definitively reveals the distinctively philosophical nature of the problem of 
realism; and, finally, because the attention drawn towards the fundamental 
epistemological assumptions employed in the debate further clarifies not only the 
epistemological character of the realist case but also the nature of the most 
controversial variant of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, i.e. Subjective 
Bayesianism.
To my mind, all the above are compelling reasons why one should want the 
realism debate to be (also) cast in Bayesian terms. This conclusion, however, is not 
to be interpreted as yet another attempt to reduce philosophical discourse to a mere 
exercise in formal reasoning. All the central arguments contained in this essay are 
philosophical rather than technical. For better or for worse, Bayesianism (as well as 
any other formal tool of analysis) is intended only to facilitate, not substitute for 
philosophical thinking.
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Chapter 1
Bayesian Confirmation Theory
In spite of the widespread usage of the term ‘Bayesianism’ in contemporary 
philosophy of science, it is best thought of as a cover-term. There are elements that 
all Bayesians more or less agree on but the term ‘Bayesianism’ conceals several 
different interpretations of the probability calculus. In this chapter I shall first 
highlight the main points of agreement between Bayesians of all persuasions and 
then analyze the essentials of the diverging interpretations.
1.1 Elements of Bayesianism
1.1.1 Probabilities as Degrees of Belief
The first major common thesis that all Bayesians share is an interpretation of 
the probability calculus as representing degrees o f belief rather than objective 
features of the world. The point of view we are concerned with here is ontological 
in nature and reflects an attitude towards the nature of the calculus. Interpretations 
that take probabilities to be degrees of belief can be classified under the label of
19
epistemic interpretations, in contradistinction to physical ones that take 
probabilities to be features of the physical world. Hence, Bayesians accept as 
legitimate an epistemic account of probabilities. They need not, however, be 
committed to the stronger view that an epistemic account is the only legitimate 
account of the calculus. Pluralist approaches to probabilities have been adopted 
from as early as Poincare’s Science and Hypothesis (1902, ch. XI) and Ramsey’s 
classic (1926) paper “Truth and Probability” and, as we shall see shortly, are still 
quite popular1. Hence, if one is a Bayesian, one adopts at least an epistemic 
interpretation of the probability calculus.
1.1.2 Justification via Betting Behaviour
A second thesis that most Bayesians adopt involves reference to betting 
behaviour in order to justify the connection between probabilities and degrees of 
belief. The paradigm of such justification takes the form of the celebrated Dutch- 
book argument, originally presented by Ramsey (1926) and De Finetti (1937). This 
argument shows that if one’s degrees of belief fail to comply with the formal 
axioms of the probability calculus, then one must be susceptible to accepting a bet 
which guarantees a loss whatever happens (Dutch-book); and, conversely, that if 
one is susceptible to a Dutch-book, then one’s degrees of belief fail to comply with 
the axioms of the probability calculus. Failure of your degrees of belief to 
instantiate the axioms of the calculus is equivalent to employing degrees of belief 
that are incoherent, in the sense that there is a system of bets which you regard as
1 Over the years pluralist approaches to probability have been adopted by inter alia Carnap (1950), 
Howson and Urbach (1993) and Gillies (2000).
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‘fair’ but on which you are bound to lose come what may (that is, whatever way the 
world turns out to be).
Despite its apparent simplicity, however, a lot of ink has been spilled over the 
exact character of the Dutch-book argument and the kind of justification it offers 
for equating degrees of belief with probabilities. This has resulted in much 
confusion.
Reference to betting behaviour in justifying the connection between degrees 
of belief and probabilities goes back to Ramsey’s intuition that “the old-established 
way of measuring a person’s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest 
odds which he will accept” (Ramsey 1926,172). The betting situation is set up as 
follows: person^ is the bookmaker and person B  the agent, whose degrees of belief 
on the truth-value of a proposition E we want to elicit. B agrees to state a number q, 
called his betting quotient on E, and only after this is done the bookmaker chooses 
the stake S, which can be either positive or negative. The agent is to pay the 
bookmaker qS in exchange for S, if E comes out true and nothing if it comes out 
false. Hence, in case E  comes out true the agent receives S-qS = S(1 -q) and he loses 
qS in case E  turns out to be false. It is assumed that, under the above conditions, q 
represents B’s degree of belief in the truth of E. It can be proved that B’s degrees of 
belief are coherent in the sense of avoiding a Dutch-book if and only if they satisfy 
the formal axioms of probability. This is the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem.
The Ramsey-De Finetti theorem applies in a straightforward way relative to 
the following axioms of the probability calculus:
1. 0 < Pr(E) < 1, and ?r(T) = 1, where T is a necessary truth.
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2. If two propositions E  ^ ond E 2 src inconsistent, Pr(.F j v E 2) Pr(£ 1) + 
Pr(E2). Finite additivity then follows, since for any finite number n of
n
mutually inconsistent propositions F , .. .F „ , Pr(F, v - v £ „ )  = X Pr(£ /)-
/=]
3. For any two propositions E and F, assuming P r (F ^ 0 , Pr(F/F) = 
Pr(F a  F)fPr(F).
Consider, for example, the simple case of axiom 1. Assume that one fails to assign 
probability 1 to a tautology, setting instead q = Pr(7) < 1. All the bookie has to do 
then is set a negative stake. Then, the agent is guaranteed to lose |F| (/-#), since a
tautology is always true. The rest of the axioms are justified in a similar manner2.
Disagreement has been quite widespread regarding countable additivity, 
however, in which the domain of the propositions is (countably) infinite. More 
formally, the following principle had for long been deemed either illegitimate or at 
least problematic for Bayesians:
2’. For a countably infinite number of inconsistent propositions F , .. .En ...,
Pr ( £ , v . . . v £ „ v . . . ) = ! > ( £ , ) .
;=1
The reason is that countable additivity does not allow for a uniform distribution 
over the countable set of propositions. To see this, consider the hypothetical case 
that we do assign a uniform distribution over the uncountable domain. Then, by 
axiom (1), Pr(F,) > 0. If it is greater than zero, then the sum will be infinite, 
violating the other half of axiom (1), which demands that a probability assignment
2 See Gillies (2000,59-64) for a complete demonstration o f the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem relative 
to all axioms.
22
cannot be greater then one. If it is zero, then ]T Pr(£,) = 0, violating axiom (1) in
/ = i
that a necessary truth has probability 1. It is assumed here that our domain is 
denumerably infinite, so that denumerably infinitely many inconsistent propositions
oo
exhaust this domain and, hence, ^  Pr(Et) = 1.
/= i
De Finetti, very much in the spirit of his subjectivism, famously rejected 
countable additivity on the grounds that there is no good a priori reason why one 
should not bet according to a uniform distribution. On the other hand such a 
decision has many undesirable consequences for the actual practice of mathematics, 
since countable additivity has for long been a very useful probabilistic assumption. 
Hence, until recently, many authors had either used it or even stipulated it as a 
strengthening of axiom (2) on the basis of its instrumental value despite the absence 
of a foundational justification . Recently, however, Williamson (1999) has given a 
Dutch-book argument for countable additivity to the effect that whoever violates 
the principle is irrational precisely in the sense that a bet ensuring loss can be 
arranged against him. Williamson’s argument invokes just one additional constraint 
- that only a finite amount of money can change hands after the outcome of the bet 
is determined. Hence, betting according to a uniform distribution is in fact excluded 
by the same considerations of coherence that necessitate adherence to the other 
axioms of probability.
These important results have been taken to provide a complete justification 
for equating rational degrees of belief with probabilities. Furthermore, the appeal to 
coherence led Ramsey (and his followers) to assert that “the theory of probability is 
in fact a generalization of formal [i.e. deductive] logic” (Ramsey 1926, 82).
3 See Williamson (1999) and references therein.
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According to this view, what probability theory tells us is what degrees of belief we 
should employ about certain propositions given our simultaneous degrees of belief 
on other propositions. Such remarks, though, sound at least over-ambitious if one of 
the most common objections to Dutch-book justifications is correct - namely that 
such arguments offer only a pragmatic justification of the calculus (cf. Kennedy 
and Chihara 1979; Joyce 1998, 584-586).
The motivation for this complaint is simply the very down-to-earth betting 
set-up as well as the explicit invocation of utilities or monetary units in the 
statement of the Dutch-book argument. These have been taken to suggest that the 
success of the argument offers only pragmatic support to the conclusion without 
any apparent relevance for epistemology. James Joyce has stated this complaint as 
follows:
“A more significant problem has to do with the pragmatic character of the 
Dutch-book argument. There is a distinction to be drawn between prudential 
reasons for believing, which have to do with the ways in which holding 
certain opinions can affect one’s happiness, and epistemic reasons for 
believing, which concern the accuracy of the opinions as representations of 
the world’s state. Since the Dutch-book argument provides only a prudential 
rationale for conforming one’s partial beliefs to the laws of probability, it is 
an open question whether it holds any interest for epistemology” (1998,584- 
585/.
The main problem the Dutch-book argument faces, it is claimed, is that it focuses 
too much on the prudential reasons for conforming one’s degrees of belief to the 
laws of probability. Those reasons, however, relate to one’s happiness rather than to
4 Emphasis in the original.
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any epistemically significant concept, and this why their relevance or usefulness to 
epistemology is questioned. What is worse, the descriptive inaccuracy of the 
Dutch-book assumptions might also lead one to doubt that even the pragmatic 
reading of the argument is of any value at all. It surely is a truism that factual 
evidence about the behaviour of individuals reveals that the Dutch-book 
assumptions are high-order idealizations rather than direct realistic descriptions. 
But then, one might argue, the Dutch-book argument offers not only a pragmatic 
justification of the axioms but also a poor one for that matter, since its results can 
not be regarded as representative even of what is involved in actual cases of 
prudence.
This line of reasoning has given rise to many alternative justification 
procedures, which are purported to avoid the perceived shortcomings of the Dutch- 
book argument. Some of them define (appropriately measured) ‘epistemically 
significant concepts’, such as accuracy (cf. Rosenkrantz 1981; Joyce 1998), as the 
goal of rational agents in their inquiries; and argue that a violation of the axioms of 
probability undermines that goal in the sense that a system of beliefs, which 
satisfies the axioms, is invariably more accurate. Others stipulate plausible 
desiderata and then show that any real-valued function, which satisfies them, can 
be transformed into a probability function (cf. Cox 1961, Good 1950 and Lucas 
1970). Still others justify the axioms on the grounds that violating them precludes 
the possibility of one’s degrees of beliefs being accurate estimates of frequencies, 
since frequencies themselves do obey the axioms of probability (cf. van Fraassen 
1983). Nonetheless, most Bayesians do subscribe to the Dutch-book argument and, 
I think, with good reason.
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This is that the charge against the Dutch-book argument that it offers merely a 
pragmatic justification of the axioms is unfair. Joyce, to be sure, has drawn our 
attention to a very important distinction, namely that between offering pragmatic 
versus offering epistemic reasons for belief. It may be the case that acting on the 
basis of certain beliefs can be shown to serve the satisfaction of our behavioral, 
psychological or financial aims in particular situations. If so, then we certainly have 
pragmatic reasons to co-ordinate our actions with these beliefs whenever we pursue 
such aims in those situations. This possibility, however, need not be relevant also to 
epistemic justification. This is because achieving our behavioral aims may very 
well depend on factors other than the strictly epistemic merits of our beliefs. It 
appears, then, that epistemic justification can be obtained only through arguments 
pertaining to show that our beliefs allow us to satisfy our strictly epistemic aims 
(e.g. truth, consistency etc.), irrespective of their usefulness as a guide for action in 
particular practical situations. Joyce correctly points out in this vein that “there does 
seem to be a clear difference between appraising a system of beliefs in terms of the 
behavior it generates or in terms of its agreement with the facts” (1998, 585). But, 
surely, if there is such a difference, then it is not enough merely to cite practical 
advantages or disadvantages (financial or other) in order to reach normative 
epistemic conclusions (cf. Christensen 1996, 451-452). What is required is an 
argument focusing on the exclusively epistemic merits of our beliefs.
Affirming Joyce’s distinction, however, does not imply that the Dutch-book 
argument offers only a pragmatic justification for the axioms of probability. In fact, 
as Howson notes, “to see [the] axioms as mere assurances of financial safety is to 
miss their real significance” (2000, 126). Equivalently, to see the Dutch-book 
argument as a pragmatic consideration aiming at prudent housekeeping is also
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misguided. The Dutch-book argument is not a pragmatic consideration referring to 
real life. Rather it is an idealization, an abstract model, which, though inspired by 
real-life situations such as betting, serves a purely epistemic aim. This is to 
demonstrate how violating the probability axioms results in one’s degrees of belief 
being inconsistent in precisely Ramsey’s sense: they violate genuine laws of logic, 
the logic of partial belief.
Christensen (1991, 238-239) sums up the line of reasoning underlying this 
position as follows:
1. Consistency in one’s degrees of belief is a cognitive desideratum.
2. Consistency in a person’s degrees of belief implies that no Dutch-books can 
be made against that person.
3. However, Dutch-book arguments show that violating the axioms of 
probability gives rise to such books.
4. Hence, the axioms of probability are criteria of consistency.
Premise (1) is eminently plausible for anyone who takes deductive logic seriously, 
regardless of whether one purports to understand the probability axioms in a like 
manner, i.e. as constraints of a logical nature, or not. Premise (2) should also be 
uncontroversial. Given a few innocuous assumptions about self-interested 
behaviour, it is quite sensible to assume that no one who respects the minimal 
constraints of logic would enter voluntarily an arrangement entailing a loss come 
what may.
Very much like deductive inconsistency, it is overwhelmingly probable, 
although not guaranteed in actual life due to the imperfection of human logical 
faculties, that probabilistic inconsistency will also have practical consequences. 
This is not the central issue though. The central issue has to do with whether a
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normative claim can be established regarding the constraints which the axioms of 
probability impose. The Dutch-book argument, disentangled from considerations 
referring to every-day betting scenarios, does succeed in revealing the normative 
force of these constraints.
Talking in this way, however, also shows that, despite having normative 
force, Dutch-book arguments are not fundamental in the attempt to characterize 
precisely the nature of the constraints imposed by the axioms of probability. In 
Christensen’s words, “potential vulnerability to [the] particular kind of monetary 
loss [Dutch-book arguments revolve around] serves [only] as a vivid symptom of a 
real problem” (1991, 23 8)5. The task of providing a more precise and rigorous 
account of what the ‘real problem’ of inconsistency consists in has been recently 
taken up by Howson (2000). Using deductive logic as his model, Howson lays out 
3 individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for a discipline to 
qualify as ‘logic’. These are: (a) that the discipline involves statements and 
relations between them, (b) that it legitimizes some form of non-domain-specific- 
reasoning, and (c) that it is about consistency, in the sense of having a soundness 
and completeness theorem (2000, 127).
In the case of deductive logic, a soundness theorem states that every sentence 
that can be derived using the rules of proof is a deductive consequence of the 
axioms (so that in particular where these are the axioms of pure logic, every 
derivable sentence is a logical truth), while a completeness theorem states the 
converse (that is, that every deductive consequence of the axioms is derivable using 
the system’s rules of proof). Since we are now interested in probabilistic, rather 
than deductive, consistency, a soundness theorem will state that any consistent
5 Emphasis in the original.
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assignment of fair betting quotients will satisfy the axioms of probability, while a 
completeness theorem, like before, the converse.
Howson goes on to show that probability theory satisfies all three conditions 
and, hence, does qualify as logic, the logic of partial belief (ibid. 127-132). In 
effect, the constraints of the axioms of probability (including countable additivity) 
can plausibly be seen as logical constraints directly analogous to those of deductive 
logic, exactly as Ramsey envisaged in the beginning of the 20th century6.
One can sum up the results of the discussion so far as follows: the Dutch-book 
argument, despite appearances, does have normative force in that it reveals 
inconsistencies between our various degrees of belief, if these are not probabilities. 
The nature of these inconsistencies can be more precisely characterised using the 
resources of formal logic. This, however, need have no implications regarding the 
kind of justification Dutch-book arguments offer. It follows, then, that worries 
arising from its alleged pragmatic dimension vanish, since there is no really 
pragmatic dimension, or any such element involved, in this particular use of the 
Dutch-book argument. At the same time, the above picture helps us explain why it 
is no surprise that alternative justifications successfully demonstrate the superiority 
of a system of beliefs respecting the axioms compared to ones that don’t. One can 
hardly expect an inconsistent system in the logical sense to do better than a 
consistent one relative to whatever systematic epistemic standards7. Hence, while
6 De Finetti seems to have a similar interpretation to Ramsey’s in mind. His expositions, however, 
are less clear because o f his ultra-empiricism and operationalist spirit. For these aspects in De 
Finetti’s work, see Galavotti (1989).
7 Non Dutch-book justifications yield results which hold invariably for all situations and, hence, are 
not vulnerable to the objection that an inconsistent agent might do very well in a one-off situation, 
since a consistent one would do even better. To be sure, these justifications are not without
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Earman’s conclusion that “collectively [all the above methods of justification] 
provide powerful persuasion for conforming degrees of belief to the probability 
calculus” (1992, 46) seems reasonable, one may arguably claim that the betting 
scenario suffices on its own to correlate degrees of belief with probabilities, 
especially in the face of its overwhelming simplicity when compared to other 
methods of justification.
1.1.3 The Principle of Conditionalisation
A third thesis most Bayesians share refers to the way beliefs are updated in 
the face of evidence. The model used to describe the process is called Bayesian 
Conditionalisation, which takes two forms, a strict form and a more sophisticated 
one due to Richard Jeffrey. Strict Conditionalisation (SC) dictates that if one’s 
probability in evidence E is 1 and if E  is the strongest such proposition, then the 
new probability we assign to some one hypothesis H  after we have learned 
evidence E equals the old probability of //conditional on the evidence in question. 
Formally: Pr„„ (H) = PrM (H/E).
O
SC assumes that the evidence is known with certainty presently . It could be 
the case, however, that even in present time we are only partially confident 
regarding evidence E, perhaps because some experiment or observation has merely 
altered the degree of our partial belief in E  rather than made it certain. Despite the 
lack of certainty about E , changes in its probability are expected to have some
problems. Most o f them, though, revolve around the plausibility o f their underlying assumptions 
rather than the universality o f their results (cf. Earman 1992, 44-46).
8 If Pr old(E) = 1, then no belief-change would occur at all, since in that case Pr new(H) = 
Prold (H/E) = ? r old (H).
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effect on the probabilities of some of our hypotheses. Under those circumstances, 
belief-change accords with Jeffrey Conditionalisation (JC), originally proposed by
Jeffrey (1965): Pr„„(//) = £  Pr»« (H /E , ) x Pr„™ (£ ,) > for all members of a
/
partition E E n . Prwew(^ ,)  reflects our present (new) uncertainty over the 
evidence, which is different from ProW (E i ) and arises through an exogenous, i.e.
non-conditionalisation, change of belief stemming from, in fact, observation or 
experiment (at least in standard cases). Clearly, SC is only a special case of JC for 
?vnew (E ,) = 1, for some one i.
Despite this, virtually all recent applications of Bayesianism in philosophy of 
science make use just of SC on the basis of simplicity of presentation. 
Mathematically, ?rold (H/E) is standardly computed using Bayes’ Theorem, which 
in its simplest form says that:
p P r W x P f f ^ )
Pr(E)
where Pr (H/E?) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis, Pr (H) the prior 
probability of the hypothesis, Pr(E/H) the likelihood of the evidence and Pr(E) the 
prior probability (or expectedness) of the evidence.
In the literature there have been several attempts to offer Dutch-book 
arguments for both SC and JC and, hence, render them an indispensable part of the 
Bayesian apparatus, on an equal footing with the standard probability axioms. The 
underlying idea is to show that if  one violates the principle of conditionalisation in 
either of its forms, a set of sequential bets can be arranged, which, although fair for 
our agent when taken at any given time-instant, collectively entail an inevitable loss 
over time. Some such result or other is often taken to establish the thesis that SC
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and JC enjoy the same status as the formal axioms of probability9. In what follows I 
discuss only the case of SC.
The betting set-up for a diachronic Dutch-book argument for SC is precisely 
the same as with the synchronic case, with the agent stating his fair betting 
quotients (presumably as and when these arise at various temporal stages) and then 
the bookmaker arranging the stakes10. Take the simplest case, i.e. a two-stage 
betting situation. Suppose that one’s new degree of belief in a hypothesis H  is 
Prnew(H) = 0.5, while by conditionalisation on his old beliefs he would have
reached the conclusion that it was Pr old (H/E) = 0.7. Suppose, also, that he gives the
evidence E  Pr old (E) = 0.6. The following betting strategy is open to the bookmaker:
(a) he offers now (i.e. at ‘old’ time) a conditional bet on //given E, whereupon the 
bet pays, say, £10 if both E  and H  are true at the price of £7, and the bet is off in 
case E  is false, b) he also offers a bet on E  alone, paying £2 at the price of £1.20. 
Both these bets, taken individually, are fair for the agent, who accepts them.
If E  is false, then the bookmaker wins a net £1.20 pounds from bet (b), since 
bet (a) is off. In case E  turns out to be true, the bookmaker offers to buy a third bet 
from the agent, this time based on his new degree of belief on H\ (c) the bookmaker 
offers to buy a bet paying £10 in case H  is true at the price of £5. Once again, this 
bet is fair taken by itself. Since it applies only i f  E  turns out to be true, the net gain
9 Van Fraassen, being a liberal Bayesian, would deny this implication for he holds that Bayesian 
Conditionalisation imposes itself as a rationality requirement only if  we decide to update belief 
following a rule. The latter condition, though, is not necessarily true. See van Fraassen (1989) p. 169 
and Douven (1999) p. S425.
10 The discussion o f the diachronic Dutch book argument here is a more concrete version o f the one 
found in Howson and Urbach (1993,100-105). The original exposition can be found in Teller (1973, 
1976).
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for the bookmaker in this case will be: 1) in case H is  true, (£7 - £10) + (£1.20 -  £2) 
+ (£10 - £5) = -£3 - £0.8 + £5 = £1.20.
2) in case H  is false, £7 + (£1.20 -  £2) - £5 = £1.20.
Hence, in any case, regardless of the truth values of E  and //th e  bettor is assured of 
losing a fixed amount of money or, in other words, a Dutch-book11.
What does this mean for conditionalisation though? The proponents of 
conditionalisation have taken this argument to show that the principle of 
conditionalisation is a requirement of rationality. This, however, is not at all 
obvious. One worry relates to the fact that here we are talking about a combination 
of bets, not just a single one. For the argument to go through one needs the extra 
assumption that “the value of the sequence [of bets] to him [i.e. the agent] is the 
sum of the separate values he sets” (Schick 1986,117), sometimes referred to as the
17‘package principle’, which, it is argued, need not be true . This objection need not 
be that troubling, however. All we have to do is recall our interpretation of the 
betting scenarios as merely abstract models, which help us determine the conditions 
that give rise to incoherent states of belief, and thus help us end up with 
conclusions bearing normative status. To the extent that this is our understanding of 
the betting situation, monetary value-related worries immediately disappear as 
missing the point of the argument.
11 A similar argument has also been presented in favour o f JC. See Skyrms (1987) and Howson and 
Urbach (1993, 109-110).
12 In fact this objection is also intended against the justification o f the synchronic axiom o f  
additivity, stating that Pr (A v  B) — Pr (A) +  Pr (5 ), if  (= —i(A a  B ) , since it also rests on a 
‘package’ o f bets, albeit simultaneous and not diachronic (Schick 1986, 112-116).
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A more fundamental problem for the diachronic Dutch-book argument is 
whether it is of the appropriate kind to deliver its conclusion. For the argument to 
show inconsistency in the logical sense, it has to be assumed that it is a Dutch-book 
argument of the same kind as the one pertaining to the synchronic axioms of 
probability. Appearances to the contrary, not only is this assumption not self- 
evident but it is clearly false. To see this, we have to look closer at the general 
structure of the argument.
The dynamic Dutch-book argument shows that there is an inconsistency 
between a) an initial probability assignment Pr(//), b) the principle of 
conditionalisation as a means for updating belief, and c) a new assignment not in 
accordance with this principle. The proponents of conditionalisation elect to put the 
blame either on (a) or (c). Hence, they argue, either we have been incoherent by 
violating conditionalisation and reaching (c) on the supposition that our initial 
assignment (a) is unproblematic; or, in case, we know that (c) will be our new 
degree of belief at some future time, we have been incoherent due to our initial 
assignment (a). The second case is summarised in van Fraassen’s (1984) Principle 
of Reflection:
Pr, (HfPi l+] (H) = r) = r.
In either case, conditionalisation remains sacrosanct.
There are convincing counter-examples, though, to this line of argument, the 
most entertaining of which is due to Christensen (1991). Suppose someone 
swallows a pill of LSQ, a psychedelic drug which makes you believe strongly 
within one hour of taking it that you can fly (F). Conditionalising on the 
information that you will be so disposed to believe, yields Pr,+](F) = Pr,(F /
Pr,+] (F) = 0.99) = 0. At the same time, Pr,+] (FfPrt+] (F) = 0.99) = 0.99 as a matter
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of tautology. Hence, the clash between (b) and (c) cannot be resolved by blaming 
the assignment in (c). What about (a), i.e. that Pr(F) = 0? It seems obvious to me 
that Christensen is perfectly right when concluding that, if this person is asked 
about his degree of belief now that he can fly, “the answer mandated by Reflection 
(.99, of course!) is ridiculous” (ibid. 234). This is a clear case, however, in which 
both ways that the conditionaliser uses to resolve conflict fail, which in turn means 
that doubt must be cast on the principle of conditionalisation itself as a principle of 
rationality.
In order to doubt this, though, one must find a way to come around the 
. obstacle presented by the fact that what “justifies” conditionalisation is a Dutch- 
book argument. To avoid inconsistency, then, one has to show that this Dutch-book 
argument is not of the same kind as the ones used to justify the synchronic axioms. 
This is precisely the answer sketched by Christensen (1991) and elaborated in more 
detail by Howson and Urbach (1993) and Howson (2000). It revolves around the 
idea that probability theory is a kind of logic dealing with the consistency of 
beliefs. Taking into account that consistency, as in deductive logic, is first and 
foremost a ‘synchronic' notion, Howson and Urbach (1993, 102-103) argue that, 
although the series of bets in the diachronic version of the argument does result in 
inevitable loss, this does not suffice to demonstrate inconsistency, for it violates the 
strictly synchronic character of the latter. In the same sense that I can consistently 
believe p  today and not-p tomorrow, I can also violate today’s assignment via 
conditionalisation tomorrow without being inconsistent.
To my mind this is clearly the correct answer to the problem of 
conditionalisation: the rule cannot be considered a universally true one without 
qualifications. Furthermore, it gives new insight to the Dutch-book argument for
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the standard case: for it to have any normative bearing regarding the restrictions on 
one’s degrees of belief, it has to be synchronic, i.e. all the bets must be bought at 
one and the same time. Mere assurance of net loss is not enough. In order to 
differentiate between these cases, arguments like the diachronic Dutch-book are 
usually called ‘Dutch-strategies’ (a term due to van Fraassen (1984)) rather than 
Dutch-books proper.
The above arguments do not intend, of course, to establish that Bayesian 
conditionalisation, in any of its two forms, is generally invalid; they clearly suggest, 
however, that it is valid only conditionally. The condition under which 
conditionalisation is valid, then, is that upon learning evidence E  and Vxnew(E) = 1, 
one’s conditional probabilities relative to E  remain unchanged. In other words, if, 
upon learning E  with certainty, P rnew(H/E) = P roW (H/E), then conditionalisation
becomes a valid rule of inference. This is because if Pr new (E) = 1, then Pr new (H/E)
= Pr new(H). Hence, if Pr new(H/E) = ?xold (H/E), conditionalisation also holds, i.e.
Pr new (H) = Pr old (H/E). Surely though, as Howson and Urbach (1993,103) remark,
imposing this restriction makes the diachronic Dutch-strategy entirely unnecessary, 
since conditionalisation is now by definition the correct updating rule. 
Consequently, there seems to be no place for the diachronic Dutch-strategy in the 
realm of Dutch-books proper13.
Where does all this leave the discussion regarding conditionalisation? 
Despite their abstract and near-Cartesian14 character, one consequence of these
13 Mutatis mutandis the same conclusion can be drawn for JC (cf. Howson and Urbach 1993, 109- 
110).
141 say Hear-Cartesian because it seems obvious that the drug counter-example is not as remote from 
common sense a circumstance as the original Cartesian demon-hypothesis is.
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arguments is that conditionalisation is not a ‘logical’ principle in the way that the 
rest of the axioms of probability arguably are, since there exist cases, as we saw, 
where violating it is the reasonable thing to do. That these counter-examples make 
use of unlikely situations does not, I think, impair their force, since they are 
employed only for the purpose of demonstrating the failure of Dutch-strategies to 
count as Dutch-books proper, rather than showing that such counter-examples are 
the norm in actual life.
Clearly, the same holds for the condition that one holds his conditional 
probabilities relative to the evidence unchanged. If that condition were analytic, 
then so would conditionalisation be. Howson and Urbach remarked at one point 
that “this is a condition [they] can imagine satisfied by [the] ideal scientific 
reasoner” (1993, 113) Bayesianism refers to. I don’t think, however, that this is 
tantamount to admitting that conditionalisation has got any kind of special status 
similar to the one of the probability axioms. It sounds more like the pragmatic point 
that this way of modelling confirmation happens, as a matter of fact and not logic, 
to convey our intuitions about how belief changes over time upon learning new 
evidence. This means, though, that there is a residual tension between Howson and 
Urbach’s allusion to an ‘ideal reasoner’ and their overall interpretation of the 
probability calculus. As we have already mentioned (and shall see in more detail 
shortly), Howson and Urbach adopt a logical variety of Subjective Bayesianism, 
according to which the only justifiable constraints probability theory imposes are of 
a logical nature. Now, if alluding to an ‘ideal agent’ fails to establish a logical fact, 
how can Howson and Urbach still maintain conditionalisation as a fundamental 
principle of Bayesian reasoning?
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To the best of my knowledge, the proper answer to this problem has been 
provided only recently by Colin Howson (unpublished), in a way which greatly 
clarifies (and corrects) the account encountered in Howson and Urbach (1993). 
Howson now abandons all reference to an ‘ideal reasoner’, opting instead to drop 
the principle of conditionalisation altogether: Bayesian Confirmation Theory does 
not need conditionalisation because confirmation has nothing to do with temporal 
updating of belief.
Recall the statement of conditionalisation: ?rnew (H) = ProW (H/E). In words,
my ‘new’ probability, say in time t + 7, after I have learned the evidence E with 
certainty equals my ‘old’ conditional probability, say at time t, before E  was known 
with certainty. Howson’s proposal denies that confirmation has anything to do with 
time. It should not enter our considerations, in other words, whether in actual life I 
can only visualise having new degrees of belief at a later time relative to my prior 
beliefs. On the contrary, confirmation has to do with the objective relations 
between theory and evidence, regardless o f  when the evidence becomes known and 
the exact time that we hold the relevant beliefs. Put differently, confirmation only 
deals with how the evidence forces us to change our prior beliefs, were we to take it 
into account. So, ‘prior probability’ is synonymous with ‘probability irrespective of 
the evidence at time f  and ‘posterior probability’ with ‘probability in the light of 
the evidence at time t also’. On this account, though, the usual synchronic 
conditional probability relations will do for the purposes of confirmation theory and 
no need for conditionalisation emerges. In Howson’s own words, “where 
conditionalisation is valid, its validity is guaranteed by the axioms o f probability 
themselves” (unpublished, 17)15.
15 Emphasis in the original.
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Howson’s decision to abandon the principle of conditionalisation, then, 
essentially makes explicit all the consequences of the position adopted in Howson 
and Urbach (1993). The principle of conditionalisation is not a logical principle. 
Consequently, it is of no avail to anyone who admits only of logical constraints on 
probabilistic assignments. Of course, if one is more lax with respect to the nature of 
the constraints deemed permissible, one might still accept the principle of 
conditionalisation on other than logical grounds. For present purposes, however, it 
is crucial to keep in mind the raw-logical character of conditionalisation. As we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, the mistaken view that conditionalisation is a 
logical principle has been a central tenet in recent Bayesian reconstructions of the 
debate regarding scientific realism.
1.1.4 A Quantitative Account of Confirmation
Finally, all Bayesians agree that confirmation should be construed as 
quantitative rather than qualitative in character and that the relation of theories to 
the evidence ought to be represented by means of the probability calculus. There 
has been ample disagreement in the literature, however, regarding the exact form 
this representation should take. So-called strict Bayesians (cf. Maher 1986, Howson 
and Urbach 1993) assert that point-valued degrees of belief are a legitimate way to 
represent one’s state of knowledge, while weak Bayesians (cf. Good 1962, Levi 
1974, Walley 1991) hold that interval-valued degrees of belief are to be preferred 
on both descriptive and normative grounds.
In the present context I shall assume, although not discuss extensively, that 
point-valued degrees of belief are unproblematic, or at any rate, not more 
problematic than their interval-valued counterparts, and, hence, that strict
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Bayesianism goes untroubled. This is not merely an arbitrary assumption. Both 
Maher (1986,452) and Howson and Urbach (1993, 88) rightly remark that if strict 
Bayesianism fails, then the intervals of the weak Bayesians lack determinate 
bounds, transforming weak Bayesianism into an equally unrealistic theory. Surely, 
rational agents assume that there are determinate bounds in their interval-valued 
degrees of belief as much as they fail to single out precisely one particular 
probability function.
On the normative side, Maher (1986,453-455) offers convincing reasons why 
weak Bayesianism cannot be taken as normatively superior to the strict variant. 
Briefly put, his argument takes the form of a dilemma: either interval-valued 
degrees of belief hamper the whole of Bayesian decision-theory by failing to 
account for the notion of expected utility, or, by modifying weak Bayesianism in an 
attempt to rectify this problem, one falls back at best to strict Bayesianism and at 
worst to principles of dubious standing, like the maximin principle. It follows, then, 
that one does not incur any significant loss by modelling scientific confirmation in 
terms of point-valued, instead of interval-valued, degrees of belief.
This is not to say, of course, that, after all, people actually entertain point­
valued degrees of belief in real-life situations. Still, idealising to this effect has 
proved an immensely useful practice, due to the accuracy and clarity of the results 
produced. Arguing in favour of this practice, Howson and Urbach draw a parallel 
with the case of physical magnitudes, “where people are quite happy to invoke real- 
number values, even though, strictly speaking, lengths, volumes, masses, densities, 
and the like do not take exact values” (1993, 88). This habit is vindicated by the 
fact that “as an idealisation which gives sufficiently accurate results within the 
ranges of imprecision within which we work, it is indispensable” (ibid. 89). The
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same happens with Bayesian confirmation theory: as a rational reconstruction of 
people’s attitudes towards theories, its contribution in terms of rigour, clarity and 
precision outweighs the costs deriving from its descriptive inaccuracy.
Of the various measures of confirmation that have been proposed so far, the 
most popular one takes the degree of confirmation c of a hypothesis H  by evidence 
E  to be given by the difference between the posterior and the prior probability of //, 
i.e.
c = ?r(H/E)-?r(H). (2)
Comparisons of this quantitative account of confirmation with competing 
proposals, like Hempel’s instance confirmation and the hypothetico-deductive 
method as well as critical evaluations of its success in resolving traditional 
problems in the philosophy of science can be found in Earman (1992, chs. 3 and 4) 
and Howson and Urbach (1993, ch. 7).
1.2 Interpretations of Epistemic Probability
Perhaps the most significant way in which Bayesians diverge is over the 
answer they offer to the epistemological question what constraints, if any, should 
be applied to prior probabilities. The attempts to discover sound constraints for 
these prior values represent a spectrum of positions, varying from pure personalism 
to the logical interpretation, and correspond to different ideas regarding the amount 
of objectivity that can be achieved within the context of an analysis of partial belief. 
In what follows I provide a summary of these views.
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1.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism
At one end of the spectrum lie Subjective Bayesians (or pure personalists), 
like De Finetti and Jeffrey, who claim that any prior probability assignment is 
admissible as rational as long as it satisfies the constraints imposed by the 
synchronic Dutch Book argument, namely the axioms of probability16. Given the 
minimal and relatively uncontroversial character of these constraints, this version of
1 7Bayesianism is taken by most people to be the only clear and unequivocal one . In 
fact, its greatest virtue is precisely that it seems not to move beyond those 
constraints, which reflect requirements of logical consistency, and whose 
justification is as unequivocal as possible.
Consequently, the view that probability is ‘a new kind of logic’, adumbrated 
by Ramsey (1926), sketched by Howson and Urbach (1993) and finally 
systematically outlined by Howson (2000), is not only a rigorous explication of the 
fundamental logical properties of the probability axioms, but also explains why the 
pure subjectivist strand of Bayesianism has proved so appealing. The explanation, 
in straight parallel with deductive logic, consists in the fact that since this new logic 
deals with consistency questions only, it cannot possibly be concerned with 
substantive, and hence extra-logical, questions, like which specific value our prior 
probabilities ought to take. This will inevitably be “a probability assignment that is
1 ftnot deducible from the probability axioms” (Howson 2000, 134) .
16 Obviously those convinced by the diachronic Dutch-book arguments would add Bayesian 
Conditionalisation as a requirement o f rationality (with the exception o f van Fraassen, as we noted 
in footnote 9). The synchronic constraints though are universally accepted while, as we saw, the 
principle o f conditionalisation is, to the say the least, dubious.
17 Worrall (2000, 131-132) characterises it as the ‘pure’ version o f Bayesianism.
18 Emphasis in the original.
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It is interesting to note at this point that, although Howson’s analysis provides 
the most rigorous framework for the defence of the subjective variant of 
Bayesianism, Howson himself is a subjectivist only for those domains where there 
is no frequency information available. In case we can obtain estimates of 
frequencies, Howson does impose constraints on our degrees of belief, as we shall 
see shortly in more detail.
There is, however, an obvious problem with this interpretation of the calculus, 
namely that it (seemingly) bars any attempt to build an objective account of 
ampliative, non-deductive inference. If any prior assignment is admissible as 
rational, then there seems little hope for a definitive solution of many important 
problems in the methodology of science, despite the presence of strong intuitive 
presumptions that only one answer is ‘rational’. Put differently, Bayesian 
personalism seems to be equating rational constraints with logical constraints; all 
the rest are relegated to the domain of plausibility considerations, justified at best 
only on pragmatic grounds with no real epistemological significance. Intuitively, 
though, the probability of the sun rising tomorrow just cannot be (in an intuitive, 
but still very strong, sense of ‘cannot’) less than something like 0.9999999999.
The usual subjectivist answer to this problem revolves around the celebrated 
idea of the ‘washing-out of priors’. This is another cover-term referring to a class of 
mathematical results, which establish that under certain conditions the posterior 
probabilities of different agents on a proposition given the evidence will converge 
in the limit, no matter what their prior assignments are. In their simplest form, such 
theorems assume that agents are equally ‘dogmatic’ in that they assign zero
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probability to the same elements of the probability space (cf. Earman 1992,142)19. 
In this way, it is argued, the problem of subjectivity of the priors is not as troubling 
as it might look prima facie since, in the long run, differing initial opinions will 
match.
It is not at all obvious, however, that these results suffice to solve the 
problem. First of all, the rate of convergence of opinion is not specified. This means 
that the limit could very well be very far, which would render the results useless for 
all practical purposes. Secondly, the conditions required for these theorems to hold 
are not on a par with the axioms of probability. Hence, one presumably would have 
to invoke plausibility considerations for their justification, which the subjectivist so 
much dislikes. Finally, Earman has noted that “for some aspects of the objectivity 
problem not only is the long run irrelevant, so is the short run” (ibid. 149). More 
specifically, a plausible account of confirmation ought to explain widely shared 
judgements as to whether a particular piece of evidence supports one theory better 
than another. If, however, wide disagreement is permitted over the prior probability 
assignment those theories merit, then (for some measures of confirmation at least) 
the answer we shall get will not be unequivocal. It should be obvious that merger- 
of-opinion results, either applying in the long or in the short run, are just useless for 
the purpose of explaining the impact a particular bit of evidence has on two or more 
competing theories20.
19 Earman (1992, 142-147) contains an exposition o f more complicated convergence-of-opinion 
theorems.
20 Earman (1992,149) also mentions the problem of comparing the evidential value o f different bits 
o f evidence relative to a particular theory as another instance o f the inability o f merger-of-opinion 
results to ground the objectivity o f scientific inference within the context o f Bayesian personalism. 
This issue, however, seems to be orthogonal to the properties o f merger-of-opinion results Earman
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From this brief sketch of Subjective Bayesianism one can see that its main 
virtues are 1) its simplicity and 2) the ease with which it justifies the constraints it 
imposes, resulting from the denial to impose any kind of substantive constraints to 
prior probabilities (i.e. constraints beyond what logic mandates). On the other hand, 
its main shortcoming is that it seems to preclude from the outset any hope for an 
objective account of inductive reasoning, failing to do justice to our rudimentary 
intuitions. Much later, in chapter 5, I present a re-interpretation of Subjective 
Bayesianism which I hope does more justice to our intuitions regarding the 
objectivity of certain aspects of scientific reasoning.
1.2.2 The Logical Interpretation
At the other end of the spectrum lies the logical interpretation of 
probabilities, espoused by Keynes (1921)21 and Carnap (1950). According to this 
approach one can fix the prior probability assignment uniquely as a matter of logic.
discusses. In fact, if there is a problem here at all, it would seem to stem from the value the prior 
probability o f  the evidence, rather than the prior o f the theory, should take. Indeed, whatever the 
prior probability o f the theory under consideration, on the assumption that there is a well-defined 
value for the prior probability o f the evidence and well-defined relationships (deductive or 
statistical) between the theory in question and the evidence, it is a straightforward matter to 
determine objectively which bit o f evidence provides better support to the theory under 
consideration. For a criticism of Bayesian personalism centring on the problems relating to the 
determination o f the prior probability of the evidence see Worrall (2000, 133-135).
21 It has to be noted that Keynes’ ideas were rather different from the ones I attributed to most 
Bayesians in that 1) he thought that not all probabilities are numerical, and 2) as a result, 
probabilities could only be partially ordered (Keynes 1921, 27-39). One can easily construct a 
Bayesian reading o f Keynes’ views, however, by ignoring his qualms about non-numerical partial 
belief.
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The principle on which the burden of objectification rested according to the logical 
interpretation, is none other than the (in)famous Principle o f  Indifference. This 
asserts that “if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather 
than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the 
assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability” (Keynes 1921, 
42)22. This prima facie plausible guideline was accorded logical status by the 
defenders of the logical interpretation and suggested a way to render prior 
probabilities definite and objective23.
Even in Keynes’s time, however, it was well known that the Principle of 
Indifference gives rise to a series of difficulties, all relating to the fact that the 
principle is not language-invariant, or, in other words, that it is sensitive to the 
choice of variables24. For example, according to the Principle of Indifference the 
probability of a book, picked at random from a library we have never visited 
before, being red as opposed to non-red is Vi\ but at the same time its probability of 
being red as opposed to being either green or blue or yellow is lA. Hence, we get
22 Emphasis in the original.
23 Hence, the logical interpretation o f probabilities should not be confused with the logical 
interpretation o f subjective probability. The difference lies precisely in the fact that the latter does 
not admit any kind of constraint like the Principle o f Indifference, which goes beyond the standard 
probability axioms and attempts to single out the one true value. According to proponents of the 
logical interpretation o f subjective probability, such constraints are arbitrary in that they attempt to 
settle non-trivial questions, while “logic [is] essentially non-committal on substantive matters” 
(Howson and Urbach 1993, 71-72).
24 For an exposition o f the various paradoxes the Principle of Indifference gives rise to see Keynes 
(1921, ch. 4), Gillies (2000,37-42) and Howson and Urbach (1993,59-62). My discussion follows 
closely Gillies (2000) throughout.
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contradictory results by applying the principle to different partitions of our variable 
space.
In an attempt to rectify the situation, Keynes suggested the plausible further 
restriction that the principle be applied only when a finite set of mutually exclusive 
and indivisible alternatives is determined. While this takes care of some finite cases 
like the book-paradox, however, it does not generalise to all finite cases. Consider a 
series of coin tosses, where 0 stands for heads and 1 for tails. For n - 2  tosses, we 
get four possible outcomes: 00, 10, 01, and 11. Assuming that the outcome of one 
heads in two tosses is divisible, then 10 and 01 are distinct and the probability of 
each outcome is lA. If it is not, then the probability of each outcome is 1/3. The 
interesting thing with this case is that, while the first option may seem the more 
natural, it results in making learning from experience impossible. In this way, 
though, it negates the very purpose for which it was selected, i.e. that of 
implementing the idea of inductive logic.
To see why this is so consider the case where we know the outcomes of n 
tosses (our evidence E) and we inquire about the probability of the hypothesis (H) 
that the next toss will be heads. The ‘natural’ understanding of divisibility yields 
Pr(//) = Vz. Furthermore, Pr(£) = 2 since there are 2 ” possible sequences of 
heads and tails in n trials and E  is just one of these possibilities. The posterior 
probability of the hypothesis that the next toss will yield heads is then Pr (H/E) = 
PrfE  a  / / I  2_(”+l)
------------- = --------- = 1 / 2 = P r ( / /) . It follows that if we still want learning from
Pr(£) 2~n
experience to take place, we have to promote the ‘less natural’ partition of possible 
alternatives. Yet there seems to be no other independent, non-ad hoc, reason for 
this choice.
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Furthermore, as Ramsey had already noted in his 1922 review of Keynes’ 
treatise, Keynes’ proposal fails to accommodate cases where infinite magnitudes 
are involved (Ramsey 1922 [ 1989], 221). One such case is the infamous water/wine 
example. Suppose we have a mixture of wine and water and we know that there is 
at most 3 times as much of one as of the other. Hence, we have 1/3 < wine/water < 
3 and applying the Principle of Indifference yields a uniform probability density in 
the interval [1/3,3]. From this, though, it follows that Pr(wine/water < 2) = 5/8 * 
Pr(water/wine > Vi) = 15/16. In words, the probability of the wine being at most 
twice as much as the water is different from the probability of the water being at 
least half of the wine, despite the fact that these sentences are logically equivalent.
The general problem can be put as follows: for a continuous parameter 0 
taking values in an interval [<a, b] and a continuous and suitably regular function 
fid )  defined in the same interval [a, 6], such that a < 0 < b is logically equivalent to 
a <fiQ) < b, there is no guarantee that applying the Principle of Indifference to both 
will yield the same results. In fact, the general case is that the opposite will happen, 
creating further contradictions. As a result, nowadays the consensus has it that, 
despite ingenious attempts to resolve some individual paradoxes (cf. Jaynes 1973), 
the Principle has to be discarded as a principle of logic.
So far, then, we have only looked at the opposite poles of the spectrum 
representing the various interpretational stances one can take towards epistemic 
probability. Between these two, however, there is a plethora of proposals - all of 
which try to strike a balance and get the best of both worlds. In order to do so, those 
proposals must introduce some degree of objectivity while being arguably soundly 
justified. There are three main rival candidates. In ascending order of strength they
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are 1) tempered personalism, 2) empirically-based subjective Bayesianism and 3) 
objective Bayesianism.
1.2.3 Shimony’s Tempered Personalism
The idea of tempered personalism is associated with Abner Shimony and is 
peculiar in that it was not the result of general probabilistic or statistical 
considerations but was developed specifically for the purpose of attaining a more 
objective philosophy of science. Its core idea consists in a minor constraint imposed 
on the prior probability assignments to scientific hypotheses and that is why it only 
slightly deviates from the strict subjectivist approach.
Shimony put forth the following ‘prescription of open-mindedness’ as a 
plausible constraint on prior probabilities:
“the prior probability ... of each seriously proposed hypothesis must be 
sufficiently high to allow the possibility that it will be preferred to all rival, 
seriously proposed hypotheses as a result of the envisaged observations'” 
(Shimony 1970, 101; my emphasis).
This he calls the ‘tempering condition’. Its aim is not so much to objectify the prior 
probability assignment in the sense of singling out ‘the one true value’ - he 
explicitly allows for much subjectivity and variation in this respect (ibid. 102)- but 
rather to combat one of the problems we encountered when discussing the idea of 
the ‘washing-out of priors’; namely that it only applies to the limit and that limit 
may be too far away. Shimony expresses this worry as follows: “If personal 
probabilities were used, unqualified by the tempering condition, then deep-seated
25 The original presentation in Shimony (1970), nonetheless, contains a much greater extent o f  
deviation, owing to his preferred non Dutch-book justification o f the probability axioms.
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prejudices ... could produce immense (and possibly infinite) prior probability 
ratios; swamping [i.e. the ‘washing-out of priors’] would consequently be 
impossible with a moderate amount of data, and consensus would be severely 
delayed” (ibid. 103). What the tempering condition is intended to achieve, then, is 
that, even with a moderate amount of data, consensus will be reached within a 
reasonable amount of time, thus ridding the idea of convergence of its dangerously 
impractical character. The end result is a potentially more effective way to alleviate 
the effects of arbitrariness in determining the prior probability assignments.
Obviously much rests on what a ‘seriously proposed hypothesis’ is and on 
what the ‘envisaged observations’ mean. Shimony, as might be expected, did not 
give an accurate characterisation of either notion. With regards to the first, he 
explicitly acknowledged the role of personal judgments in specifying what counts
0f\as a ‘serious hypothesis’ . It seems that the most one can say in this connection is 
that the community of scientists creates vague rules as to what counts as a ‘serious 
hypothesis’ and what doesn’t. Clearly, though, this does not amount to an adequate 
theoretical foundation for the notion of ‘seriously proposed hypothesis’. Similar 
remarks apply to the notion of the ‘envisaged observations’. Though Shimony 
wants his tempering condition to effect convergence of opinion within a 
‘reasonable amount’ of time and given only a ‘moderate amount’ of data, he does 
not specify any further the process which would produce the ‘envisaged 
observations’ or how long it should last. Personal judgement and subjectivity, then,
26 In discussing the need to avoid both the danger o f postulating arbitrary and inflexible sharp 
criteria as well as the one o f leaving the choice o f what counts as a serious hypothesis entirely up to 
subjective judgment, Shimony proposes “to formulate some methodologically sensible guidelines 
for decisions on this question, without pretending to eliminate entirely the subjective judgement o f  
the investigator•” (Shimony 1970, p. 110; my emphasis).
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are bound to enter the picture again, presumably leaving the scientific community 
to determine internally and in practice the precise form and duration of their 
investigations. This vagueness in defining the ‘seriously proposed hypothesis’ or 
the ‘envisaged observations’ clearly counts among the weak links in Shimony’s 
theoretical approach. We should also note, however, that any theory is practically 
certain to admit vague notions and concepts at some point; consequently, vagueness 
in this respect need not be damning for the ‘tempering condition’.
Shimony also thought that his tempered personalism requires a different 
justification for the probability axioms from the usual Dutch-book argument, 
because he took the concept of ‘rational degree of belief to be undesirable as an 
explicandum of the concept of probability in the context of evaluating scientific 
hypotheses. His arguments were a) that a bet on a universal generalisation cannot 
be decided due to the open-ended character of such a statement, and b) the 
Popperian idea that the rational degree of belief on such a generalisation should be 
zero, or, at any rate, very close to zero, which evidently undermines the aims of the 
‘tempering condition’. His solution was to suggest the notion o f ‘rational degree of 
commitment’ as the appropriate explicandum for ‘probability’ and to opt for the 
Cox-Good-Lucas justification of the axioms (ibid. 94-95 and 104ff.).
In the face of what I said about the character of the Dutch-book argument, 
however, it seems to me that one need not be that troubled with the practical fact 
that we can’t decide the truth-value of a universal generalisation. Assuming one 
only takes the Dutch-book justification to be an abstract model aiming at conferring 
normative weight to its conclusions, whether we can in fact decide the truth-value 
of a theoretical hypothesis or not is beside the point of the argument. Furthermore, 
it is not at all obvious that the probability of a universal law should be zero. In fact
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there have been convincing criticisms of all of Popper’s arguments for his thesis 
(cf. Howson 1973; Earman 1992, 92-95 and 104-109), which, together with the 
previous consideration regarding the character of the Dutch-book arguments, 
suggests that probability as degree of belief is a perfectly adequate notion even 
within the context of theory-evaluation.
More interesting is the way in which Shimony attempted to justify the 
tempering condition within the context of a naturalistic epistemology - an approach 
he dubbed ‘Copemican’. In outline the idea is that in justifying the tempering 
model of inductive inference and confirmation, we have to use the results of 
precisely those domains of inquiry our model intends to vindicate. In doing so, we 
employ a prior assumption regarding both the reliability of our pre-scientific 
intuitions as well as the fruitfulness of the hypotheses we regularly come up with. 
Then, we are justified in assigning non-vanishing priors to our ‘seriously proposed 
hypotheses’, since we believe that our reliable habits, which gave rise to them, also 
give them a good chance to be the true ones and, hence, make them worthy of a 
unanimously high degree of belief.
This line of reasoning sounds hopelessly circular. Shimony himself remarks 
that “the problem of circularity is evidently raised by the fact that a body of natural 
knowledge, which was itself tentatively established by means of scientific 
inference, is methodologically significant” (Shimony 1970,139). Nonetheless, he
4
goes on to dismiss the danger, holding that the circularity under consideration is 
non-vicious on the grounds that theories are still open to criticism and refutation 
(ibid. 159-160). Although I think the charge of circularity is well-founded, I will 
postpone detailed discussion for a later chapter. The reason is that this attempted 
justification of the ‘tempering condition’ by endorsing allegedly non-viciously
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circular arguments is methodologically on a par with some recent popular defences 
of scientific realism. Hence, since assessing its legitimacy is directly connected 
with the possibility of offering a Bayesian reconstruction of at least one version of 
the central realist argument, I will take up this issue again only when I explore the 
possibility of offering the realist arguments in a Bayesian form.
1.2.4 Empirically-Based Subjective Bayesianism
A stronger constraint on the prior probabilities relates to the way empirical 
knowledge is taken into account. Empirically-based subjective Bayesians propose 
that, whenever one possesses reliable information about the theoretical (i.e. 
limiting) frequency of the occurrence of a type of event, then one’s degrees of 
belief that a singular event of this type will occur should be set equal to the 
theoretical frequency (or objective chance) the available data dictate. This idea also 
originates with Ramsey (1926,195-196), who, as I remarked earlier, adopted a dual 
interpretation of the probability calculus, allowing probabilities to stand both for 
degrees of belief and frequencies. His account, however, remains rather sketchy, 
since he never managed to give a systematic account of his frequency concept of 
probability. Empirically-based subjective Bayesians follow Ramsey’s pluralistic 
approach and propose a more rigorous way to constrain the prior probabilities in the 
light of empirical information.
A viable pluralistic approach to probabilities, of course, demands a 
multiplicity of fully worked out accounts of probability. We have seen that 
probability as personal degree of belief is one of them; empirically-based Bayesians 
also accept the frequency interpretation as a legitimate account of probabilities -  an 
interpretation which goes back to von Mises (1928) and Hans Reichenbach (1949).
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This interpretation rests on two basic principles. First, the probability of a 
variable taking a certain value is defined to be equal to the limiting frequency of the 
occurrence of this value over the total number of trials, when this number tends to 
infinity. Symbolically:
Pr(£/C) = df lim m(E)/n,
where C stands for the sequence of these trials, m(E) for the number of times the 
variable in question has taken some value E  and n for the total number of trials. 
Von Mises introduced the term collective to refer to sequences like C and defined it 
as follows: “[the term ‘collective’] denotes a sequence of uniform events or 
processes which differ by certain observable attributes, say . colours, numbers or 
anything else” (1928,12). As is obvious by the definition, probability as frequency 
makes sense only after a collective has been specified.
This definition is supplemented by a second principle relating to the 
explication of the notion of randomness within a collective. Von Mises’ idea was to 
identify randomness with the impossibility of producing a gambling system, in 
other words an algorithm with the ability to produce frequency values for 
subsequences of the original collective different from those of the collective itself. 
For a subsequence C’ of the initial collective that is:
lim ^  m(E)/n = lim ^  m{E)!n
As it turns out, using the resources of the theory of recursive functions this 
principle can be given a rigorous mathematical expression. Furthermore, coupled
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with the axiom of convergence, it allows for the standard axioms of probability to
7 7be recovered, thus providing an adequate foundation to the frequency theory .
A different concern is that, despite the frequency theory being a legitimate 
interpretation of the calculus, it might not be appropriate as a constraint on our 
degrees of belief. This worry is founded on the single-case character of our degrees 
of belief, i.e. the fact that they can refer to propositions about singular events, and 
the explicitly non-single case character of the frequency approach, which refuses to 
attach probabilities to such events and can only make sense of the concept of 
probability relative to a collective. Hence, an account needs to be given of how 
information about frequencies can inform our degrees of belief.
Howson and Urbach (1993,345) have responded to the problem by offering a 
Dutch-book argument for the connection between them. They were able to 
demonstrate that failing to set one’s degrees of belief equal to frequencies leads to 
sure loss after some finite time. In this way, Howson and Urbach attempt to 
maintain the objective character of the frequency interpretation and transfer it to 
our degrees of belief. To be sure, our knowledge of frequencies is not always 
complete. Nothing hinges on that, however, since we can always probability 
hypotheses about what the limiting frequency of a particular collective is (cf. 
Howson 2000, 234-236).
This process is summarised in the form of (a version of) the Principal 
Principle, originally introduced in Lewis’s (1980) treatment of the notion of 
‘chance’. ‘Chance’ is usually understood as objective single-case probability rather
27 For more details see Howson and Urbach (1993, ch. 13), Gillies (2000,105-109) and Williamson 
(2005a, sec. 6). A bothersome feature o f the frequency interpretation, however, is that it cannot 
accommodate countable additivity except by fia t (cf. Gillies 2000,110-111).
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than frequency and Lewis most certainly follows this tradition (cf. Lewis 1980,83- 
84). Empirically-based Subjective Bayesians, however, reject the existence of 
single-case objective probabilities and identify ‘chance’ with frequency (cf. 
Howson 2000, 223 and 230-232). In effect, they adopt a version of the Principal 
Principle in which ‘chance’ is understood as limiting relative frequency. With this 
proviso in place, the principle requires that our degree of belief that some variable 
will take the value E at some instant given that the chance of E  is r be set equal to r. 
Formally:
Pr, (£/Chance, (E) = r) = r.
Hence, once we have reliable knowledge of the frequency (or ‘chance’) of some 
type of event, empirically-based subjective Bayesians require that we set our prior 
degrees of belief that the event will occur on the ‘next’ occasion equal to that 
frequency. Similarly, if our frequency data specify only an interval, then our prior 
belief is free to lie anywhere in this interval but not outside of it on pain of 
inconsistency. In this way, assuming a certain amount of pluralism in the 
admissible interpretations of the probability calculus, some Bayesians try to reduce 
arbitrariness in the assignment of priors. As is obvious, however, this can only be 
achieved when there is frequency data available. When there isn’t, either due to 
practical difficulties or the nature of the subject under discussion, we are inevitably 
thrown back to pure personalism.
Two things are worth noting here. First, although frequentism is an objective 
account of probabilities, empirically-based subjective Bayesianism will not be fully 
objective even in the presence of reliable information about frequencies until it
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faces effectively the reference-class problem2*. Recall that probability as frequency 
makes sense only within a ‘collective’, i.e. a large set of uniform events. Now, there 
are many ways to assign a particular event within the domain of a collective and it 
is not at all self-evident that there is a uniquely correct way to do this. For example, 
inquiring about the probability that Mr Smith, aged 40, will experience heart 
problems within the next 5 years, it is possible to classify him as a man aged 40, an 
Englishman aged 40, a Londoner aged 40, a Londoner aged 40 who drinks a lot etc. 
Clearly, our decision will be based on the factors that we think might be relevant to 
heart problems, the available statistics etc. The problem, then, is to decide which of 
the possible classifications to use in order to answer our initial query.
One possible solution to this problem is provided by the principle of the 
narrowest reference class, which states that for collectives C, C \  C” , if C is a 
subset of C’, which in turn is a subset of C ” , one should opt for the narrowest 
class C. Though plausible, however, this principle does not answer to all problems. 
Occasionally there are more than one narrowest reference classes for which there 
are reliable statistics. What if, in our hypothetical example, Mr Smith also exercised 
regularly and there were reliable statistics for Londoners who drink a lot, 
Londoners who exercise regularly but not for Londoners who both drink and 
exercise? In that case the Principal Principle would yield different degrees of belief 
for the same proposition, depending on the reference class assignment we would 
choose, thus failing to introduce a fully objective element into the subjectivist view. 
Furthermore, our knowledge of what counts as a relevant factor to heart problems 
changes over time. This means that even if we are able to single out one and only
28 My discussion o f the ‘reference-class problem’ follows closely the one found in Gillies (2000, 
119-125).
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one narrowest reference class according to current knowledge, future developments 
may very well show our current probability estimates to be way off the mark. 
Hence, Gillies’ conclusion that “probabilities for single events,.. .though sometimes 
objectively based, will nearly always fail to be fully objective” (2000,120) seems 
justified.
Secondly, besides the explicitly non-single-case character that Empirically- 
based Subjective Bayesians attribute to ‘chance’, their approach is quite different 
from Lewis’ own discussion of objective credence in yet another respect. 
Empirically-based Subjective Bayesianism makes use of an independent account of 
‘chance’, namely that of the frequency interpretation. Lewis, on the other hand, 
implicitly defines ‘chance’ in terms of its relation to beliefs (cf. Howson 2000, 
222). This strategy, however, leaves the way in which one can sensibly retain talk 
of objective chance entirely mysterious .
1.2.5 Objective Bayesianism
An even stronger constraint on prior probabilities has given rise lately to the 
stance called Objective Bayesianism. Objective Bayesians agree with strict 
personalists that a rational degree of belief must satisfy the axioms of probability, 
however, like the Empirically-based Subjective Bayesians, they deny the converse: 
not all sets of degrees of belief that satisfy the axioms of probability are rational. 
Furthermore, although they agree with empirically-based subjective Bayesians that
29 An alternative reading o f Lewis, which fares better in this respect, would be to reserve the term 
‘chance’ only for the probabilistic assignments derived by means o f probabilistic laws o f nature, 
understood according to Lewis’ ‘best-system analysis o f laws’. In his (1994, 477-480), Lewis is 
quite explicit about it, unlike the earlier cryptic remarks found in his (1980, 1986a).
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empirical constraints ought to have a bearing on our degrees of belief, they add to 
this requirement one further ‘logical constraint’: given the empirical background 
information, an agent’s belief function should be as non-committal as possible, 
reflecting also one’s “lack of knowledge of the world” (Williamson 2006, 13)30. 
The end result is an objective version of Bayesianism, imposing very stringent 
constraints on our degrees of belief.
Objective Bayesians give priority to the empirical over the ‘logical 
constraints’. They incorporate them into background knowledge and demand that 
they be taken into account before logical considerations come into play (cf. 
Williamson 2006, 14). Hence, if reliable frequency information determines an 
interval of frequency values, our degree of belief should not fall outside this 
interval. Once this is known, however, logical considerations allow us to single out 
one particular belief function. The ‘logical constraint’ imposed takes the form of 
the maximum entropy principle, introduced by Jaynes (1957) in the context of 
statistical mechanics. It requires that from a variety of choices of probability 
distributions determined by our background knowledge, we choose the one which 
maximises entropy, i.e.
H(p/) = -*2]p/logp,,
(=1
where k is a constant. Being a measure of uncertainty satisfying many intuitive 
1desiderata , entropy is taken to characterise precisely the agent’s lack of 
knowledge, which, according to Objective Bayesians, ought to constrain one’s 
degrees of belief. The end result of this process is preference for a belief function,
30 Any page references to Williamson (2006) and (2007) found in this section correspond to the on­
line version o f Williamson’s papers (the full on-line reference is contained in the bibliography).
31 See Jaynes (1957, 621) for more details.
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which is as middling as possible, or, put differently, as far away from the extremes 
as possible.
It follows, then, that when our background information suffices to single out 
one frequency value and not just an interval, the answer Objective Bayesianism 
gives as to what one’s degree of belief should be coincides with that of 
Empirically-based Subjective Bayesianism. Similarly, when there is no background 
empirical information at all, the maximum entropy principle’s result is the same as 
the one that the Principle of Indifference would give, i.e. equiprobability of all 
possible outcomes. In fact, Jaynes himself described it as “an extension of the 
principle of insufficient reason [i.e. the Principle of Indifference]” (1957,623), so, 
given the problems regarding the justification of the Principle of Indifference, it is 
an urgent question to see how its extension might avoid those problems.
The first attempt at a justification was offered by Jaynes himself in his 
seminal 1957 paper. Jaynes suggested that “that the maximum entropy distribution 
may be asserted for the positive reason that it is uniquely determined as the one 
which is maximally non-committal with regard to missing information, instead of 
the negative one that there was no reason to think otherwise” (ibid. 623). It should 
be clear, however, that this kind of approach is question-begging. As Williamson 
(2007, 6) notes, there is no good a priori reason why maximally non-committal 
degrees of belief ought to be desirable. In fact, the whole edifice of pure 
personalism rests on the seeming absence of such a priori reasons, so simply 
postulating a desideratum will not do.
In his (1973) Jaynes offered a reformulation of his desideratum as follows: “in 
two problems where we have the same prior information, we should assign the 
same prior probabilities” (228); and in the next sentence he calls it
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“psychologically impossible to quarrel”, possibly appearing “so trivial as to be 
without useful content” (ibid. 228). Still, though, one should not rest content with 
assertions like these. On the one hand the psychological effects of a principle need 
have absolutely nothing to do with its status as an epistemic principle. On the other, 
if the Principle of Indifference, which is implied by this desideratum, fails to be a 
trivial logical principle, then the desideratum itself fails to be trivial, in which case 
a more persuasive argument than mere allusion to appearances is needed.
A different line of argument has been offered recently by Williamson (2007). 
After reviewing several application-oriented attempts to justify the maximum 
entropy principle and finding them wanting, Williamson offers his own justification 
by appealing to caution. His point, which he demonstrates formally (ibid. 14-16), is 
that “the maximum entropy principle is on average the more cautious policy when 
it comes to risky decisions” (ibid. 16) , where by ‘risky decisions’ he refers to ones 
in which caution matters most since the unfavourable outcomes are very costly . 
He concludes that one is thereby generally justified in using the maximum entropy 
principle in fixing one’s prior degrees of belief.
While this is an interesting result, it is of both limited applicability and also 
rests squarely on pragmatic issues. It may well be the case that in everyday life we 
tend to be cautious in the face of risky decision situations involving costly 
outcomes, yet risky decisions in that sense are not the only ones we are typically
32 Emphasis in the original.
33 We must note, however, that Williamson’s use o f the term ‘risky decisions’ is rather idiosyncratic. 
Indeed, as Williamson acknowledges himself, “every course o f action has its associated risks” 
(2007, 12), which means that all decisions under uncertainty may reasonably be held to fall under 
the concept of ‘risky decisions’, irrespective o f the severity o f their unfavourable outcomes. At any 
rate, in what follows and for purposes of discussion I have adopted Williamson’s use o f the term.
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faced with. A priori there seems to be no reason why one should focus only on the 
‘risky decisions’ for purposes of justification of the principle, thus completely 
disregarding their non-risky and equally frequent counterparts. Furthermore, even if 
we restrict attention to ‘risky’ circumstances, it is by no means a universal law that 
people tend to be cautious when facing risky decision situations but rather a rule of 
thumb with no self-evident normative character. Finally, regardless of the empirical 
merit of attitude-to-risk theories, when it comes to non-practical but purely 
epistemic affairs it is not at all clear how this result can have any significance at all. 
Consider, for example, the task of determining the prior probability of a hypothesis 
in an attempt to evaluate its posterior after the data is collected irrespective o f  the 
use we intend to put it to. The consideration regarding the cautious character of the 
maximum entropy principle seems to have no application to such a case.
Williamson is, admittedly, explicit that the justification of the principle is 
bound to go beyond both the evidence and logic (ibid. 9). And argues that adhering 
to it relative to practical or even scientific affairs is the sensible thing to do. In fact, 
Jaynes’ 1957 paper introduced the principle within the context of statistical 
mechanics with great practical success, while its use as a heuristic principle in other 
areas of natural science might well be valuable (cf. Gillies 2000, 48-49). Still, 
though, arguing this way only provides empirical support for the principle and only 
for its validity within the particular practical domains of inquiry. Hence, it is still 
not clear how such considerations could constitute a case for its application outside 
physics and the domain of practical problems34.
34 It should also be noted that the maximum entropy principle is not free o f technical problems 
either. The most important o f them is that by generalising the principle to apply to uncountably 
infinite domains uniqueness is jeopardised. There is no guarantee, that is, that the modification o f
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So far, then, I have sketched the main theses one has to subscribe to in order 
to qualify as a Bayesian and analysed in some detail the flexibility of this general 
framework relative to the amount of objectivity one is free to endorse. 
Schematically, one can arrange the aforementioned interpretations on the basis of 
their subjectivity as follows:
Subjective Bayesianism -> Tempered Personalism —> Empirically-based 
subjective Bayesianism -» Objective Bayesianism —> Logical Interpretation 
For the purposes of the discussion to follow, there is no need to assume that any of 
the above interpretations is the correct one. Rather, I will explore the extent to 
which each one of them might be put to use in examining the prospects of a 
Bayesian reconstruction of the debate regarding scientific realism.
the principle will be able to single out one unique belief function any more, which in turn means that 
subjectivity re-enters the picture. Still, Williamson is quite reassuring about this issue, suggesting 
that objective Bayesianism need not be fully objective. It would suffice if  it is merely the most 
objective Bayesian account of all (cf. Williamson 2007,24-25). Given that the exploration o f this 
dimension o f the maximum entropy principle transcends the scope o f this thesis, for present 
purposes I shall assume that this sort o f technical complications can be accommodated within 
Objective Bayesianism without vitiating its character.
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Chapter 2
Bayesianism and ‘Theory Acceptance’
The aim of this thesis is to investigate in a systematic way the relationship 
between Bayesianism and the thesis of scientific realism. The most obvious 
stumbling block to representing the realism debate in Bayesian terms is the issue of 
‘theory acceptance’. Bayesians seem to lack an appropriately strong notion of 
‘theory acceptance’, which, as we shall see in more detail shortly, is often assumed 
to be an indispensable characteristic of the realist view. If this charge is upheld, 
however, then the prospects for presenting an illuminating Bayesian reconstruction 
of the realism debate are slim. Indeed, if the concept of ‘theory acceptance’ is 
essential to the realist thesis but impossible to accommodate within the Bayesian 
framework, it follows that Bayesianism is ill-equipped to express essential
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dimensions of the realist position and, hence, contribute additional insight to the 
debate.
In this chapter I argue to the contrary that the Bayesian theory provides the 
very conceptual tools necessary further to elucidate the notion of ‘theory 
acceptance’, which is only prima facie transparent and unproblematic, even for a
realist. More specifically, I develop and defend a reductive theory of ‘theory
>
acceptance’, according to which Bayesianism helps us replace the primitive idiom 
of ‘theory acceptance’ with the more precise language of probabilities. In the 
process, I also discuss and dismiss various alternative Bayesian accounts that might 
be given of ‘theory acceptance’. Finally, I show how my own preferred view is to 
be used in modelling the realist thesis and its competitors.
2.1 A Challenge to the Bayesian
2.1.1 Scientific Realism - Preliminary Definition
A strong conception of scientific realism can plausibly be taken to embody 
the following three theses, as outlined in Psillos (1999, xix): (Rl) the metaphysical 
claim that the world enjoys a definite and mind-independent existential status , 
(R2) the semantic thesis that our scientific theories should be taken at face value,
i.e. as making assertions about a reality ‘underlying the phenomena’ that are 
genuinely true or false rather than mere algorithms/instruments for prediction; and
35 Put this way (R l) seems to be making use o f an old-fashioned dualism, according to which the 
mind belongs to a different realm from the external world. A more appropriate way to formulate 
(R l) would be to assert that “there exists a structured and undivided reality o f which the mind is 
part; moreover that far from imposing their own order on things, our mental operations are in their 
turn governed by the fixed laws which describe the workings o f Nature” (Zahar 2001, 56). 
Expressed in this way, it becomes clear that no such dualism is assumed.
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(R3) the epistemic thesis that our best well-confirmed scientific theories are 
reasonably assumed to be at least approximately true -  that is, that the unobservable 
entities they postulate (or perhaps something like them) are real.
The first claim is to be contrasted with the traditional metaphysical doctrines 
of idealism and phenomenalism, and is taken for granted in all recent discussions. 
The second is directed against various instrumentalist philosophies of science, 
which view scientific theories as shorthand notation and mere predictive devices 
incapable of being true or false. Defending a semantic realist approach to scientific 
theories was a central concern in the heyday of logical empiricism, given the 
linguistic nature of the positivist approach to science. Recently, however, the focus 
has rested squarely on the third epistemic thesis, which aims to establish that we are 
justified in believing in the truth, or rather approximate truth, of our best scientific 
theories, i.e. that we are justified in believing that they reveal how the world 
actually is.
It has often been claimed that an equivalent way to present this epistemic 
attitude is to say that ‘a scientific realist accepts our best current theories’. Richard 
Boyd, for example, has defined scientific realism as
“the doctrine that the sort of evidence which ordinarily counts in favour of the 
acceptance of a scientific law or theory is, ordinarily, evidence for the (at 
least approximate) truth of a law or theory as an account of the causal 
relations obtaining between the entities quantified over in the law or theory in 
question” (1973, 1; my emphasis).
Bas van Fraassen has also linked scientific realism with ‘theory acceptance’ in his 
famous definition of scientific realism:
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“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that 
it is true” (1980, 8; my emphasis).
Van Fraassen is, of course, adamant that “acceptance of theories ... is a 
phenomenon of scientific activity which clearly involves more than belief’ (ibid. 
12). By this, he means to differentiate the strictly epistemic aspect o f ‘acceptance’ 
from the pragmatic one. The former reflects our strictly epistemic dispositions 
towards a theory. The latter involves consideration of factors like one’s personal 
commitments in terms of time, energy, research projects, institutional behaviour in, 
say, a university or even large-scale policy decisions regarding fund allocation (cf. 
van Fraassen 1980, 12-13 and Earman 1992, 194). We can extract from van 
Fraassen’s characterisation, however, a distinct epistemic notion of ‘theory 
acceptance’ by isolating the epistemic aspects of van Fraassen’s wider concept. 
From the present point of view, i.e. that of normative philosophy of science, it is 
this epistemic notion of ‘theory acceptance’ which is of exclusive interest.
Stathis Psillos agrees that the focus of philosophy of science should rest 
squarely on the epistemic dimension of ‘theory acceptance’ and offers yet another 
definition of scientific realism in terms of ‘theory acceptance’:
“One of the central concerns of modem epistemology of science has been to 
characterise what should be involved in accepting a scientific theory. 
Scientific realists suggest that acceptance should be equated with the belief 
that the theory is approximately true, and that this belief can be warranted and 
rational” (1999, 249).
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It appears, then, that the notion of ‘theory acceptance’ is often viewed as an 
essential aspect of the realist position. This, however, raises the first difficulty for 
our Bayesian reconstruction of the realist thesis.
2.1.2 The Challenge
The debate on ‘theory acceptance’ is essentially a continuation of the 
discussion in the 1960s about rules o f detachment in inductive logic, i.e. the 
problem of detaching (or ‘accepting’) the conclusion of an inductive argument. The 
various statements of realism I have just reviewed suppose that there is nothing 
particularly problematic about the realist’s notion of ‘acceptance’. The realist 
attempts to provide an argument for his thesis36 and then, on the assumption that it 
is successful, he ‘accepts’/detaches its conclusion without any (or much) 
qualification. At the same time, however, it is agreed that a Bayesian can 
uncontroversially accept a proposition only if this proposition is assigned 
probability 1 (cf. Earman 1992, 193-194; Worrall 2000, 141-142). Yet, so the 
argument goes, scientists should not generally believe (except, perhaps, in very 
exceptional circumstances) that they can be in possession of such conclusive 
evidence in favour of a scientific hypothesis to assign it probability 1 and, hence, 
uncontroversially accept it from a Bayesian point of view. Indeed, assigning 
probability 1 to a scientific hypothesis amounts to saying that the probability of 
observing any piece of evidence conflicting with that hypothesis is 0 . Such a
36 To be discussed in considerable detail later.
37 This is because Pr(£)= P r ( 7 ) x P r ( £ /7 )  + Pr(^7)xPr(£/--7). Since Pr(7)=l, Pr(r-7)=0. Furthermore, 
if  evidence E conflicts with T, Pr(E/7)=0. It follows, then, that Pr(£)=0. A residual problem, of  
course, is that under these assumptions Pr(77£) cannot be defined.
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dogmatic attitude, however, is hardly sensible when it comes to discussing the 
epistemic merits of fundamental physical theories. Since the realist’s decision to 
accept his theories is supposed not to be problematic ex hypothesis it is the Bayesian 
who fails to accommodate an essential aspect of the realist epistemic attitude.
Psillos has raised this issue forcefully in his recent discussion of the prospects 
of giving a Bayesian rendition of Inference to the Best Explanation. As we shall see 
in considerable detail later, Psillos argues that the realist inference to the 
approximate truth of our best theories is an instance of the general ampliative 
inferential rule called Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). One of the reasons 
IBE is supposed to serve the realist cause is that it
“is typically seen as a rule of acceptance. In its least controversial form, IBE 
authorises the acceptance of a hypothesis H, on the basis that it is the best 
explanation of the evidence” (Psillos 2004, 83)38.
Bayesianism, on the other hand,
“does not have rules of acceptance. On a strict Bayesian approach we can 
never detach the probability of the conclusion of a probabilistic argument, 
no matter how high this probability might be. So, strictly speaking, we are 
never licensed to accept a hypothesis on the basis of evidence” (ibid. 
83)39.
Psillos’ wording here is imprecise. Instead of saying that ‘on a strict Bayesian 
approach we can never detach the probability of the conclusion of a probabilistic 
argument’, he ought to say that ‘on a strict Bayesian approach we can seldom 
detach the conclusion of a probabilistic argument’. First, we have just seen that a
38 Emphasis in the original.
39 Emphasis in the original.
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Bayesian can detach the conclusion of a probabilistic argument if this conclusion is 
assigned probability 1. And secondly, if there is one thing that a strict Bayesian 
approach allows us to uncontroversially assert, this surely is the probability of the 
conclusion. Even if we correct Psillos’ assertion, however, the problem remains: if 
scientific realism requires, as has been suggested, that we ‘accept’ our hypotheses 
as approximately true descriptions of reality, then Bayesianism will typically not be 
in a position to capture all the elements involved in the realist thesis. In Psillos’ 
words: “[T]here is a tension between Bayesianism and the standard renderings of 
IBE. This might make us wary of attempts to cast IBE [and, by default, the realist 
position] in a Bayesian framework” (ibid. 83).
2.2 The ‘Threshold Account*
One natural suggestion for a Bayesian who wants to endorse a notion of 
‘theory acceptance’ is to postulate a ‘rule of acceptance’ (again analogous to a 
detachment rule) which makes use of a level of probability less than 1. Such a rule 
would be of the form:
a hypothesis H  is rationally acceptable to an agent on the condition that he 
assigns to H a  probability value at least as great as some specified number r  < 
1.
The number r  represents the ‘probability threshold’ that must be exceeded if a 
hypothesis is to be accepted and is usually considered to be close to, but (clearly) 
strictly less than, 1. This proposal has been adopted for example by Kyburg (1968, 
1970), Harman (1986) and by Foley (1992), who even traces its origins back to 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).
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An obvious initial problem with this proposal is that it is not clear at all what 
the value of the probability threshold r ought to be. A quick answer would be to say 
that this is a matter of convention and that contextual circumstances will in the end 
determine the exact value of r. This reaction, however, hardly constitutes an 
adequate answer not only for a scientific realist but also for anyone seeking even a 
moderately objective analysis of the issue of ‘theory acceptance’.
A step towards the precise determination of the threshold value has been 
taken recently by Achinstein (2001), who argues that the threshold value 0.5 is a 
necessary condition for acceptance40. Suppose, says Achinstein, that one selects a 
threshold value r < 0.5. This value leaves open the possibility that an agent could 
both ‘accept’ a theory H and, at the same time, ‘accept’ since they would both 
satisfy the threshold requirement (ibid. 116). This, however, is a highly undesirable 
result, telling in effect in favour of r = 0.5 as at least a necessary condition for 
acceptance.
Achinstein’s argument is a strong one. Surely, we could not sensibly be 
regarded as accepting a theory to which we assigned probability less than 0.5. 
Surprisingly enough, however, Patrick Maher (1993,137-139) argues for exactly 
this possibility41 on the basis of the following thought experiment42. Imagine a
40 In fact Achinstein talks about ‘b elief and not ‘acceptance’ but we can take the two as 
synonymous since we are only interested in the epistemic aspects o f ‘theory acceptance’.
41 It should be noted that Maher himself does not endorse the ‘threshold account’ but instead a 
decision-theoretic framework, which I will take up a little later in this chapter. His argument, 
though, can clearly be used in the context o f the ‘threshold account’.
42 The thesis that r = 0.5 is necessary for acceptance has also been questioned on the basis o f the 
‘preface paradox’, introduced by Makinson (1965) (cf. Foley 1992, 113-114). The ‘preface 
paradox’, however, has been formulated in many different ways over the years, “even to the extent
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hypothetical encounter with Einstein. Presumably Einstein did ‘accept’ the General 
Theory of Relativity (GTR) without serious qualms. Suppose, however, that he 
were offered two options:
1) World peace if GTR is completely correct.
2) World peace if GTR is false in some way.
Maher claims that Einstein -  obviously given his pacifist inclinations- would have 
chosen (2). Maher adopts the preference interpretation of the probability calculus, 
which suggests that “we understand attributions of probability ... as essentially a 
device for interpreting a person’s preferences” (ibid. 9). On this interpretation one 
can derive (through a class of results known as representation theorems) the usual 
probability functions on the assumption that people’s preferences satisfy certain 
relatively uncontroversial qualitative conditions. From Einstein’s alleged 
preference for (2), then, one can conclude that he would accord probability less 
than 0.5 to GTR. Yet, suggests Maher, we cannot really say that the father of GTR 
did not accept GTR, hence the conclusion that high probability is not necessary for 
acceptance.
It is not difficult to see what is wrong with this argument. No scientific realist 
asserts that GTR is completely correct. He merely asserts that GTR is 
approximately correct. Notwithstanding the problems with the notion of 
approximate truth, the choice between the two alternatives would not be that easy if 
the question were posed in the approximate-truth version. In fact, if Einstein were 
offered a choice between
that one might want to distinguish between various Preface Paradoxes” (Douven 2002, 393, fh. 5). 
For this reason, and in order to avoid complicating the discussion, I shall not delve into the details of 
the ‘preface paradox’ here.
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1 ’) World peace if GTR is approximately correct 
2’) World peace if GTR is not even approximately correct, 
he would surely have thought of the offer as surprisingly promising for the 
prospects of world peace and opt for (1 ’).
Hence, it is very hard to deny that the threshold value 0.5 is a necessary 
condition for ‘theory acceptance’. It is equally hard, however, to find an argument 
specifying the value that constitutes a sufficient condition for acceptance. A 
threshold value as low as r  = 0.5 intuitively seems too low to warrant acceptance of 
a hypothesis. At the same time, it is enormously difficult to argue for any particular 
value lying in the open interval (0.5,1) in any principled way. Folley expresses this 
problem as follows:
“There doesn’t seem to be any principled way to identify a precise 
threshold.. . .  Still we want to be able to say something, even if vague, about 
the threshold above which our degrees of confidence in a proposition must 
rise if we are to believe that proposition. What to say is not obvious, however, 
since there doesn’t seem to be a non-arbitrary way to identify even a vague 
threshold” (1992, 112).
It seems, then, that the determination of what constitutes a probability threshold 
sufficient to warrant acceptance of a hypothesis must remain vague, a matter of 
stipulation varying with the context one faces. Foley himself concurs: “we deal 
with other kinds of vagueness by stipulation. Why not do the same here?” (ibid. 
256).
No matter how this may be, for the purposes of our discussion there is no 
need to determine a unique threshold value for ‘theory acceptance’. It will be 
assumed, that is, that the determination of the threshold on an ad hoc basis is
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permissible and does not pose special concerns. This is because the ‘threshold 
account’ must first face a more important and logically prior issue, namely the 
charge that any threshold value less than 1 fails as a sufficient condition for 
acceptance. The infamous lottery paradox is the paradigmatic illustration of this 
problem.
2.2.1 The Lottery Paradox and the Conjunction Problem
The lottery paradox, originally due to Kyburg (1961), casts doubt on the 
acceptance rule that high probability is sufficient for acceptance by applying the 
‘threshold account’ to an ordinary lottery situation. Consider a fair lottery with n 
tickets, in which there is to be one winner. Each ticket has a probability of 1 In to 
win, which means that each has a probability ( « - l ) /«  of not winning. The 
paradox for the ‘threshold account’ arises as follows:
1. A hypothesis ought to be accepted if it exceeds an antecedently specified 
threshold r.
2. For any threshold r, one can construct a fair lottery by suitably determining n 
such that for each individual ticket /, one ought to accept the hypothesis {H : 
ticket i will not win}.
3. The closure principle states that one must accept any deductive logical 
consequence of any statement one accepts. This implies that if H  is accepted 
with respect to each ticket individually, then it ought to be accepted with 
respect to their conjunction as well.
4. Hence, we have to accept the hypothesis that no ticket will win.
5. However, we know and, hence, ‘accept’ that one ticket will win the lottery, 
and hence that the claim that no ticket will win is simply false.
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Therefore, we are led to a contradiction. Assuming that premise (3) is 
unproblematic, this paradox clearly undermines the viability of premise (1), i.e. the 
‘threshold account’.
All this might sound too contrived to be of interest for the scientific case. But 
the lottery paradox is in fact just a dramatic illustration of the more general 
conjunction problem. By the probability calculus we know that for two propositions 
A and B , given that (A a B )  |- A, it follows that Pr(^ 4 a B) < Pr(/4). Furthermore, 
equality holds only when Pr(B/A) = 1. Consequently, increasing the number of 
conjuncts, which are assigned probability less than unity (given the previous 
statements in the conjunction) but higher than a pre-specified acceptance threshold, 
will eventually lead to a probability value for the conjunction below that threshold. 
Now, if we substitute theoretical hypotheses for propositions referring to tickets 
and assume (quite plausibly) a) that the ‘new’ hypotheses are not logical 
consequences of some conjunction of the individual conjuncts that went before, and 
b) that these hypotheses merit probability less than unity, one can see, for example, 
that assigning degree of belief 0.8 to each of General Relativity and Quantum 
Mechanics would make each of them acceptable for, say, r = 0.7, but their 
conjunction unacceptable. And this of course seems highly counterintuitive. More 
generally put and independently of the particular value that the threshold for belief 
in our theories might take, the circumstance might (and typically will) arise that our 
best theories, although individually acceptable beyond reasonable doubt, fail to 
pass the threshold of acceptability when conjoined.
One possible reaction to the paradox is to retain the ‘threshold account’ but 
suggest that the paradox is a reductio of premise (3), i.e. of the principle of 
deductive closure -  rather than a reductio of (1). The first to take this line was
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Kyburg himself, who claimed that “the lottery paradox shows that one cannot 
simply impose logical closure on bodies of belief ’ (1968, 118)43. For Kyburg 
problems like the lottery paradox were “fairly straightforward technical problems” 
in which “nothing of deep philosophical significance is involved” (ibid. 119); 
consequently, a technical solution of this sort must have seemed the most 
appropriate. Foley (1992) also went down that path in his attempted resolution of 
the lottery paradox. He notes that “[the lottery and the (structurally identical) 
‘preface paradox’] aren’t paradoxes at all. They simply illustrate in a particularly 
dramatic fashion that rational beliefs are not conjunctive [i.e. closed under 
conjunction]” (117). Finally, a more recent example of this line of reasoning is 
afforded by Howson, who declares in his discussion of the lottery paradox that 
“such a closure principle is most certainly not a necessary one” (2000, 213)44.
As I just mentioned, dropping the closure principle amounts to denying that 
whatever holds true individually for the members of a set of propositions also holds 
true for all their (joint) logical consequences, including their conjunction. If so, then 
the paradox disappears. One cannot infer (4) from (1) and (2) in the lottery case 
and, similarly, it no longer follows that one should accept the conjunction of 
individually acceptable theories, which gave rise to the conjunction problem.
There are, however, various problems with this proposal. First, the closure 
principle -  for all Howson’s (purely rhetorical) suggestion that it is ‘most certainly’ 
not necessary - is, in fact, surely difficult to resist. It is difficult to see intuitively 
how one could be committed to a and committed to b without being committed to 
{a & b). And this (strong) intuition can be reinforced by the following
43 Emphasis in the original.
44 Other examples o f this line o f reasoning include Makinson (1965) and Moser and Tlumak (1985).
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consideration due to Douven (2002,395). He notes that it is very doubtful that there 
is any psychological or phenomenological difference between asserting 
propositions a and b individually and asserting their conjunction {a & b}. If so, it 
seems strange to endorse a logical principle which differentiates between these two 
cases.
A more fundamental problem with any attempt to question the closure 
principle has been noted by Kaplan (1981, 309). His argument focuses on the 
logical form of reductios in general, of which the lottery paradox is an instance. 
Kaplan correctly notes that a typical reductio makes use of the very same closure 
condition that those seeking a way out of the paradox allegedly deny. In a reductio 
we derive a contradiction from the conjunction of a number of propositions we 
already accept individually. Hence, someone who rejects the principle of closure as 
a way out of the lottery paradox seems to be committed to denying that we should 
be convinced by his way out of the paradox. This is because his argument is a 
reductio, whose force rests on the principle of closure he invites us to deny! In 
Kaplan’s own words: “Not only are [those who deny the closure principle] 
licensing rational persons to ignore the force of reductios in general; they are 
licensing us to ignore the force of the very reductios they are using to convince us 
to reject [the closure principle]”45 (ibid. 309).
Finally, it is not at all clear what ‘acceptance’ means in the case where 
deductive closure fails to hold. As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, when I
45 Emphasis in the original. One might try to get around Kaplan’s objection by distinguishing 
between those sets o f individually accepted sentences which are in fact deductively closed and those 
that are not. It still remains to be seen, though, how such a distinction can be motivated in a 
principled, non ad hoc, way rather than by a threshold theorist’s irritation with the lottery paradox.
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presented the challenge posed to the Bayesians, everyone takes ‘acceptance’ to be 
an unproblematic notion as long as the probability of a given hypothesis is 1. It is 
merely symptomatic of this unproblematic state of affairs that virtually everyone 
affirms deductive closure for ‘acceptance’ when the probability is equal to 1. When 
it comes to ‘acceptance’ for levels of probability below 1 though, where the 
‘threshold account’ seems to be necessary, matters are quite different. Deductive 
closure (allegedly) does not hold anymore, since now we are not certain about the 
truth of our hypotheses. Doesn’t this difference in logical properties, however, 
merely reflect a difference in the meaning o f‘acceptance’ between these two cases?
It is quite clear that in the first case we intend to make an unqualified 
statement while in the second we don’t, since uncertainty demands caution. We 
cannot simply affirm a statement that we think ‘as good as’ true, in the way we 
would if we were convinced that it is true and, hence, that its probability is 1. Yet 
this is a clear case where the same term (‘acceptance’) is given different meanings 
under different circumstances. In Lakatosian style we should presumably introduce 
subscripts: acceptance, would refer to full acceptance with certainty, while 
acceptance 2 to acceptance despite uncertainty. But this is just another way of 
saying that we do not mean the same thing in both cases where acceptance- 
terminology is used. It is, then, quite reasonable to suggest that the allegedly 
different logical properties of each notion merely reflect this case of meaning 
variance and that the ‘need’ to alter the logical properties for acceptance under 
uncertainty arises out of the inappropriate insistence in using the cover term 
‘acceptance’ for these two different cases. This in turn suggests, however, that we 
might as well dispense with acceptance 2 altogether and try to explain (away) the
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concept in some other way. This is the course I will pursue in the constructive part 
of this chapter.
Abolishing the principle of closure was a response both to the general 
conjunction problem as well as the more specific lottery paradox. The rest of the 
existing literature on the ‘threshold account’, however, focuses exclusively on the 
latter without any mention of the more general conjunction problem. The common 
thread running through these approaches is that they attempt to revise the threshold 
condition in such a way that it circumvents the particular instance of the lottery 
paradox while also maintaining the core intuition behind the ‘threshold account’. 
Hence, these ‘solutions’ attempt to bypass the problem by allegedly demonstrating 
that the concept of rational acceptance, while legitimate in most cases, fails to apply 
to the lottery case. Pollock (1995), Ryan (1996) and Douven (2002) are typical 
examples of this strategy.
Douven, for example, proposes to replace the simple rule of acceptance, 
which requires merely that the probability of a hypothesis exceeds a certain 
threshold with a more demanding condition reading as follows:
a hypothesis H is  rationally acceptable to an agent on two conditions, 1) that 
the agent assigns to H a  probability value no less than a previously specified 
number r < 1, and 2) H  is not a member of a Probabilistically Self­
undermining Set of propositions (PSS)46.
A PSS is a set of propositions with the following characteristics: a) the probability 
of each proposition in the set given background knowledge exceeds a certain value
46 Here I use ‘hypothesis’ and ‘proposition’ interchangeably, since on the syntactic approach to 
theories I adopt hypotheses simply assert certain propositions.
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r, but b) each proposition receives a probability value below r  conditional on 
background knowledge plus some conjunction o f members o f  the set itself
Douven (ibid. 196-197) shows that the set of sentences about winning tickets 
in the lottery case constitutes a P$S and, hence, fails to meet the second condition 
of his proposed acceptance rule. Clearly, the first condition for a set to be a PSS is 
satisfied in the lottery case - since all propositions describing the event of each 
outcome not winning are assigned probability higher than any sensible threshold for 
acceptance. At the same time the second condition is also satisfied. This is a 
consequence of the fact that the lottery is bound to have a winner, so that each 
proposition (‘ticket i will not win’) conditional on all the others (describing the 
wow-winning outcomes) will be assigned zero probability. Hence, the lottery case 
constitutes a PSS, which in turn means that acceptance talk -  on Douven’s 
construal - is inappropriate for the lottery case.
Amongst the problems facing this solution is the fact that it fails to capture 
basic intuitions regarding ‘theory acceptance’47. It is not as if the lottery paradox is 
a very complex example far from ordinary life and so it would seem that if 
acceptance-talk is appropriate anywhere, it ought to be appropriate in this relatively 
simple example. And indeed Douven himself acknowledges that “there is some 
controversy over whether denying that it is rational to accept any of the 
propositions in [the lottery scenario] is intuitively correct” (ibid. 397, fn. 14)48. This 
means, however, that should an alternative account saving those intuitions be 
shown to be adequate, we would have good grounds to prefer it.
47 This problem obviously affects all solutions modifying the acceptance rule with an eye to prohibit 
the application o f the notion o f acceptance to the lottery case.
48 Emphasis in the original.
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More fundamentally, notions such as the PSS do not even, on close 
examination, really seem to provide the definitive answer to the lottery paradox that 
they were initially taken to promise. In fact, Douven and Williamson (2007) have 
generalised the lottery paradox in such a way that it now renders not only Douven’s 
(2002) proposal but also all solutions, which suggest that acceptance-talk fails to 
apply to the lottery scenario in particular, at best incomplete. Consider an arbitrary 
proposition <p, for which r  < Pr(p) < 1. By constructing a series of ‘trivialisation 
arguments’ Douven and Williamson show that one can always include any 
proposition exceeding a previously specified probabilistic threshold in a set which 
fails to satisfy any amended threshold condition. As a result, “not only lottery 
propositions, but all propositions having non-perfect probability fail to qualify as 
rationally acceptable” (ibid. 760)49. This clearly implies that the strategy of making 
the threshold condition more demanding fails to provide an acceptable general 
solution to the lottery paradox.
It seems, then, that the threshold-probability route does not constitute a 
satisfactory Bayesian account o f ‘theory acceptance’, given the puzzles its various 
versions give rise to.
2.3 A Decision -Theoretic Account of ‘Theory Acceptance*
Some other way of modifying the Bayesian framework would, it seems, need 
to be found if the realist intuition about ‘theory acceptance’ that we started with is 
to be captured. One such proposal, which originates in Levi (1967) and has often 
been defended in the subsequent literature, proposes to model ‘theory acceptance’ 
in decision-theoretic terms. This implies, however, that we abandon the direct
49 Emphasis in the original.
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connection between acceptance and (degrees of) belief, assumed so far to be 
relatively unproblematic within the ‘threshold account’, and reconstrue acceptance 
in a different way. The most recent fully fledged decision-theoretic account of 
‘theory acceptance’ is due to Maher (1993) and it is on this account that I 
concentrate here.
2.3.1 Maher’s Decision-Theoretic Account
On Maher’s decision-theoretic account a theory is accepted when it is 
sincerely and intentionally asserted. Hence, one cannot accept a theory if he is 
either insincere about his judgement or this judgement is the outcome of a slip of 
the tongue. This definition, of course, is not required by the decision-theoretic 
approach. It only reflects the obvious consideration that merely uttering -  and 
seeming to assert - a hypothesis does not mean that you do in fact accept it. For 
instance you might be lying. Hence, defining acceptance this way is also 
compatible with the ‘threshold account’.
But under what conditions is one justified in accepting a hypothesis? One 
might both sincerely and intentionally assert a hypothesis but at the same time have 
no satisfactory normative grounds for doing so. Such a person would surely be 
incorrectly accepting this hypothesis. Maher’s claim is that a decision-theoretic 
approach is superior to the ‘threshold account’ from a purely normative point of 
view on two counts. Decision-theory, we are told, not only avoids the paradoxes of 
the threshold account, but also sheds significant light on the reasons that determine 
when one correctly accepts a hypothesis by taking into account factors, which 
although crucial for the normative dimension of acceptance, are neglected by the 
‘threshold account’.
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Two main factors are involved when it comes to theory acceptance, says 
Maher, namely truth and informativeness. Obviously we are interested in accepting 
true theories in science, since truth is (standardly) considered the regulative ideal of 
rational discourse. At the same time, though, we are not after any true hypothesis. 
We are primarily interested in hypotheses rich in content and information, which 
therefore allow us to increase our knowledge. Maher’s charge against any theory of 
acceptance which focuses solely on probabilities -  echoing Popper’s from long ago 
(1959, 268-270 and 374)- is that such a theory is bound to fail adequately to take 
into account the second factor just considered, i.e. informativeness. By focusing on 
probabilities we only pay attention to the issue of the degree of warrant for the 
assertion of the truth of the hypotheses we consider. Yet, this concern automatically 
offsets progress relative to the problem of finding informative hypotheses. 
Consequently, Maher points to a trade-off between “the concern to be right (which 
would lead one to accept hypotheses of high probability) ... and the desire for 
informative hypotheses (which tends to favour hypotheses of low probability)” 
(Maher 1990, 388).
Decision-theory, Maher argues, provides a neat way to underwrite such a 
trade-off. Alongside Bayesian probabilities, which reveal one’s attitude towards the 
truth of a hypothesis, he introduces the notion of cognitive utility, which captures 
the cognitive value to us not only of truth but also of the informativeness of a 
hypothesis, and is mathematically represented by an appropriately defined cognitive 
utility function50. Maher expresses the intuition behind the introduction of the 
cognitive utility function as follows:
50 For the mathematical details o f how he proposes to define such a function see Maher (1993, ch. 
8).
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“Other things being equal, acceptance of a true proposition has higher 
cognitive value than acceptance of a false proposition, and among true 
propositions the cognitive value is higher the more informative the 
proposition is” (1992, 154).
Note in this connection the strictly epistemic character of utility - as Maher 
construes it. Within the decision-theoretic approach ‘theory acceptance’ retains its 
strictly epistemic, non-pragmatic dimension, since utilities refer not to material 
gains of any sort but to the intrinsic cognitive value of truth and of information for 
the purposes of scientific reasoning. When we have to decide, then, which theory to 
choose among a set of competitors, all we have to do is estimate the expected 
cognitive utility for each theory and accept the one which maximises this 
magnitude.
Once a well-defined notion of a cognitive utility function has been given, it is 
an easy task to compute the various expected utilities, and then choose the theory 
which maximises it. For an arbitrary theory H, then, the expected cognitive utility 
of accepting it would be given by
E U h = ' Zn XPr(x)xU(H,x) ,
where U stands for cognitive utility, E U for expected cognitive utility and x 
describes any of the possible cognitive consequences of accepting H  belonging to 
some set X. A simple suggestion, due to Hempel (1960) and Levi (1967), defines 
‘cognitive consequences’ as the consequences of accepting a theory relative to its 
truth-value. Hence, on this approachX  would contain two elements, i.e. the states 
‘accepting //w hen it is true’ and ‘accepting //w hen it is false’. Consequently, U{H, 
x) expresses the cognitive utility of accepting H  in each of the possible states (in 
this simple case the states that H  is true or false), Pr(x) stands for the probability
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that these states obtain and the expected cognitive utility of accepting H is  just the 
probability-weighted sum of the utilities of the possible consequences (or states) 
(cf. Maher 1993, 141-143).
Maher, however, takes a more ambitious course and introduces the notion of 
closeness-to-the-truth (or verisimilitude) into the discussion. This is because Maher 
wants “the utility of accepting a hypothesis [to] depend [not only] on whether the 
hypothesis is true or false, but also, in case the hypothesis is false,... [on] how far 
from the truth the hypothesis is” (ibid. 142). In other words, Maher is not satisfied 
with the simple suggestion to take as the only possible ‘cognitive consequences’ the 
states ‘accepting H  when it is true’ and ‘accepting i f  when it is false’. Instead, he is 
after a richer account which allows for more ‘cognitive consequences’ than these 
two. Those ‘extra’ consequences will be determined on the basis of how close to 
the truth our theories are, on the assumption that we accept them while they are 
false. To be sure, not much changes with respect to calculating the expected 
cognitive utility of accepting a hypothesis. The only difference is that on Maher’s 
enriched suggestion, the probability-weighted sum of utilities ranges over the 
consequence ‘accepting //w hen it is true’ and those cognitive consequences that 
will arise from the partition of ‘accepting //w hen  it is false’ on the basis o f f / ’s 
distance from the truth51.
Maher’s allusion to verisimilitude, nonetheless, is quite surprising, since the 
task of determining anything resembling a formal objective measure of the distance
51 Note that the introduction of verisimilitude implies that the partition o f the consequence 
‘accepting //w hen  it is false’ is, in principle at least, non-denumerable. It does no harm, however, to 
present the situation as denumerable, since all real-life theory comparisons should be given a 
reasonable answer even under this simplifying assumption.
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from truth has often been considered to be virtually impossible. Even if we accept 
that the concept of verisimilitude is pre-theoretically transparent, there still remain 
serious problems with respect to a) making it precise within the context of a 
coherent theory, and b) doing so in a way that allows at any instant the 
determination of a given theory’s degree of verisimilitude. In fact, ever since 
Popper’s seminal 1963 paper in Conjectures and Refutations, there has hardly been 
any remotely satisfactory answer to either (a) or (b) .
Popper (1963) construed verisimilitude as approximation to the complete 
truth. Hence, a theory would be maximally verisimilar if and only if it were “not 
only true, but completely comprehensively true: if it [corresponded] to all facts, as 
it were, and, of course, only to real facts” (ibid. 317-318)53. Popper, of course, was 
much more interested in the comparison of theories in terms of their degree of 
verisimilitude rather than the conditions under which any theory could be deemed 
maximally verisimilar. This is because his ultimate purpose was to be able to say 
that, for two refuted theories, one can still be more verisimilar than the other. In this 
way, he hoped to substantiate the claim that later theories approximate the truth 
better than earlier ones and, hence, that, through theory-change, scientific 
knowledge approaches more and more closely to the truth (ibid. 313,318). To this 
end, however, the specification of an objective measure of verisimilitude is 
required. Unfortunately, Popper’s own proposed measure in terms of the truth and 
falsity-content of theories had been shown to be empty long ago by Miller (1974) 
and Tichy (1974), who were able to prove that, on Popper’s characterisation, any
52 See Maher (1993, 220-224) for a brief survey o f the literature on verisimilitude and further 
references.
53 Emphasis in the original.
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two false theories have the same verisimilitude. And, as noted a little earlier, no 
satisfactory objective measure has been proposed so far.
Maher does not deny the force of this problem and that is why he does not 
seek an objective measure of verisimilitude. Instead he proposes a subjective 
definition, which links verisimilitude with human interests and values. Maher’s 
proposal is quite idiosyncratic and rests on the postulate that “a measure of 
verisimilitude is essentially a measure of the cognitive utility of accepting a 
hypothesis under different circumstances” (Maher 1993, 226). Since we already 
possess well-defined cognitive utility functions, which express the various 
cognitive values scientists take into account when facing a problem of theory- 
choice, the obvious next step is to use these functions in order to obtain a measure 
of verisimilitude. People’s cognitive utility functions, of course, are bound to differ, 
since their values and interests need not be identical. Hence, Maher must accept 
that “verisimilitude is relative to persons” (ibid. 227). The fact that he is only 
interested in a subjective characterisation, though, makes him think that “we do not 
need there to be one unique verisimilitude function in order for the notion of 
verisimilitude to be meaningful” (ibid. 227). All that is required is that the cognitive 
utility functions we start with are well-defined.
Maher (ibid. 227-231) goes on to measure the verisimilitude of a theory H  
when state x  is the true state, denoted by v x (H), via a normalised cognitive utility
function so that the verisimilitude of a tautology is 0, while that of the complete 
true theory is 154. When it comes to a problem of theory-choice, then, we can also
U ( H , X ) - UX
Maher’s proposed measure o f the verisimilitude o f a theory H is vx (H)  = ------------------ ,
UT ~ Ux
where U(H, x) is the cognitive utility o f accepting H  at state x, U T is the cognitive utility o f the
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compute the expected verisimilitude of a theory in a similar way to expected 
cognitive utility, i.e. calculate the quantity
E v ^ X ^ P r W x v ^ t f ) -
The expected verisimilitude of H  (denoted by E v(Hj) will be the probability- 
weighted sum o f f f s  verisimilitude in each of the possible consequences (or states). 
Since verisimilitude is just normalised cognitive utility, it also follows that 
whenever we maximise expected cognitive utility we also maximise expected 
verisimilitude.
One might object at this point that the phrase ‘a subjective definition of 
verisimilitude’ is a contradiction in terms -  analogous to the obvious contradiction 
in the phrase ‘a subjective definition of truth’. The sole reason why we might try to 
produce an acceptable characterisation of verisimilitude is because we (think we) 
know that we can’t have the complete truth, yet we might feel reasonably confident 
that we can’t be “very far” from it. In other words, we want a measure of how close 
to the objective truth we think we are. Determining this measure on the basis of our 
agents’ interests, though, seems to be entirely irrelevant to achieving this target. 
Hence, resorting to subjectivity in this respect simply because we tend to think that 
any attempt to objectively define a measure for verisimilitude is bound to fail is 
really no different from admitting defeat and, with it, the impossibility of any such 
measure. In fact, even ardent realists, like Psillos (1999,276-279), have abandoned 
this task, treating the notion of ‘approximate truth’ instead as something like an 
undefined but still intuitively acceptable primitive concept.
completely true theory and U x  the cognitive utility o f a tautology. If H  is the completely true 
theory, U(H, x) = U T and v x (H) = 1, while if H  is a tautology, U(H, x) = U x  and v x (H) = 0 (cf. 
1993,228-229).
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Let’s, despite this objection, grant Maher his definition of verisimilitude for 
the sake of argument - since such an admission will not affect my central point. 
Nonetheless, this kind of objection invites a more serious worry for our purposes, 
namely that the decision-theoretic construction has abandoned the traditional 
understanding of realism for a more pragmatically-oriented attitude. Indeed, 
following the example of Levi (1967), most decision-theorists tend to be pragmatist 
in their general philosophical outlook. This would seem enough to disqualify them 
from entering the standard debate on scientific realism, since the concept o f ‘truth’ 
employed in it is one pragmatism disowns. Maher, nonetheless, is adamant that “the 
notion of truth figures centrally in my account of scientific values” (1993, 208). 
What is less clear is what conception of truth he adopts.
In his 1993 book (ibid. 208-209) Maher argues that the so-called transparency 
property of truth (also sometimes known as the ‘redundancy theory’), which 
suggests that the statement ‘It is true that/?’ means the same as suffices for the 
explication of the notion on the grounds that “since the meaning of the latter 
sentence [i.e. ‘/?’] is unproblematic (if anything is), so is the meaning of the former 
[i.e. ‘It is true that/?’]” (ibid. 209). It might be thought that Maher advocates here 
some form of a minimalist account of truth, in line with his pragmatist 
predecessors. Although such a reading is not unreasonable, it is far from being 
unambiguous. In fact, one can extract a markedly different picture from Maher’s 
peculiar understanding of philosophy of science itself, which brings him much 
closer to the mainstream assumptions entertained within the standard debates on 
realism.
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Maher’s main focus is on scientific values. By ‘scientific values’ he refers to 
the epistemic goals science presupposes. Maher, however, construes ‘scientific 
values’ in a rather surprising way. Taking his cue from van Fraassen, he writes: 
“Is the issue [about scientific values] a descriptive one about the values 
scientists actually have? Or is it a normative one, about the values scientists 
ought to have? It is neither of these. Van Fraassen is answering the question 
What is science?..., and so his claims about scientific values are claims about 
what values a person must have to be a scientist” (ibid. 241)55.
But a number of objections can be raised to this. First, the issue of ‘what values a 
person must have to be a scientist’ is a normative one. Hence, Maher’s assertion 
that it is neither normative nor descriptive is very puzzling . On top of this, van 
Fraassen’s own construal of the issue is, in the end, also normative (and, in fact, 
much richer than the mere question of defining ‘which values a person must have to 
be a scientist’). After a few rather ambiguous introductory remarks in his (1993, 
189), van Fraassen specifies a scientific theory as “an object for epistemic or at 
least doxastic attitudes -  the attitudes expressed in assertions of knowledge and 
opinion” (ibid. 190). The investigation of the status of our doxastic attitudes 
towards scientific theories, however, is by definition a normative endeavour.
Maher’s main protest, then, is that both realists and anti-realists have failed to 
appreciate the import of further factors (or ‘values’, in his terminology) such as 
informativeness, besides the standard-ones like truth and empirical adequacy, for
55 Emphasis in the original.
56 In a footnote, Maher attributes to van Fraassen himself the view that the issue regarding scientific 
values is neither normative nor descriptive (1993, 241, fii. 18). Even if  this is a faithful 
representation o f what van Fraassen actually said, though, one is still left wondering about the nature 
o f the debate on van Fraassen’s own characterisation.
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theory-choice. He claims that his own decision-theoretic account fares better than 
standard methodologies by explicitly incorporating all the relevant values through 
the introduction of the concept o f ‘cognitive utility’. If that is so, though, and in the 
absence of further illumination from Maher, it seems difficult to see how he could 
object to the common-sensical correspondence account of truth, assumed among 
others by van Fraassen himself. In other words, what seems to matter most to him is 
not what ‘truth’ is about but, rather, what else besides truth -standardly-understood 
is important for theory-choice. I conclude, then, that the main difference between 
Maher’s decision-theoretic account and the standard approaches is not so much that 
they employ two different conceptions of truth but, rather, that they disagree on 
what are the relevant epistemic values for theory-choice.
It follows that Maher’s decision-theoretic approach is consistent with the 
basic realist assumptions regarding the notion of ‘truth’. Let’s, then, see how it can 
be used by the Bayesian to counter the realist’s charge. The decision-theoretic 
approach denies that a Bayesian can only accept a hypothesis if it has probability 
one. Maher claims that “Bayesians can admit that there are more things in this 
world than subjective probabilities” (Maher 1992,154). By admitting the existence 
of epistemic utilities, they explicitly deny that probability is all that matters for 
‘theory acceptance’. Acceptance of one theory among many competitors merely 
requires that that theory maximises expected cognitive utility, and this is, of course, 
quite compatible with that theory’s probability being significantly lower than 1. 
Hence, the assumption that a realist always accepts his theories57 does not commit
57 It might still be rather unclear what a proper characterisation o f the realist position might look like 
on the decision-theoretic account. Given the central role ‘theory acceptance’ occupies in this 
context, the correct formulation is, I think, the following: a decision-theorist will be taking a realist
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him to assigning to them probability 1 -  if the decision-theoretic account is 
adopted.
Decision-theory, then, appears to offer a way out of the charge that Bayesians 
cannot accommodate within their analytic framework a notion of ‘theory 
acceptance’ that is appropriate for the analysis of the realist position. I think, 
however, that the decision-theoretic way of reconciling realism and Bayesianism is 
unacceptable. This is because decision-theory fails to provide a persuasive, or even 
a coherent, account of the trade-off between informativeness and probability on 
which it centrally relies.
2.3.2 The Benign Trade-off Between Informativeness and Probability
The only uncontroversial case of a trade-off between informativeness and 
probability is when a theory Tentails some other theory T \  When this happens, T s  
logical content (or informativeness) is greater than that of T \  On the other hand, it 
is of course a theorem of the probability calculus that if T f= T \  then Pr(7) < PrCT*); 
moreover, the equality holds if either Pr{TIT1) = 1, for example when T* logically 
entails T, or if Pr(71') = 0. Thus, in this special case of entailment, probability and 
content will generally pull in different directions.
But does this pose special problems for a purely probabilistic approach to 
theory change that require radical reshaping of the approach and, perhaps, the 
introduction of a utility function? Let’s look at actual science for a case where a 
theory T entails some other theory T \  A readily available way for the creation of
stance towards his theories if  and only if he a) already accepts a theory on the basis o f utility- 
maximisation, and b) assigns to this theory probability greater than 0.5 (more details as to how 
condition (b) should be construed are contained in section 2.5.1).
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such a situation is to isolate parts of general theoretical frameworks and thus create 
deducible sub-theories. For example, one might consider Newton’s theory of 
planetary motion, which is entailed by the general framework of Newtonian 
Mechanics (NM). It might, then, be argued that although NM is less probable than 
the sub-theory referring to planetary motion, we still opt for the general framework 
on the basis of its informativeness.
It is of course true that the probability of NM is lower than that of the sub­
theory describing planetary motions in particular; but it is also false that these two 
theories have ever been (or ought to be) considered as genuine rivals. In fact, 
speaking of two theories in this case is already counter-intuitive. It seems more 
appropriate to describe this situation as a generalisation of one or more basic 
theoretical principles to a larger domain of phenomena, or, in case the principles 
were employed implicitly, as the extraction of a general principle from what is in 
reality an instance of its application. Even if we leave aside issues regarding the 
individuation of theories, though, and take NM and its planetary sub-theory as 
distinct, it is still far-fetched to suggest that there was ever (or that there ought to 
be) a question of choosing the one over the other. Instead, the real question is 
whether one has good reasons to accept both NM and its sub-theory or only the sub­
theory. Obviously the probability of the special case will be at least as great as the 
probability of the generalised framework, but this is to be expected by pure logic 
alone. In no way, though, does this constitute an instance of genuine theory choice 
between proper rival theories. Whenever a theory T  entails T \  it fails to be a 
genuine rival to T \
What happens, then, when it comes to proper rivals, in which the history of 
science abounds? The replacement of Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws by the more
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general NM is one example of genuine theory choice between rival theories. At the 
same time, it has also been taken to exemplify successful inter-theory reduction a la
co
Nagel, which means that it ought to satisfy Nagel ’ s condition o f derivability . This 
states that for reduction to take place, the newer (or more fundamental) theory T 
must entail the old (or less fundamental) theory T ’ it replaces so that all the laws of 
T ’ are deductively derivable from T. Hence, we seem to have a counter-example to 
my claim that it is impossible for a theory T to entail T ’ and also genuinely rival it.
Appearances to the contrary, this claim is not correct. For as we ought to have 
known since Duhem’s classic treatment (1906, 192-193), the replacement of 
Kepler’s and Galileo’s laws by NM in fact fails to satisfy the condition of 
derivability. Kepler’s first law, for example, says that any planet moves on an 
elliptical orbit around the sun. NM, on the other hand, says that any planet would 
move on an ellipse on the counter/actual supposition that the only bodies in the 
universe were the sun and that single planet. By taking into account the mutual 
attraction between the planet under consideration and the rest of the planets, 
however, NM predicts that planets move on a ‘perturbed’ ellipse, thus formally 
contradicting Kepler’s first law. Of course, owing to the massive size of the sun 
relative to the rest of the planets, NM entails Kepler’s law as afirst approximation, 
which, nonetheless, fails to render them logically consistent. The situation is similar 
regarding the relation between NM and Galileo’s laws. Galileo’s theory assumes 
constancy of vertical accelerations over any fall from a point above the surface of
58 The other condition Nagel thought necessary for successful reduction was the condition o f  
connectability. This dictated that in case there were terms occurring only in the less fundamental 
theory, then some assumptions or “bridge laws” were required to connect them with the terms of the 
more fundamental theory in order for the logical derivation to take place. See Nagel (1961, 352- 
254).
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the earth while NM denies this proposition. Acceleration in NM is a function of the 
distance between the centre of mass of the body and the centre of mass of the earth, 
and this distance of course changes during the course of the fall. However the 
distance between the earth’s surface and its centre of gravity is so great compared 
to the length of the fall that the change is very small; consequently, the difference 
between Galileo’s prediction and Newton’s is also very small and, in fact, well 
within observational error. But, of course, a small distance is different from no 
distance at all. Strictly speaking the two theories conflict and, again, only an 
approximate relation holds between them (cf. Feyerabend 1962, 57-59; Popper 
1983,142)59.
The significance of these well-known results should not be underemphasised. 
They establish that existing genuine instances of rival theories fail to satisfy the 
condition of derivability, and hence, that they are no counter-examples to my 
previous claim that when a theory T  entails T \  it does not genuinely rival T \  We 
may conclude, then, that in the absence of a more convincing counter-example, the 
Bayesian has not been shown to face a trade-off between content and probability in 
cases of genuine theory-choice.
One might try to contest this conclusion by noting that it is at least plausible 
to maintain that, say, NM is much more informative than either Kepler’s theory or 
Galileo’s despite the absence of strict entailment relations between them. Although 
one can derive approximate versions of Kepler’s and Galileo’s specific theories 
from NM, the converse does not hold. Hence, although not strictly derivable from 
NM, Kepler’s and Galileo’s theories still get very close to being so derivable,
59 Similar approximate relations can also be derived between NM and special relativity, for speeds 
strictly smaller than the speed o f light.
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which in turn would seem to allow us assert (no doubt rather loosely) that NM is 
much more informative than either of the two.
Even if we grant that NM is much more informative than either Kepler’s or 
Galileo’s theory, however, this by itself does not imply that there is a trade-off 
between content and probability for these theories. Put more generally, for two 
theories standing in a relation of approximate entailment it stills seems plausible to 
argue that it is at least possible to assert both a) that they are comparable content- 
wise and at the same time b) that there is no trade-off between content and 
probability in this case. One reason for this possibility might be sought in our habit 
of employing an intuitive and imprecise notion of a theory’s content alongside the 
stricter one, which applies only in cases of strict deductive entailment. We seem 
inclined to make comparisons of content even when, strictly speaking, no such 
relation can be unambiguously asserted. It’s no wonder that such an imprecise 
notion of content can be made to fit with the equally imprecise notion of 
approximate entailment. The concept of probability, on the contrary, is nothing like 
that. Being as rigorously formalised and explicated as it is, it remains mysterious 
how it is supposed to be influenced by the assertion of relations as vague as 
‘approximate entailment’.
Still, the possibility of approximating both Kepler’s and Galileo’s theories 
from the standpoint of Newtonian theory might give rise to the following possible 
objection. Those approximate Newtonian sub-theories follow logically from 
Newton’s theory, and hence, are less informative and more probable than the 
general Newtonian framework. One might be tempted to propose, then, that instead 
of contrasting the original Galilean and Keplerian formulations with Newtonian 
theory, what one should do is contrast those approximate Newtonian sub­
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constructions with the general Newtonian framework. If one does this, the trade-off 
between informativeness and probability re-enters the scene and appears to become 
a problem again.
The reason the problem is only apparent, though, is not hard to see. What we 
have done here is traded an instance of genuine theory-choice with one that is not 
genuine. We started with the original contraposition of Keplerian and Galilean 
theory with NM. These theories genuinely rivalled NM but were irreducible to it. 
We then substituted Newtonian versions of both Galileo’s and Kepler’s theories for 
the original formulations and proclaimed them to be the genuine rivals of NM. This 
proclamation, nonetheless, is illegitimate. Those Newtonian sub-formulations were 
explicitly constructed on the basis of Newtonian principles with the aim to 
approximate the original theories. It is surely highly implausible to consider as 
genuine rivals two theories, one of which is NM and the other one explicitly 
constructed on the basis of NM itself!
In reality, this objection is just another instance of the general strategy of 
isolating parts of general theoretical frameworks and thus creating sub-theories 
entailed by the more general constructions. I examined this strategy early in this 
section and concluded that it does not give rise to genuine cases of theory-choice. 
Not surprisingly, the same holds for the Newtonian variants of the Galilean and 
Keplerian theories. Hence, the main point of this section, i.e. that it is impossible 
for a theory T to entail another theory 7” and genuinely rival it, stands intact.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that this strategy of sub-theory creation might 
not even be available for all cases of theory-change. This is especially the case 
whenever new theories bring with them sharp changes in ontology by introducing 
novel theoretical entities and relations radically at odds with the ones postulated by
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the previously dominant theories. In such cases it is very hard to come up with sub­
theories, which can be both properly derived from the general framework of the 
new theory and, at the same time, meaningfully said to approximate the theory they 
replace. A typical example of this situation, due to Nickles (1973)60, is the 
reduction of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) to NM. The standard way to 
approximate NM from within STR is to take the limit of certain STR equations as 
the physical system velocity tends to zero. Yet this is not a case of proper logical 
derivation of a theory approximating NM from within STR. Strictly speaking, all 
that STR entails is “conditional statements like ‘I f  system velocity is negligible 
relative to the velocity of light, then. . .”’61 (ibid. 196, fn. 28) rather than a special 
relativistic variant approximating NM.
The situation is even more striking, if one considers the relation between 
Quantum Mechanics (QM) and NM with respect to Ehrenfest’s theorem. This 
theorem states roughly that any relation appearing in NM must be valid as a 
relation between quantum-mechanical expectation values. In other words, wherever 
NM postulates relations between variables, QM postulates relations between the 
expectation values of those variables As Nickles (ibid. 196-197) rightly notes, 
though, this amounts to saying that QM employs a formal calculus which is not 
shared by NM. Hence, although NM and QM are clearly somehow related, it would 
surely be far-fetched to suggest that through Ehrenfest’s theorem one can derive an 
approximate quantum-mechanical variant of NM, which nonetheless makes use of
60Nickles discusses these examples in the course ofhis argument against Schaffner’s (1967) model 
o f inter-theory reduction. His conclusions, nonetheless, are highly relevant for our purposes, since 
Schaffher’s approach crucially rests on the existence o f a corrected version o f the reduced theory, 
which both approximates the reduced theory and is also logically derivable from the reducing one.
61 Emphasis in the original.
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an altogether different formal calculus from NM itself! These examples illustrate, 
then, that what appeared to be a ready-made recipe for relating content with 
probability (i.e. the creation of sub-theories approximating the historical rivals) not 
only fails in principle, but is also far more difficult to implement in all actual cases 
of theory-change than initially thought.
We can safely conclude, then, that considerations of content and probability 
fo r genuine cases o f  rival theories are logically independent. The absence of a 
negative relation between them, assumed by decision-theory, shows that the 
adoption of the decision-theoretic framework is in fact ill-motivated. Since seeking 
theories with high probability does not disqualify one from getting theories with 
high content, there is no basis on which to motivate the introduction of the notion 
of epistemic utility alongside that of probability. All we need in order to understand 
‘theory-choice’ is a measure of epistemic security, which, as I argue in the next 
section, is already available to us in the form of the probability calculus.
2.4 Explaining ‘Acceptance* Away
The realist challenge to Bayesianism presented earlier can be reconstructed 
more formally as follows:
1. The realist offers a deductively invalid inductive argument for the approximate 
truth of our best scientific theories62.
62 The term ‘inductive’ here refers to the realist No-Miracles argument qua an ampliative inference 
rather than to enumerative induction or any other ‘inductive rule’. The precise content o f this 
argument will be discussed in detail in later chapters. For the purposes o f this chapter it suffices to 
note that the realist explicitly claims his argument to be ampliative and, hence, that its conclusion 
does not follow deductively from its premises.
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2. This argument allows him to ‘accept’ these theories on the grounds that it 
affords them strong inductive support.
3. ‘Accepting’ the conclusion of an inductive argument is justified if and only if 
the argument is inductively strong.
4. Hence, the realist justifiably ‘accepts’ his best theories.
At the same time, though, we know that:
5. These theories should be assigned probability strictly less than 1.
6. Furthermore, the Bayesian can uncontroversially ‘accept’ a hypothesis if and 
only if it is assigned probability 1.
7. Therefore, the Bayesian lacks the resources to accommodate the realist’s 
justified epistemic attitude towards his theories.
Premises (1) and (2) merely articulate what a realist expressly holds, 
assuming for purposes of discussion that his argument is inductively strong. 
Premise (3) is implicit in the realist’s argument, if his decision to ‘accept’ his 
fundamental theories is to be justified at all. Premise (5) is also eminently 
reasonable. Indeed, no serious scientific theory should ever be assigned probability 
1, whatever the evidence for it might be, given the extent to which it transcends the 
phenomena and its indirect link to them through exceedingly complex ways of 
experimenting. Finally, premise (6) is supported by the failure of both the 
‘threshold’ and the decision-theoretic account to yield a viable Bayesian theory of 
‘acceptance’ for levels of probability less than 1, as argued for in the previous 
sections.
In contrast to the ‘threshold account’ and to the various decision-theoretic 
approaches, which seek to modify premise (6), the reason I believe that the above 
argument is unsound is because premise (3) seems clearly false. If so, then there is
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no basis for (4) and the realist is not justified in ‘accepting’ his best scientific 
theories. Note, though, that this conclusion does not in turn imply that one can 
never be justified in being a realist. Quite to the contrary, in what follows I argue 
that a Bayesian approach explains both why a realist should never accept his 
theories and why one can still perfectly reasonably claim to be a realist vis a vis his 
best scientific theories. If I am right, then Bayesian Confirmation Theory is not 
only able to capture fully the essentials of the realist position, it also further 
elucidates it and becomes a proper means of expressing it.
To start with, we need to identify the relevant aspect of the realist position 
which allegedly is not captured by the Bayesian view. The reason why the realist 
asserts that his arguments legitimise detachment of their conclusion and, hence, 
‘acceptance’, is because he wants to claim to possess knowledge. Recall his main 
concern: that of establishing the epistemic claim that we have good reasons to 
believe that our best scientific theories are well-confirmed and (at least) 
approximately true. We know that when it comes to deductive arguments starting 
from entirely uncontroversial premises (if there are ever any), accepting (or 
detaching or asserting) their conclusion is a simple consequence of their validity. 
For all we know, though, nothing similar holds for the inductive case. The realist’s 
conclusion does not follow from his premises, no matter how uncontroversial they 
are. Can we detach the conclusion of an (deductively invalid) inductive argument, 
even if we concede that the argument is inductively strong?
When examining the lottery paradox, I mentioned that we deal with 
essentially two conceptually distinct notions o f ‘acceptance’. One of them, I called 
it acceptance,, refers to fully-fledged acceptance, i.e. acceptance when the 
probability we assign to our propositions is 1. This case is not particularly
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problematic, since we can arguably claim knowledge regarding such propositions, 
if we can ever claim knowledge at all. Examples of such propositions are all 
standard logical truths and (perhaps) some other standardly accepted propositions, 
e.g. reports of observations collected via our unaided senses, which, although non­
trivial, reflect our fundamental epistemological presuppositions. To be sure, 
endorsing those presuppositions goes beyond subjectivism. This is because we are 
now in effect asserting that we can obtain objective knowledge of certain non­
trivial propositions. The justification of those presuppositions, however, need not 
occupy us at this point, since they were only intended as an illustration of what is 
involved in cases of fully-fledged acceptance. The other notion, acceptance 2, 
refers to propositions which are assigned lower probability, but still quite high. In 
this second case, I maintained, we don’t employ the same concept. We want to 
make a qualified statement, which reflects both our confidence in the (approximate) 
truth of the statement under consideration as well as our recognition that we do not 
have conclusive grounds for it.
The realist’s claim is just one such statement. If asked about his epistemic 
stance regarding his best theories, the realist would not respond by saying that he is 
sure that they are true, nor even that he is sure that they are approximately true. In 
failing to claim certainty, he also fails to accept his theories in the sense of 
acceptance,. What he would say instead is that he has reasons to believe that 
current theories are approximately true and that is why he only accepts his theories 
in the sense of acceptance 2. But, then, what does ‘having reasons to believe’ 
mean? What comes naturally (and, I would argue, correctly) to mind when faced 
with this question is: ‘they are probably approximately true’ or ‘it is very likely that 
they are approximately true’. In other words, the realist’s ‘reasons to believe’ in the
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approximate truth of our theories (as well as his grounds for acceptance 2) are 
summed up in no more than a probability statement.
A tempting rejoinder for a defender of acceptance 2 would be to attempt to 
explicate this notion by alluding to the idea that inductive arguments allow us to 
‘accept’ only defeasible conclusions. Psillos, for example, drawing from Pollock’s 
(1986) work, points out that “unlike deductive methods, ampliative methods are 
defeasible. The issue here is ... that further information can remove the warrant for 
holding the output of the method” (2002, 609). He readily admits, of course, that 
the defeasible character of ampliative inferences provides only “prima facie 
warrant for an output (belief)” (ibid. 609). Rather than this becoming a reason for 
refusing to ‘hold’ or ‘accept’ the conclusions of ampliative inferences, however, 
Psillos praises Pollock for “rightly [stressing that] to call a warrant (or a reason) 
prima facie is not to degrade it, qua warrant or reason” (ibid. 609)63. In short, the 
claim seems to be that, by accepting 2 that our scientific theories are approximately 
true, we acknowledge that our reasons for ‘acceptance’ might be removed in due 
course, yet we think that at present there is no evidence that should make us suspect 
that this possibility is real.
I still think, however, that this is not an acceptable solution. In fact, alluding 
to the ‘defeasibility’ of ampliative inferences further highlights why notions like 
acceptance 2 are totally redundant and reducible to a mere probability statement. 
Indeed, what else does an assignment of a high probability but less than 1 to a given 
statement express except the recognition of the fact that, despite our present 
confidence, this statement might turn out to be false, i.e. be defeated7 Clearly, if 
there is a feature of ampliative reasoning that a purely probabilistic approach can
63 Emphases in the original.
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express most adequately, then this is its defeasible character. This is because a 
probabilistic theory incorporates at the outset the salient feature of defeasibility, 
namely indefiniteness or uncertainty of opinion.
We see, then, that the realist’s ‘reasons for belief and the ensuing 
acceptance 2 eventually boil down to a probability assignment alone, offering no 
further information whatsoever about one’s epistemic situation. The only thing the 
realist can achieve by maintaining the cover term ‘acceptance’ is to convey the 
false impression that we have somehow got away from the contingent character of 
the realist claim. And that, as a consequence, we are all of a sudden able to claim 
some sort of epistemic security for our hypotheses superior to what a mere 
probability assignment offers. Yet nothing of this sort can happen - and this for 
logical reasons alone. It follows that probability statements are not only suitable for 
expressing the realist epistemic situation, they are also mandatory in that they alone 
express transparently the contingent (and non-certain) character of the realist thesis.
This approach is not new, of course. It was proposed by the master of 
conceptual elucidation, Rudolf Carnap, in his (1968a). Carnap proposed to apply 
his notion of explication -  originally introduced in his Logical Foundations o f  
Probability (1950) for the purpose of analysing the concept of ‘confirmation’ - also 
to the notion of ‘theory acceptance’. By ‘explication’ Carnap understood “the 
transformation of an inexact, pre-scientific concept, the explicandum, into an exact 
concept, the explicatum” (1950,1). Concepts, he maintained, are typically ranked 
in ascending degree of accuracy into classificatory, comparative and quantitative 
ones. Classificatory concepts are typical of a pre-scientific mode of thought, 
according to which things are assigned only a few mutually exclusive properties. 
This makes the use of these concepts easy for the layman but at the same time
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disqualifies them from supplying the fine grained distinctions necessary for the 
expression of more complicated ideas. Quantitative concepts, on the contrary, are 
the exact opposite. Despite requiring technical skill, they signify the attainment of a 
level of conceptual sophistication typically associated with scientific (and, one 
might add, philosophical) advancement.
According to Carnap, the whole debate about ‘theory acceptance’ is “not so 
much a question of right or wrong, but rather of primitive or more refined 
procedures...[I]n particular, [the problem situation regarding acceptance rules] 
appears to me [i.e. Carnap] to be a special case of the distinction between three 
kinds of concepts, namely, classificatory, comparative, and quantitative concepts” 
(1968a, 147). The concept of ‘theory acceptance’ is just a typical example of a 
classificatory concept. Talking in terms of acceptance (in the sense of acceptance 2, 
of course) is just one way to characterise one’s epistemic disposition towards a 
theory, yet it is a rather primitive way. Adding a numerical scale makes the 
characterisation of that very same disposition more detailed and clear. The new and 
more powerful conceptual tool, then, correctly takes the place of the old and less 
refined one, allowing one to express his epistemic attitude more accurately and 
transparently. Sticking with the old conceptual machinery is just an attempt to 
preserve the psychologically comforting connection with the absolute notions that 
the realist (rightly) aims at and these primitive concepts rely on, thus creating the 
illusion that these ideals somehow become easier to achieve if one prefers one 
linguistic idiom over the other.
I  conclude, then, that the realist should never accept his theories. He should 
not do so in the sense of acceptance 1, because this sense does not convey the 
meaning of the thesis he wishes to defend; equally, he should not accept his
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theories in the sense of acceptance 2, because employing this terminology offers 
nothing over and above the probabilistic assignments and at the same time merely 
obscures the issues involved. Hence, pure Bayesianism both avoids our initial 
problem and at the same time emerges as a proper standpoint from which to 
reconstruct the debate about realism.
Finally, let me emphasize once more that this construal o f‘theory acceptance’ 
is related exclusively to the epistemic issues debated within normative philosophy 
of science. It is not an attempt to regulate the everyday use of terms; it is merely a 
view according to which using seemingly innocuous terms in a philosophical 
context may create pseudo-problems and unjustifiably prejudice one against 
otherwise legitimate theoretical approaches like Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
2.5 Modeling Realism and Competitors Once More
How, then, should we model realism and the various alternative positions in 
purely probabilistic terms, now that we have found good reason to abstain from 
using any acceptance-related terminology?
2.5.1 Realism
The realist’s principal focus is on the epistemic claim that we are justified in 
believing in the approximate truth of our theories. I have just argued that the realist 
claim naturally translates into the proposition ‘we have good reasons to think that 
our best theories are probably approximately true’ and that is why one ought to 
reduce the meaning of the realist thesis to some probability statement(s). But what 
does it mean, in more quantitative terms, to hold that ‘we have good reasons to 
think that our best theories are probably approximately true’? The natural (and most
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popular64) answer to this question seems to be that, in principle, thinking that we 
are justified in assigning to our theories any probability more than 0.5 is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for someone to count as a scientific realist. 
This is because that proposal amounts to saying the obvious, i.e. that a realist thinks 
that he has good reasons to believe that our current theories are more likely than not 
to be approximately true. And when one thinks that some hypothesis is more likely 
than not to be true, one can assert, as the realist does, that his theories are ‘probably 
approximately true’.
There are two interrelated issues here. First, note the importance the realist 
must assign to his having good reasons to think that our best scientific theories 
deserve probability greater than 0.5. Indeed, the epistemic thesis that we are 
justified in believing in the approximate truth of our best theories is an integral 
component of the realist stance, as defined at the beginning of this chapter (pp. 65- 
66). Hence, the requirement that the probabilist asserts explicitly that there are 
certain good reasons which induce his probabilistic assignments is intended to 
safeguard the normative import of the realist position on its probabilistic 
understanding. It is not enough merely as a subjective matter to assign a probability 
higher than 0.5 to some current theory in successful mature science. In fact, one 
might add that it is not even enough to allude to ‘reasons’ that are not included in 
the set of factors, which are taken to be evidentially relevant to a judgement of truth 
for a scientific theory from the perspective of the modem, empirically oriented, 
thinker. Examples of such ‘reasons’ would be divine revelation or the allusion to 
the opinion of some one authority, e.g. the Pope. As a realist, one must hold that
64 See, for example, Dorling (1992,366ff.), Howson (2000,201) and Magnus and Callender (2004, 
330).
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one has good reason for making that probability assignment, where ‘good reason’ 
must of necessity involve those factors that are thought epistemically significant for 
a judgement of truth from the standpoint of the empirically-minded, scientifically 
oriented modem thinker.
Secondly, it follows from the realists’ insistence on having good reasons for 
the adoption of their epistemic stance that their probabilistic assignments should be 
supported by strong philosophical arguments for their correctness. This situation 
not only takes us beyond subjectivism from the outset but it also sets an, 
admittedly, unusually strong requirement for having degrees of belief in the truth of 
certain propositions. I think it reflects, nonetheless, quite accurately how 
epistemically demanding and interesting the realist claim is. The realist does not 
wish to issue merely a tentative statement regarding the (approximate) truth of our 
best theories. He tries instead to present us with a strong normative case, which 
serves as the foundation for his epistemic stance65. Consequently, it seems that the 
emphasis on justification that realism presupposes accounts quite naturally for the
65 The philosophical nature of the realist’s argument in favour of his probabilistic assignments (whose 
content is analysed in considerable detail in the chapters to follow) is also helpful in avoiding a potential 
infinite regress problem, which might seem to arise out o f my probabilistic characterisation o f the realist 
position. Indeed, if  the realist’s probabilistic assignments are based on our meta-beliefs concerning their 
justification, don’t we need further arguments which would justify those meta-beliefs o f ours, and so on 
and so forth ad infinituml I think the solution to this problem is provided by the fact that the justificatory 
argument for our first-order beliefs is philosophical, and hence, foundational for those beliefs. Like all 
philosophical arguments, the realist’s argument operates by default on the fundamental level o f discourse, 
and hence, breaks a potentially threatening regress at the outset. More details about how such an argument 
ought to be construed from the point of view o f fundamental epistemology are contained in ch. 5.
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demanding conditions that must be satisfied if one’s degrees of belief are to classify 
him within the realist camp.
It might readily be accepted that a necessary condition for realism is that we 
think our probabilities justifiably exceed the threshold of 0.5. It will surely not be 
accepted without protest that this is also sufficient for realism. What of the person 
who thinks that the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) deserves probability 
0.500000001? Is he a realist proper? I admit that attributing to him the realist 
epistemic stance brings with it an air of paradox. It is a paradox, though, difficult to 
evade. Let’s suppose that we refuse to call him a realist. In this case, someone who 
is not a realist still believes that GTR is more likely to be true than not. Is this less 
paradoxical? It seems that for limiting cases like this one, whichever way one goes 
inevitably brings some kind of counter-intuitive consequence. I suggest that, given 
that any threshold other than 0.5 is bound to reflect some arbitrary choice, 
Bayesians should accept the surpassing of this particular value as both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for endorsing the realist thesis. In this way, they can claim 
for themselves the following two advantages: a) this criterion is at the same time 
clear, definite as well as very natural and easily justifiable, b) it allows one to count 
as a realist about different claims without assigning to each one the same 
probability value. Surely, the fact that our belief in the existence of everyday 
middle-sized objects is far stronger than our belief in GTR does not entail that we 
can not be realists about both of them at the same time. Employing the 
aforementioned standard readily accommodates the obvious fact that realism itself 
comes in degrees and is not an all-or-nothing affair. In view of these advantages 
(especially the first one), we are better off if we bite the bullet and allow our 
peculiar figure who assigns probability 0.500000001 to GTR to count as a realist.
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Before I move on to realism’s main competitors, however, two things should 
be emphasised. First of all, setting the threshold at 0.5 is to be understood as an 
abstract characterisation of the realist thesis and not as an argument that realists 
today ought to believe in our best theories to a degree only slightly over 0.5. In 
other words, the degree of belief one ought to have in the approximate truth of our 
theories is to be determined solely through independent argumentation (of the sort 
presented in the following chapters) and not through an abstract analysis of the 
concept of ‘realism’ undertaken here. Secondly, the threshold probability 0.5 
should not be read as a detachment rule, i.e. a rule which allows us to assert without 
qualification the theory under consideration, since this would reintroduce the 
conjunction problem. My purpose here is to give a reductive analysis of the realist 
thesis, i.e. define it in terms of some specific set of probability attributions. 
According to such a view, then, there is nothing over and above the probability 
attributions just specified in the realist epistemic claim.
2.5.2 Constructive Empiricism
The main anti-realist contender over the last twenty-five years has 
undoubtedly been van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Faithful to the post­
positivist intellectual atmosphere, constructive empiricism takes issue with the 
realists’ epistemic claim. Van Fraassen is in agreement with the realist as far as the 
metaphysical and semantic theses of the realist doctrine are concerned. From a 
metaphysical point of view van Fraassen accepts the existence of a mind- 
independent world and from a semantic point of view he shares with the realist the 
belief that “the language of science should be literally construed” (van Fraassen 
1980,10). His disagreement centres on the realist’s epistemic claim that scientific
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theories are reasonably believed to be approximately true. Instead, van Fraassen’s 
empiricist alternative suggests that the empirical success of science to-date entitles 
us to infer only to the ‘empirical adequacy’ of our theories. It should be carefully 
noted that by this latter term van Fraassen refers “to all the phenomena; these are 
not exhausted by those actually observed, nor even by those observed at some time, 
whether past, present, or future” (ibid. 12) 66. The proper epistemic attitude towards 
the truth of our theories, and therefore towards its trans-observational components, 
is, van Fraassen suggests, suspension of belief and agnosticism.
There has been much discussion of how, if at all, van Fraassen’s agnostic 
position can be modelled in Bayesian terms. Van Fraassen’s own proposal can be 
found in his Laws and Symmetry (1989):
“The mistake ... is to assume that agnosticism is represented by a low 
probability. That confuses lack or suspension of opinion with opinion of a 
certain sort. To represent agnosticism we must take seriously the vagueness 
of opinion, and note that it can be totally vague” (193-194).
Thus, van Fraassen explicitly denies that agnosticism is to be identified with low 
probability. The argument for this claim is only found his (1998, 215-216) and is 
based on the plausible requirement that agnosticism is closed under negation: if one 
is agnostic about proposition^, then one is agnostic about -'A. But if we attribute to 
A probability less than 0.5, then we are forced to attribute to ~'A probability more 
than 0.5. Yet, this would amount to violating the closure condition, for, as we saw 
(and van Fraassen concurs), assigning probability more than 0.5 to a proposition 
does not amount to being agnostic about it. Instead, van Fraassen proposes that the 
right representation is through a set of probability functions, which includes 0 (a
66 Emphasis in the original.
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representor, as he calls it). Consequently, agnosticism is identified not with a low 
point-valued probability but instead with vague probability, i.e. an interval [0, x], 
where x  is some probability value other than 0.
An immediate consequence of van Fraassen’s proposal, noted by Hajek 
(1998) and Monton (1998), is that if we model constructive empiricism through 
interval-valued probabilities, then an agnostic can never change his mind. Indeed, if 
one conditionalises on any interval [0, jc], vagueness will be preserved since the 0- 
end of the interval will also be preserved in any new interval resulting from 
conditionalisation. Both Monton and Hajek claimed that it is an unwanted 
consequence of this way of modelling constructive empiricism that “it has a life­
long claim on its devotees” (Hajek 1998,201).
It might be objected, however, that this consequence of van Fraassen’s 
proposal is not undesirable at all . From the standpoint of philosophy of science 
and a priori analysis, it is quite natural to maintain that the philosophical stance one 
will take regarding the status of the observation-transcendent parts of theories is not 
subject to change through conditionalisation on the evidence. This being so, 
dogmatism on the agnostic’s part need not be particularly troubling with respect to 
the interval-valued probabilistic representation of agnosticism.
Still, even if we grant this, it does not follow that the interval-valued approach 
succeeds. The main reason to think not is that it seems that interval-valued 
probabilities fail to convey what is intended by the concept ‘agnosticism’. To see 
this, consider the following situation. Suppose I ask someone, ‘do you believe in 
God?’. If he said ‘there is a 90 per cent chance that God exists’, he would
67 Van Fraassen comes close to giving something like the same answer in his (1998,215) but does 
not elaborate.
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justifiably be classified as some sort of theist or ‘realist’ with respect to the 
unobservable entity ‘God’. If he said, however, ‘my degree of belief in the 
existence of God lies in the range from 0 to 0.9’, then one should think not that this 
person is agnostic, rather that he is just confused with respect to his own beliefs! 
Most probably, he would describe his own epistemic situation with the phrase ‘I 
don’t know what to think’, instead of ‘I am agnostic about God’.
But is there, then, any probabilistic construal of agnosticism? As I argue 
below, the answer to this question is affirmative. The agnostic position can be 
faithfully modelled in probabilistic terms. I wish to argue, nonetheless, that the 
model that works shows that once the probabilistic idiom is adopted, the 
identification between agnosticism and constructive empiricism becomes very 
misleading. This is not to say, of course, that van Fraassen has been misled from 
the outset into identifying his theory with agnosticism, since this identification was 
part of an informal (and, hence, vague) explication of his position. It is only to 
suggest that it is much more fruitful to leave behind this identification when one 
already operates within the context of the quantitative, probabilistic language. To 
see this, let’s go back to the essentials of the constructive empiricist position.
Constructive empiricists assert that scientific theories are to be interpreted 
literally. This means that they can freely assign probability values to their truth, 
unlike instrumentalists, who don’t think that scientific theoretical talk admits of 
truth-values. Furthermore, constructive empiricists deny the realist claim. 
Assuming that the construal of realism in the previous section is the right one, they 
don’t assign probability greater than 0.5 to our theories. If they did, then they would 
rightly be called realists. I have also argued that they do not assign interval-valued 
probabilities either, since constructive empiricists do not want to say that we are
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confused regarding the issue of realism. Instead, they want to say that they can 
understand the realist claim, that they don’t share the realist’s optimism but at the 
same time that they can’t exclude the possibility that our theories are in fact true. 
Indeed, this is what suspending judgement means.
Agnosticism, on the other hand, can be informally understood as saying that 
there is no reason to believe one thing or the other in the face of evidence. Hence, 
being agnostic about a scientific theory arguably amounts to assigning probability 
0.5 exactly to the claim that the theory in question is true. In this case, it’s safe to 
say that the reasons for the truth or falsity of the theory are in perfect balance. 
Granted, a sharp probability value equal to 0.5 makes it also possible to express all 
the main elements of the constructive empiricist’s position. But, of course, or so I 
claim, we can also faithfully express the fundamentals of the constructive 
empiricist stance when we assign determinate probabilities to our theories lying in 
the interval (0, 0.5] . By assigning a value of, say, 0.3 one expresses disbelief in 
the realist claim but at the same time acknowledges the possibility that the theory is 
in fact true. This possibility leads to what can be informally characterised as 
‘suspension of judgement’ but not to agnosticism according to the aforementioned 
proposal. I conclude, then, that insisting on identifying constructive empiricism 
with agnosticism within the probabilistic idiom leads one to a very narrow and 
implausible representation of the former, i.e. as requiring that one assigns to his 
theories probability exactly equal to 0.5.
68 In fact van Fraassen might even be happy with the interval [0, 0.5]. Since he is not an orthodox 
Bayesian and allows changes o f belief without conditionalisation, one can assign 0 probability to a 
hypothesis today and change his mind in a non-conditionalisation fashion tomorrow (cf. 1998,219).
114
One way out of this problem might be to claim that instead of assigning 
probability equal to 0.5, an agnostic should simply suggest that there are 
propositions for which we have no rational degrees of belief at all. Arguably, if we 
have no degrees of belief at all in the truth of certain propositions, we can be no 
other than agnostic about them. Despite the fact that such an epistemic (non) 
attitude can plausibly count as agnosticism, though, it is highly counter-intuitive 
that constructive empiricism amounts to having no degrees of belief at all in the 
truth of our scientific theories. It is very sensible to understand van Fraassen’s view 
as denying that our reasons for belief in truth are as strong as the realist suggests. 
On the contrary, it just does not seem plausible at all that van Fraassen’s pessimism 
with respect to our knowledge of the unobservable realm extends so far as to say 
that we do not even have the slightest clue about it.
These sentiments are reinforced by van Fraassen’s own occasional 
presentation of constructive empiricism as a fall-back (i.e. logically weaker) 
position relative to full-blown scientific realism. Here is van Fraassen on the merits 
of constructive empiricism compared to realism:
“[BJelief in the truth of theories is supererogatory. Suppose that nothing 
except evidence can give justification for belief. However flexibly this is 
construed, it means that we can have evidence for the truth of a theory only 
via evidential support for its empirical adequacy. The evidence then still 
provides some reason for believing in the truth, a infirmiori so to say ... but 
the additional belief is supererogatory” (1985, 255).
This clearly demonstrates that van Fraassen himself has not intended constructive 
empiricism as implying that we can have no rational beliefs at all in the truth of our 
theories. On this understanding, constructive empiricism is only a ‘safer’ option
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than realism on the basis of logic alone. If belief comes in degrees, then, and we 
can have beliefs in truth, we can also have degrees of belief in the truth of our 
theories. Restating van Fraassen’s argument in probabilistic terms makes this point 
even more transparent. Since constructive empiricism is logically weaker than 
realism, i.e. since belief in truth implies belief in empirical adequacy but not vice 
versa, it follows from the probability calculus that the probability for truth can 
never exceed that of empirical adequacy. This for van Fraassen is reason enough to 
opt for his account rather than realism. Irrespective of whether he is right in his 
assessment69, though, it follows from his argument that a constructive empiricist 
has well-defined degrees of belief in the truth of our theories.
In effect, I have argued for a low probability understanding of constructive 
empiricism and for denying its identification with agnosticism within the 
probabilistic language. This line of thought is also perfectly consistent with the 
positive element of this account, i.e. the thesis that our current theories are 
empirically adequate in the interesting sense that they save all the phenomena, 
whether past, present or future, observed or unobserved. Surely, this claim is not 
trivial but requires some kind of inference. Additionally, this inference has to be 
inductive in kind and, at best, will make van Fraassen’s claim ‘probable enough’ 
rather than established. At any rate, we can’t possibly expect van Fraassen’s 
particularly powerful claim of empirical adequacy to be established with anything 
other than some degree of probability. Very much like realism, then, van Fraassen’s 
position amounts to saying that ‘although we don’t have good reason to believe in 
the (approximate) truth of our best theories, we do have reasons to think they are
69 For a similar probabilistic reconstruction o f van Fraassen’s argument and criticism see also Psillos 
(1999, 204-105).
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empirically adequate’, which translates quite naturally into ‘although it is not very 
probable that our theories are (approximately) true (although they might be), there 
are good reasons to think that it is quite probable that they are empirically 
adequate’70. Hence, van Fraassen’s position amounts to assigning point-valued 
probabilities between (0,0.5] to the (approximate) truth of our theories, and greater 
than 0.5 to their empirical adequacy.
Finally, we can also see why van Fraassen’s argument against constructive 
empiricism being identified with low probability has already been neutralised. This 
argument, recall, poses as a plausible requirement that ‘agnosticism’ is closed under 
negation: if one is agnostic about A, one ought to be agnostic about iA  also. But we 
have already denied that it is advisable to identify constructive empiricism with 
‘agnosticism’ within the probabilistic idiom. This being so, the road is open for a 
low-probability understanding of constructive empiricism.
I conclude, then, contra van Fraassen, that constructive empiricism is best 
understood as assigning point-valued probabilities lying in the interval (0, 0.5] to 
the (approximate) truth of our theories, and point-valued probabilities greater than 
0.5 to their empirical adequacy. And the same argument I offered earlier for the 
troublesome case of someone assigning probability 0.500000001 to GTR, I am 
willing to offer for his constructive empiricist counterpart who thinks that GTR 
deserves probability 0.0000000001. Probabilistic reasoning expresses indefinite 
knowledge even assuming point-valued attributions. Within this indefiniteness,
70 Hence, when van Fraassen asserts that according to constructive empiricism '‘''acceptance o f  a 
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (1980, 12; emphasis in the original), 
his notion o f ‘acceptance o f a theory as empirically adequate’ is again reduced to a mere probability 
statement for precisely the same reasons as the realist’s notion o f ‘acceptance o f a theory as true’, 
outlined above in section 2.4.
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there ought to be room for both realism and constructive empiricism. And as we 
have seen, there is.
Van Fraassen’s own reaction was quite unclear. In his (1998) he admitted that 
his interval-valued account was not adequate as an explication of the concept 
‘agnosticism’ but maintained that it was still good enough for the purposes of 
describing the constructive empiricist’s epistemic attitude. Van Fraassen explains: 
“[I]n the initial context, the important desire was not to be agnostic about 
theories which postulate unobservable entities - the desire was to be agnostic 
about the existence of the entities postulated. I submit that this desire can be 
satisfied. But what has now become clear is that we need to distinguish 
between these two related concerns” (1998,217).
This is surely a surprising remark. Indeed, how else can we be agnostic about the 
unobservable entities our theories postulate, except by being agnostic about the 
theories themselves? Van Fraassen seems to be repeating the fundamental 
misconception of entity realism here, i.e. he wrongly supposes that one can hold 
differing epistemic attitudes with respect to the entities we can access only with the 
mediation of our theories and the theories themselves. However that may be, 
though, I have maintained that one can reasonably model constructive empiricism 
quite faithfully, without any reference either to ‘agnosticism’ or interval-valued 
probabilities.
2.5.3 Epistemic Structural Realism
The last epistemic rival to full-blown realism I wish to consider briefly is 
Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR). ESR is a moderate realist position, apparently 
standing in-between full-blown realism and constructive empiricism. It aims to take
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into account both the realist’s reasons for his optimism as well as one of the main 
reasons for the anti-realist’s (though not van Fraassen’s own) reservations.
The realist’s optimism is based on the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), which 
claims that unless we take our theories to be true, their undeniable predictive 
success would amount to a miracle of a near-cosmic scale. This is the argument on 
the basis of which the realists have been proclaiming, misleadingly as we saw, that 
they ‘accept’ their theories in an epistemically special way. The exact content and 
success of the argument will be the subject of much to follow; for the time being let 
us accept that it does carry considerable force. The sceptic’s reservations, on the 
other hand, derive in great part from the famous ‘pessimistic induction’, an 
argument usually attributed to Laudan (1981), but whose essentials are found 
already in Poincare (1905) and Duhem (1906). The ‘pessimistic induction’ aims to 
undercut the NMA. The NMA asserts that there is a close link between predictive 
and experimental success and truth. In response, Laudan offered a list of theories in 
his (1981), which were once considered true by virtue of their empirical success, 
yet were subsequently abandoned as false. Laudan’s conclusion is that there is in 
fact no connection between success and truth, a claim he famously termed ‘the 
confutation of convergent realism’.
ESR tries to combine NMA and the ‘pessimistic induction’ by asserting that 
science reveals (approximately) the structure o f  the world, preserved within the 
continuous development of the mathematical laws of physics, while remaining 
silent about “the nature of the basic furniture of the universe” (Worrall 1989a,
71162) . Hence, the epistemic structural realist still adheres to the realist theses (R1)
71 Emphasis in the original.
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and (R2) (p. 64 above) but modifies (R3) to the effect that only (approximate) 
structural knowledge is accessible to us humans.
In effect, ESR falls in-between realism and constructive empiricism72. The 
epistemic structural realist sides with the latter in that we are not entitled to the 
realist’s epistemic optimism. He further claims, though, that approximate structural 
truth is attainable, its possession being evidenced in the continuous development of 
the mathematical expression of physical laws, which manifest the structure of the 
world.
It has been pointed out (cf. Howson 2000, 39-40) that structural realism can 
also be viewed as offering a detailed account of approximate truth. Indeed, it is 
quite reasonable to suggest that if ESR is correct and science does reveal the 
(approximately) true structure of the world, then we can claim that our theories are 
approximately true73. And since ESR is a well developed theoretical approach, it 
enjoys the additional advantage of being much clearer than most competing 
accounts of approximate truth. Hence, ESR not only combines the best realist and 
anti-realist arguments into one coherent thesis, it also provides a workable account 
of the elusive and obscure notion of approximate truth.
72 There has been considerable discussion lately regarding whether ESR is any different from either 
realism or constructive empiricism (c f  Demopoulos and Friedman 1985, Psillos 1999, Worrall and 
Zahar 2001, Ketland 2004). For present purposes I assume, although I don’t argue for it, that ESR 
does succeed as a freestanding position.
73 Note, however, that ESR claims that science is approximately structurally true. This means that 
although ESR offers a more precise account o f approximate truth when compared to full-blown 
realism, it still makes use o f a similarly vague notion o f ‘approximation’ when referring to 
approximate structural truth.
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While this line of reasoning is perfectly sensible, it is nonetheless logically 
independent of how ESR and full-blown realism are to be modelled in Bayesian 
terms. Regardless of whether they express themselves in Bayesian terms, full­
blown scientific realists tend to have a stronger notion of approximate truth in mind 
than ESR allows for. Accordingly, they claim that their position is markedly 
different from ESR74. Whether their disagreement is presented as one over the 
precise content of the notion of ‘approximate truth’ or over the proper scope of 
application of an antecedently agreed upon notion o f ‘approximate truth’ is largely 
a linguistic issue, just a different way of phrasing the same substantive point of 
disagreement.
Taking this into account, I follow standard usage in my Bayesian 
reconstruction of ESR and focus on the extent to which it claims that an 
antecedently understood concept of ‘approximate truth’ can be claimed for our 
theories. Very much like the constructive empiricist, then, the structuralist does not 
share the realist’s epistemic optimism. Hence, he assigns to the unqualified 
approximate truth of our theories point-valued probabilities lying in the interval (0,
0.5]. On the other hand, he does not merely claim that our theories are empirically 
adequate. The structuralist is optimistic regarding our attaining (approximate) 
structural truth. Following precisely the same rationale as in the case of realism, 
the structuralist’s position amounts to assigning probability greater than 0.5 to our 
theories being approximately structurally true.
74 A structuralist might wish to contend this by arguing that ESR provides the only workable notion 
of approximate truth. Such a strong impossibility result, nonetheless, needs independent 
argumentation.
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Finally, it is interesting to note the connections between the various 
philosophical standpoints we discussed in this chapter. It seems quite reasonable to 
suppose that if a theory is true, then this theory ought to be both structurally true as 
well as empirically adequate in van Fraassen’s strong sense. Hence, a realist might 
be expected to hold by default that his theories are also structurally true and 
empirically adequate. Nonetheless, no serious realist claims that total truth is 
forthcoming, since even today’s science is clearly not complete. This is why realists 
typically speak of ‘approximate truth’. The problems regarding the definition of 
this notion notwithstanding, it is not obvious that approximate truth entails either 
structural truth (even approximate structural truth) or full empirical adequacy. 
Especially with respect to the later, it seems clear that approximate truth does not, 
in fact, entail full empirical adequacy. Indeed, the main reason why a realist argues 
only for approximate truth is the reasonable expectation, in the face of the historical 
record as well as the open problems current science faces, that there will be some 
evidence, which current theories will not in fact be able to deal with (at least 
properly). The same remarks hold for structural realism. No structuralist infers to 
the total structural truth of our theories; instead, the notion of approximation must 
be invoked here too. Hence, even if empirical adequacy follows from total 
structural truth, this seems no longer to be the case when we consider approximate 
structural truth.
In what follows I do not attempt to resolve this issue, since it is largely 
tangential to my purposes in the rest of the thesis. It should be noted in passing, 
however, that this consideration of the logical connections between the main 
competitors in the realism debate reveals that the notion of empirical adequacy van 
Fraassen has in mind is too strong. A more appealing version of constructive
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empiricism would, perhaps, result from substituting reference to full empirical 
adequacy with approximate empirical adequacy. To the best of my knowledge, 
however, van Fraassen has never proposed such a revision.
2.6 Conclusion
My aim in this chapter was to show that a standard preliminary objection to 
the Bayesian is misguided. The objection amounted to the claim that the Bayesian 
lacks the conceptual apparatus to capture the subtleties of the realism debate, and in 
particular those revolving around the issue o f‘theory acceptance’. I maintained that 
this claim is in fact misguided since it depends on our unjustifiably strong pre- 
theoretic intuitions that there is an epistemically significant concept of ‘theory 
acceptance’ for non-trivial propositions. Rather than modifying Bayesianism in 
order to do justice to these intuitions, I suggested that they are abandoned in favour 
of the more precise, accurate and sophisticated probabilistic language. The resulting 
probabilistic reconstruction of realism and its main competitors shows, I think, how 
the probabilistic language best captures all their subtleties and essential details 
relevant for the debate among them. Hence, now that we know that the Bayesian 
can fully appreciate all the crucial concepts of the debate, we can proceed to a 
Bayesian reconstruction of its content and see whether we can learn anything useful 
from this point of view.
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Chapter 3
Bayesianism and the No-Miracles Argument I -  
Incompatibilism Examined
The discussion so far has revolved around the adequacy of the Bayesian 
framework to provide a formal reconstruction of the realism debate. It has, in other 
words, been mostly concerned with whether the concept of realism can be faithfully 
captured within Bayesianism, a question we answered affirmatively. Nothing has 
been said with respect to the content of the debate, i.e. which of the various 
positions outlined earlier, if any, is judged the correct one from a Bayesian point of 
view. On this issue, there are a number of claims to consider. First, we need to 
identify the most serious informal argument for the realist thesis. Once this is done, 
we can proceed to its probabilistic reconstruction. The problem is that there is no 
universal agreement with respect to the precise understanding of this argument nor 
is there only one probabilistic reconstruction of its various interpretations. In this 
chapter I commence an attempt to bring some order to the discussion of these 
issues. My tasks will be to: a) single out the most frequently-cited informal
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argument for realism -  that is, the No-Miracles Argument (NMA) and its possible 
interpretations, and b) discuss and disarm a set of arguments claiming either that 
Bayesianism shows that all interpretations of NMA are unacceptable or that 
Bayesianism fails to capture the NMA’s essential features. This will prepare the 
way for the positive Bayesian reconstruction of NMA I attempt in chapter 4.
3.1 The ‘Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism*
The most popular argument for Scientific Realism is the so-called No- 
Miracles Argument. Its name derives from Putnam’s remark that “the positive 
argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success 
of science a miracle” (Putnam 1975,73). However, the claim itself has a long pre­
history and has been understood in two markedly different ways. According to one 
conception, NMA is just another plausibility argument resting largely on our 
intuitions, while according to the other it represents an application of the distinct 
and allegedly sound mode of inference called Inference to the Best Explanation. It 
is unfortunate, however, that the terminology occasionally used tends to obscure the 
situation. Thus, Musgrave (1988), for example, offers a reconstruction of NMA as a 
plausibility argument despite the fact that he makes heavy use of the term ‘best 
explanation’. In what follows and for the sake of clarity I shall reserve the term 
‘best explanation’ only for the non-intuitive version of NMA.
3.1.1 Plausibility Considerations
The intuition behind the plausibility version of NMA (hereafter also referred 
to as the ‘intuitive’ NMA), put forth explicitly by Worrall (1989a) but with some of 
its elements going back to Smart (1963), Maxwell (1962,1970) and, most notably,
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as Worrall himself insists, Poincare (1905), is conveyed by the following prima 
facie obvious consideration. It is widely accepted that current science is 
predictively very successful. Some of its predictions are bom out to an 
extraordinary degree of accuracy, as testified through sophisticated and reliable 
processes of testing and measurement. Given this relatively uncontroversial fact, it 
would surely be a miracle if scientific theories failed to be fundamentally correct in 
at least some important ways in their theoretical description of nature. Miracles, 
however, are commonly thought of as our last resort, after all attempts to provide a 
rational account of some phenomenon have failed. That science’s predictive 
success is due to its being ‘essentially correct’ in its description of the unobservable 
reality is both a plausible as well as a non-miraculous claim, and, hence, ought to 
be preferred to the miraculous alternative.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this understanding of the NMA, the concepts 
employed in it are not transparent. One issue has to do with the notion of predictive 
success. Although it sounds innocuous to say that science is a predictively 
successful enterprise, it has been forcefully argued that the empirical success of a 
theory should not be equated merely with its ability to entail the phenomena, since 
any theory can trivially satisfy this requirement. Indeed, this is just a consequence 
of the celebrated Duhem thesis, i.e. the idea that a theory is always tested in 
conjunction with initial conditions and auxiliary assumptions. Given enough 
ingenuity, any recalcitrant datum can be made to follow from a system based on 
any core theoretical claim by suitably modifying some one of the various parts of 
the conjunction under test. Surely, though, the realist wants his theories to be 
empirically successful in a more genuine way than the aforementioned truism 
allows for.
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Perhaps the most widely accepted non-Bayesian characterisation of genuine 
empirical success is due to Elie Zahar (1983) and John Worrall (1985,1989a, 2002) 
and is usually referred to as ‘the use-novelty’ account. It suggests that a theory is 
genuinely empirically successful if and only if the successfully predicted data were 
not used in the construction of the theory under consideration. This allusion to the 
‘construction of a theory’ in the clearest case means that the theory initially left 
unspecified some free parameter, which is evaluated only by means of the data in 
question. The claim o f‘use-novelty’ is that, when these circumstances are in place, 
the data can’t be taken to provide any (or at least full) support to the core 
theoretical claim of these systems relative to any other, which predicts them 
independently. The claim of the realist is that our current best theories do in fact 
exhibit this demanding form of predictive success.
Even if one grants, though, that our best theories are genuinely predictively 
successful, this does not entail that they are approximately true. Of course, no 
serious proponent of the NMA claims that the argument proves the realist thesis. It 
is still logically possible that our genuinely predictive theories are false in their 
description of the unobservable parts of nature and that, in due course, new theories 
will take their place in the scope of the NMA. Despite this possibility, however, 
there is an intuitively clear sense that it would be too far-fetched to believe that our 
world is not even approximately as our theories say it is, even if that is logically 
possible. Although there is no deductive proof from indubitable first principles that 
the NMA delivers its conclusion, our ‘inductive intuition’ assures us that all the 
future, logically possible competitors to our theories are indeed not worth worrying 
about. The only plausible view is that it is very likely that our current mature 
science is (approximately) true.
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How is this plausibility claim justified in its turn, though? The answer 
provided by its defenders is that it is not justified by means of an argument. For any 
further argument would involve non-trivial premises, which would need further 
arguments in their support and so on to an infinite regress or a logical circle -  in 
fact, this is no other than an elaboration of Hume’s problem of induction. 
Nonetheless, we seem to possess some sort of ‘inductive intuition’, which guides 
and to date has guided successfully our ampliative reasoning, be it everyday or 
scientific75. No one seriously questions the truth of ‘obvious’ but non-trivial 
propositions assuming the existence of an external world revealed to us through the 
senses. Affirming such propositions, though, depends precisely on a consideration 
of the same kind as NMA: it would surely be a miracle if our everyday experiences, 
feelings etc. failed to correspond to an objective external reality, despite the fact 
that there is no demonstrative proof of the truth of these propositions vis a vis the 
infinity of logically possible metaphysical alternatives. For someone who accepts 
the everyday version of NMA, then, it would arguably be inconsistent to deny the 
scientific one.
Of course, as noted a little earlier, the above argument does not establish the 
realist thesis, since it assumes that one justifiably accepts everyday extrapolations 
on the basis of inductive intuitions of the NMA kind. These extrapolations are non­
trivial claims too, and hence, non-demonstrable. The intuitive force, nonetheless, of
75 The term ‘inductive intuition’ was used by Carnap (1968b), yet his own understanding o f this 
term is quite different from the use I make o f it in the main text. For Carnap ‘inductive intuition’ 
refers first and foremost to our intuitive knowledge o f the axioms o f the system o f inductive logic, 
which are logical in nature, rather than our ability to acquire empirical knowledge. Furthermore, and 
despite the fact that he regards inductive logic as a priori, he makes explicit reference to circular but 
admissible ways o f reasoning, something modem a priorists deplore.
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our everyday inductive judgements is so overwhelming that it allows us to regard 
our ‘inductive intuitions’, everyday or scientific ones, as fundamentally sound on a 
priori grounds (cf. Worrall 1989b, 384; 1999, 350 and 360-361). This approach to 
the problem of induction is very well expressed by Pierre Duhem (who was in turn 
echoing of Blaisse Pascal): “We have an impotence to prove, which cannot be 
conquered by any dogmatism; we have an idea of truth which cannot be conquered 
by any Pyrrhonian scepticism” (1906, 27).
It has been argued, however, that this line of defence, no matter how honest in 
terms of taking into account our logical limitations, is not satisfactory. This 
complaint originates in the work of Richard Boyd, who held the view that the 
‘intuitive’ NMA76 “does not address the crucial epistemological claim of the 
empiricist argument: that since factual knowledge is grounded in experience, it can 
extend only to observable phenomena” (1984, 43). Though Boyd readily admits 
that the ‘intuitive’ NMA “is probably the argument that reconstructs the reason why 
most scientific realists are realists” (ibid. 49), he still doubts that its ‘intuitive’ 
formulation is strong enough to underwrite the realist claim and decisively defeat 
all anti-realist arguments. Boyd’s central worry seems to be that plausibility 
considerations based on a priori grounds are too weak to offer a satisfactory 
epistemological foundation for the realist thesis. In his own words, “[the ‘intuitive 
NMA provides us] with a reason to suppose that realism is true, but [does not 
provide us] with any epistemology to go with that conclusion” (ibid. 50).
76 Though Boyd never uses the term ‘intuitive NM A’ in his (1984, 49-50), his preliminary 
discussion makes it clear that he treats NMA as a plausibility argument. As is well-known, of  
course, he then goes on to ‘strengthen’ the argument by subsuming it under the general scheme o f  
Inference to the Best Explanation. An outline of this version o f NMA is contained in the next 
section.
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Consequently, if we wish the NMA to become an effective argument against the 
various forms of anti-realism, we should try to enhance its epistemological 
foundations. Boyd’s own suggestion was to supplement the epistemological basis 
of the NMA by regarding the argument as an instance of abductive reasoning, 
suitably understood as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). This is in turn taken 
to be an independent and sound form of non-deductive reasoning.
3.1.2 NMA as an ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’
Boyd (1984) argued that in order for realism to neutralise the anti-realist 
challenge, what is required is a neutral basis on the background of which the 
relative merits of the realist and anti-realist positions can be assessed. Boyd found 
this neutral ground in the way each philosophy explains what nearly everyone takes 
to be an uncontroversial fact, i.e. that our scientific methodology is predictively and 
experimentally very successful in the demanding way of the ‘use-novelty’ approach 
outlined earlier (cf. Psillos 1999,106-107).
According to the IBE-version of NMA (hereafter also referred to as the 
‘explanationist version’) one should be a scientific realist because realism provides 
us with the best explanation of the instrumental reliability of current mature science 
-  indeed Boyd implies that it is the only real explanation of that phenomenon (Boyd 
1984, 66). As Psillos explains, however, Boyd’s programme rests on the 
assumption that “a realist epistemology of science should employ no methods other 
than those used by scientists themselves” (1999, 78). This naturalistic thesis 
implies the controversial admission that realism offers a scientific explanation of 
the reliability of science, presumably of the same kind with the explanations of 
natural phenomena provided by ordinary scientific theories. Postponing further
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investigation of this point until the next paragraph, the explicit explanationist 
argument, succinctly reconstructed by Musgrave (1988) and repeated in Psillos 
(2006, 139-140), goes as follows:
(IBE-1) Science is a predictively successful enterprise.
(IBE-2) Realism enjoys the advantage over anti-realist philosophies that it best 
explains the predictive success of science.
(IBE-3) It is reasonable to infer the truth of a theory from the fact that it best 
explains the evidence in hand.
77Therefore, realism is the correct philosophical perspective .
Neither Boyd nor Musgrave nor Psillos of course simply asserts the explanatory 
superiority of realism in premise (IBE-2). They also provide an intuitively very 
powerful detailed comparison of realism to the significant anti-realist alternatives, 
ranging from Berkeleyan phenomenalism to van Fraassen’s constructive 
empiricism (cf. Boyd 1984,58-63, Musgrave 1988,60-68 and Psillos 1999,90-97).
Clearly (IBE-1) is true. However any number of doubts can be raised about 
(IBE-2). First, it presupposes that we have some clear notion of scientific 
explanation - a presupposition rendered very doubtful by a glance at the vast and 
heterogeneous literature on this topic produced over the last 50 years. Secondly,
77 Musgrave’s own understanding o f IBE is not that it is a distinct, non-deductive from of inference, 
since he notes that “I [Musgrave] prefer to construe so-called ‘inductive arguments’ as deductive 
arguments with ‘ inductive principles’ o f one kind or another among their premises. This conduces to 
clarity and obviates the need fo r  any special inductive logic” (p. 54, fii. 69; my emphasis). My 
understanding is that he simply uses the idiom o f explanation to convey what in essence is a 
plausibility judgement about the merits o f what we take to be a well-explaining theory. It remains a 
fact, however, that most defenders of IBE don’t think in the same way, as I explain below. Hence, 
Musgrave’s use o f terminology tends to be rather misleading.
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even if we agreed on what a scientific explanation is, could we really expect 
realism to provide a scientific explanation of the success of science, as Boyd’s 
naturalism invites us to do? Surely on any (sensible) account this would require 
independent testability and it seems impossible to see how realism could be 
independently tested. Moreover, even if we were to accept (IBE-2) so that the 
inference depended only on (IBE-3), the explanationist would still not be home free 
since there are important issues about (IBE-3) too.
Since the explanationist defenders of NMA are not satisfied with the a 
priorism of the plausibility version, they can’t possibly claim that (IBE-3) is shown 
to be true by means of a plausibility argument. This would simply collapse their 
case to the plausibility strategy we encountered in the previous sub-section. What 
they need to claim, instead, is that they can provide a convincing argument, which 
shows that IBE is in fact a reliable inference pattern, allowing us to infer truth on 
the grounds of explanatory superiority (cf. Psillos 1999, 79).
This takes us to the most controversial part of the explanationist defence of 
NMA, since the argument which allegedly demonstrates that IBE conveys 
epistemic warrant to its conclusions is circular and depends explicitly on the 
success of the NMA. The motivation for this kind of approach can be traced back to 
Goodman’s classic (1954) exposition of his ‘solution’ to the old problem of 
induction. As I noted earlier, in attempting to justify induction, one finds oneself 
confronted either by circularity or infinite regress. Goodman (ibid. 63-64), drawing 
on a parallel with deductive logic, reasoned essentially as follows in his ‘solution’ 
of the traditional problem:
1. There can be no non-circular justification for deductive logic.
2. We typically assume, however, that we are justified in using it.
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3. Therefore, once we are able to formulate a justification for induction, 
which, though admittedly circular, is arguably equivalent to the case of 
deduction, we should be justified in using it.
If we are willing to tolerate circularity in the case of deductive logic, doesn’t 
consistency require that we do the same for induction?
Determining the truth-value of premise 1 in this latest argument, of course, is 
not a trivial issue. Those who are suspicious of the justificatory merit of all circular 
arguments will look for some other way to account for our allegedly justified use of 
deduction. And, as we have seen, allowing for a priori knowledge easily 
accommodates this requirement: if our strong inductive intuition warrants belief in 
the NMA, then our even stronger deductive intuition surely warrants belief in 
deductive logic.
On the other hand, those who accept premise (1) face the task of arguing for 
the counter-intuitive claim that circular arguments can serve justificatory purposes. 
The next step, then, is to characterise precisely the notion of circularity involved in 
the case of deduction and investigate whether it can indeed be harmless.
It seems incontestable that an argument is viciously circular when its 
conclusion is contained explicitly among its premises. Such an argument fails to 
provide reasons for the truth of the conclusion, since it merely reasserts the truth of 
what is already taken to be a premise. When we try to justify deductive reasoning, 
though, there is another kind of circularity involved, or so it is claimed, which is 
not vicious. In the deductive case we typically are asked to prove a meta-theorem in 
the meta-language that, for example, modusponens in the object language is truth- 
preserving (a soundness theorem). In doing so, though, we have to use modus 
ponens (cf. Psillos 1999, 86). Here the conclusion, we are told, is not among the
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premises. Instead the argument ‘merely’ rests on a rule of inference, which would 
not be sound if the conclusion arrived at using it were not itself true. Since the 
conclusion of the argument is not modus ponens itself but that modus ponens is 
truth-conducive, merely using modus ponens does not make the argument viciously 
circular. It would have been so only ifwe had assumed in the first place that modus 
ponens is truth-conducive. This kind of circularity is often referred to as rule-
*70
circularity .
Attempts to justify induction using rule-circular arguments go back to 
Braithwaite (1953) and, more recently, Van Cleve (1984)79 and Papineau (1993). 
Psillos (1999, 82-83) has more recently argued that the IBE version of NMA also 
belongs to the class of merely rule-circular, rather than outright viciously circular, 
arguments. According to him, scientists typically construct their theories using IBE 
as their mode of inference. NMA then asserts that these theories are approximately 
true on the basis of their predictive success, also using an IBE at the meta-level. 
Since these theories have (allegedly) both been shown to be true and reached in the 
first place by means of IBE, one is allowed to conclude that IBE is a reliable rule of
781 should note that despite the fact that this line o f reasoning follows Goodman’s in structure, my 
characterisation o f circularity is distinct from Goodman’s own ‘solution’ to the (old) problem of 
induction. For although Goodman’s proposed ‘solution’ also relies on the notion o f acceptable 
circular arguments, he does not endorse the reliabilist framework. Instead he put forth the idea that, 
very much like deduction, the justification of inductive rules consists in their being ‘fine-tuned’ with 
the particular inductive inferences we are ordinarily willing to sanction and vice versa (1954,63-64), 
a process which is also known as ‘reflective equilibrium’. This is the reason why I have taken 
Goodman’s argument to provide only the motivation for the reliabilist solution.
79 Neither Braithwaite nor Van Cleve considered their attempted justification as an extension of 
what holds in deductive logic to the inductive case. Instead they applied it independently to 
induction.
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inference. The argument is claimed not to be premise (‘viciously’) circular because 
the conclusion that our theories are approximately true is not among the 
assumptions of NMA and, therefore, since it is ‘only’ rule-circular, it can 
legitimately be taken as vindicating the mode of inference involved - in this case 
IBE.
Hence, IBE is a reliable rule of inference and allows us to reach the 
conclusion that our theories are approximately true because this very conclusion 
shows that IBE is reliable. Or, put differently, (IBE-3) gets support from its 
conclusion in a non-vicious way and that is why NMA is a permissible and forceful 
argument.
There are some serious problems with this line of argument. First of all, this 
version of NMA makes use of a rather obscure distinction between particular 
theories and scientific methodology in general. In particular, since the NMA is a 
meta-IBE, it is supposed to refer to scientific methodology in general and not to 
particular theories. This move allegedly allows us to validate IBE as a general rule 
of inference through validating the many different IBEs, which gave rise to the 
“acceptance” of particular theories of current science. But scientific methodology in 
general is surely nothing more than the union set of the methodologies used in the 
many particular sub-disciplines of mature science. Hence, it is odd to refer to NMA 
as an argument distinct from the particular IBEs it is supposed to validate. In fact, 
particular versions of NMA can perfectly naturally be run with reference to the 
predictive success of each particular theory, thus making the reliabilist’s NMA 
merely a condensed and economical way to refer to all mature scientific disciplines 
and their respective particular NMAs in one go (cf. Worrall, forthcoming).
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Furthermore, in order to use IBE in the first place, according to this reliabilist 
account, do we not need to know that IBE is reliable? And if the only way to do so 
is by knowing that our theories are true, do we not need to assume this also? But 
clearly, assuming that our theories are true would make the argument viciously 
circular. In the face of these difficulties Psillos has insisted that dismissing this 
danger requires a radical shift in one’s epistemological standards (1999, 84-85). 
Traditional internalist epistemology requires that one knows or has reasons to 
believe that the rules one is using are reliable before one is justified in using them. 
Rival externalist accounts do not. They insist that the rule need simply be 
objectively reliable, regardless of whether we know it or not.
Put this way, however, the reliabilist position still faces considerable 
difficulties. The whole recent debate on realism revolves around the epistemic 
problem of whether we have reasons to believe in the truth of our theories. 
Removing completely the knowing subject from the picture by insisting that the 
rule he uses simply be objectively reliable does not of course give any reasons for 
belief Psillos tried to amend this defect by insisting that the proper way to interpret 
the reliabilist thesis is by requiring that “one should have no reason to doubt the 
reliability of the rule” (ibid. 85). This formulation sneaks the subject back into the 
picture. Quite obviously, though, it also reintroduces problems of circularity (or
ROinfinite regress) -  how are these reasons to be judged? and so on and so forth .
Both renditions of the realist NMA, then, face some serious philosophical 
challenges. The ‘intuitive’ version, on the one hand, defends scientific realism on
80 The prospects o f an externalist theory o f justification as the background for the explanationist 
NMA are discussed in more detail in section 5.2.2 o f  chapter 5.
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the basis of the dictates of our ‘inductive intuition’, which are only assertible on a 
priori grounds, and, hence, seems to rest on an overly weak justificatory 
foundation. The explanationist version, on the other, in its attempt to supply a 
sounder epistemological basis for the defence of the realist thesis, faces serious 
problems of internal coherence. In the next chapter I offer probabilistic 
reconstructions for both versions of the NMA in order to investigate their character 
and relative merits from the perspective of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. I shall 
argue that Bayesianism not only further illuminates the logical structure of each 
version, thus helping us to decide which one best serves the realist cause; it also 
contributes a lot towards clarifying the peculiar philosophical nature of the realism 
debate as a whole by bringing to light the interplay between the various 
considerations that can be adduced in favour of or against realism. Before we 
proceed with our probabilistic variants of NMA (and, also, as a means of going 
about it), however, we had better take a close look at some arguments claiming that 
Bayesian reconstructions of NMA demonstrate that the argument, in any of its 
versions, is fallacious.
3.2 Some Incompatibilist Claims Examined
There have been a number of arguments purporting to show that the NMA is 
entirely unacceptable from a Bayesian perspective. Some such incompatibility 
arguments have focused solely on the IBE version of NMA; van Fraassen, for 
example, claims that “[anyone] who becomes converted to the use of some sort of 
probabilistic IBE [of which the NMA is an instance]... quickly discovers that he is 
led into incoherence” (1989, 161). Others have questioned the general intuition 
behind the NMA, irrespective of the particular interpretation one gives to it;
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Howson, for instance, claims that “as it is usually presented [the No-Miracles 
argument] is fallacious, thoroughly fallacious... .” (2000, 59). Hence, before we 
commence our Bayesian reconstruction of NMA, it is necessary to examine and 
counter all these incompatibilist views. Let’s focus on IBE first.
3.2.1 IBE Is Incoherent
The idea that IBE is incoherent is due to van Fraassen (1989) and is part of his 
attempt to discredit the realist thesis in comparison to his favourite constructive 
empiricism. Van Fraassen’s arrives at this conclusion by modelling IBE in 
Bayesian terms and then demonstrating that it is susceptible to the diachronic 
Dutch-book argument for conditionalisation that we encountered and discussed in
o  I
detail in chapter 1 . If sound, his argument would totally neutralise the second 
interpretation of NMA, irrespective of the merits or demerits of reliabilism.
As Van Fraassen sees it, we should think of IBE as proceeding as follows:
1. Start with all the alternative hypotheses you have plus your data and use 
Bayesian Conditionalisation in order to determine the posterior probabilities of 
these hypotheses in the light of the available evidence.
2. After you conditionalise, though, add bonus points to your hypotheses 
according to their explanatory merits.
81 The probabilistic rendering of IBE, van Fraassen thinks, is the last defense line o f the 
explanationist in the face of further arguments he had already offered against IBE in his (1989,142- 
150). Although I shall not discuss them here, one can find extensive discussion and criticism in 
Lipton (1993), Psillos (1999) and Okasha (2000).
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3. Hence, the posterior probability of a hypothesis is determined by normal 
Bayesian Conditionalisation plus the bonus probabilities based on explanatory 
considerations (whatever these may be) (ibid. 166).
Assuming this probabilistic construal of IBE, van Fraassen argues that, since it 
violates Bayesian Conditionalisation, IBE is incoherent on the basis of the 
diachronic Dutch-book argument.
Van Fraassen’s argument has been challenged from many different angles. 
Day and Kincaid (1994) and Okasha (2000) admitted the force of the dynamic 
Dutch-book argument but questioned the way van Fraassen chose to model IBE, i.e. 
in terms of bonus points. They suggested that his modelling option is neither 
compelling nor even ‘natural’ - claiming that it is in fact “an idiosyncratic way of 
representing IBE in probabilistic terms” (Okasha 2000, 703). Okasha has argued 
quite convincingly that, when engaging in explanatory considerations of the sort 
IBE tries to codify, there is nothing like the two stage process on which van 
Fraassen based his reconstruction. Instead of adding explanatory considerations to 
normal Bayesian response to new evidence, one merely uses explanatory 
considerations in order to decide how to handle this evidence (ibid. 702-703).
This reaction is, I think, fundamentally correct. IBE was never intended as a 
supplement or addition to Bayesian Confirmation Theory -  one that requires such a 
probabilistic reconstruction as van Fraassen’s. The following problem still emerges 
however. Ever since Harman’s seminal (1965) paper, IBE has been systematically 
championed as an independent form of inductive inference (cf. Lipton 2004, Psillos 
2002). Van Fraassen’s proposed reconstruction, although not faithful to the 
common understanding of the workings of IBE, does convey this intuition that most 
of its defenders share, i.e. that IBE is in fact an independent form of inference.
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Rejecting van Fraassen’s interpretation of it does not imply, of course, that IBE 
loses this status. It does imply, nonetheless, that if IBE is to maintain its 
independence, then the probabilistic reconstruction that should replace van 
Fraassen’s own has got to reflect it somehow. Okasha touches on this issue when he 
discusses possible objections to his own reconstruction (to be discussed in the next 
chapter), only to conclude that “a fundamental and unresolved question is whether 
the Bayesians are explaining, or just representing [the old tradition of non-formal 
accounts of scientific method, in which IBE belongs, when probabilistically
89reconstructed]” (ibid. 706) . As I explain in the next chapter, I think this question 
is far from unresolved. In fact, it seems that the character of all viable probabilistic 
reconstructions of IBE tells decisively against any claim of independence its 
defenders can make. All this, however, presupposes the discussion of some 
compatibilist accounts between Bayesianism and IBE and so will be postponed for 
the present.
Douven (1999) offered an alternative, decision-theoretic way of defending 
IBE, which concedes to van Fraassen his modelling option in terms of bonus points, 
yet denies the validity of the diachronic Dutch-book argument for 
conditionalisation. His strategy depends crucially on a literal reading of the betting 
situation and the ability of the agent to foresee the Dutch-book. In particular, 
Douven argues that van Fraassen’s probabilistic construal of IBE can be combined 
with a method of calculating the initial probability of a statement such that some of 
the bets giving rise to the diachronic Dutch-book would no longer seem fair. Hence, 
the agent would avoid the trap by refusing to buy these bets in the first place (ibid. 
429-433).
82 Emphasis in the original.
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I have already maintained in the first chapter that such a literal reading of the 
betting situation misses the whole point of the argument by transforming a 
challenge directed against our inferential methods per se into a challenge directed 
against the agent’s intelligence or prudence. To repeat briefly: such a literal reading 
of the betting set up fails to appreciate the original intention of finding a normative 
basis (no matter how idealised) on which to ground considerations of consistency. 
This line of thought, which treats Dutch-books as mere symptoms of inconsistency, 
not only fails to impair the normative force of Dutch-book arguments but also 
results in a clear and systematic framework for the treatment of consistent partial 
belief. It is quite natural, then, to conclude that a decision-theoretic denial of the 
dynamic Dutch-book argument hardly stands up to the normative challenge 
presented by van Fraassen .
Having already denied the validity of the dynamic Dutch-book argument 
myself in chapter 1, though, I hasten to say that the alternative strategy of blocking 
van Fraassen’s charge through rejecting the validity of this argument is sound. It is 
important, nonetheless, to have in mind the correct reasons why it fails. Unlike 
Douven, who thinks that the dynamic Dutch-book argument fails on the basis of the 
contingent computational abilities of rational agents, I have already endorsed in 
chapter 1 a different line of criticism. This centres on the observation that 
consistency is only a synchronic notion. Hence, one ought to be free to update 
diachronically one’s degrees of belief at will, under the sole constraint that he
83 Douven himself came close to acknowledging the implications o f the literal reading of the betting 
scenario in footnote 8 o f his paper (1999, S433), yet he dismissed the challenge that they pose for 
his preferred solution on the grounds that “[it] is not at all clear [that the decision-theoretic solution 
is shown to address an inessential problem]” (ibid. S433, fh. 8). Except from some very brief 
remarks, though, Douven presents nothing like an argument for his stance.
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adjusts his new synchronic beliefs accordingly, so as to avoid proper synchronic 
Dutch-books. Of course this way out of the problem does not imply that van 
Fraassen’s modelling option is indeed the correct one, it merely shows that, even if 
it were, IBE would still have not been shown incoherent.
This way of putting the issue also sheds some light on van Fraassen’s views 
on rule-following. Van Fraassen’s original intention was to model IBE as a rule of 
belief revision. The diachronic Dutch-book argument, then, was supposed to 
establish that any such rule other than conditionalisation was bound to lead to 
inconsistency. Van Fraassen, in effect, invites us to consider the following problem: 
“Could there be a...view, that we have rules which (a) we are rationally 
compelled to follow, which (b) leave nothing to our choice when we proceed 
rationally, and yet (c) give us new expectations that are not logically implied 
by our old opinions leavened by new experience?” (1989,171).
Deductive logic most clearly satisfies (a) and (b), and also most clearly fails to 
satisfy (c). When it comes to IBE, though, things are less clear. It seems reasonable 
to suggest that IBE supporters intend their inferential method as ‘rational’ in some 
sense, which, again in some sense, is supposed to dictate the correct answer to our 
inferential problems. It is also clear, though, that these, hitherto unspecified, senses 
of rationality and compulsion are markedly different from the case of deductive
logic. IBE is intended as a non-deductive, and hence logically non-compelling, rule
i
of inference. At best it is hoped to be a factually reliable rule of inference, leading 
us to contingently true propositions about the world. This being so, and despite the 
apparent vagueness surrounding the notion of IBE, all one can say against IBE is 
that it is not a factually reliable rule of inference, or that it is not reliable enough to
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talk about theunobservable realm, or other such things. What one cannot say is that 
IBE is incoherent, in the sense offorcing us to hold incoherent degrees of belief.
It follows, then, that van Fraassen’s conclusion that “i f  and when we commit 
ourselves to a rule for the revision of opinion, it [the rule] must be non ampliative” 
(ibid. 174)84 reveals an overly strong conception of inductive rules, which tends to 
equate them with the canons of deductive inference. Indeed, if it is a necessary 
requirement for the adoption of a rule that it provides absolute epistemic warrant, 
then surely no inductive rule meets this qualification. What is even worse for van 
Fraassen, though, not even conditionalisation meets this qualification! Of course, it 
remains to be clarified in which sense IBE (or any other inductive rule for that 
matter) is rationally compelling. Surely, though, failure to do so does not make this 
rationally-compelling-in-some-sense rule incoherent.
It might be argued that van Fraassen can easily restate his case with reference 
not to conditionalisation and Prnew{H) after the evidence is known but with 
reference to the synchronic relation Pr (HZE). In other words, qua empiricist, he 
would simply ask what the probability of the hypothesis is in the light of the 
evidence irrespective of when this evidence becomes known, following in effect 
Howson’s latest proposal (unpublished) that we encountered in chapter 1. He would 
then be able to show that violating the axiom Pr {HIE) = P r(//a  E)f?r(E) by adding 
bonus points to Pr(H/E) would make one susceptible to a Dutch-book proper (i.e. to 
a synchronic Dutch-book). In fact, this was van Fraassen’s own initial rendition of 
the problem (1989,166-167), only to change his mind apparently on the basis that 
confirmation is a forward-looking relationship between data and theory most 
faithfully captured by conditionalisation. And since van Fraassen believes in the
84 Emphasis in the original.
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validity of the diachronic Dutch-book, it is no accident that he eventually charged 
IBE with incoherence on the basis of this very argument. But we have seen that the 
diachronic Dutch-book argument fails, because conditionalisation is not a logical 
principle85.
Van Fraassen’s attack, then, misfires on two counts: a) it is based on a model 
of IBE which is not faithful to the way IBE is supposed to operate, and b) even if 
this modelling option were provisionally accepted, IBE could not reasonably be 
suspected of incoherence, since the diachronic Dutch-book argument ultimately 
fails. Van Fraassen is surely right when he concludes that “rationality does not 
require conditionalisation, nor does it require any commitment to follow a rule 
[outside those of deductive logic] devised beforehand” (ibid. 174). He should add, 
though, that rationality does not require conditionalisation even if we decide to 
commit ourselves to a rule of belief revision, unless of course this rule is 
conditionalisation itself.
3.2.2 The NMA Commits the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’
The claim that NMA is fallacious because it embodies the ‘Base-Rate 
Fallacy’ has been forcefully put forth by Colin Howson in his (2000), and repeated 
by Magnus and Callender (2004). This argument attacks the general orientation of 
the NMA without distinguishing between its ‘intuitive’ and explanationist
85 Needless to say, had van Fraassen opted for the synchronic case, the argument would in fact be 
successful, showing in effect that IBE cannot be modelled in terms o f bonus-points. Conceived as a 
diachronic relation, though, van Fraassen’s argument does not go through.
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construals. If sound, it defeats both o f  them on the grounds that they violate valid 
probabilistic reasoning.
Howson (ibid. 36) proposes the following reconstruction of NMA:
1. If a theory T is predictively successful yet not approximately true, then its 
success can only be attributed to chance.
2. The chance, though, that T is false and at the same time predictively 
successful is extraordinarily small.
3. Granted (2), one should reject the hypothesis that the success of T is to be 
attributed to chance, especially in light of the fact that there is an alternative 
non-miraculous explanation, the realist one.
4. Therefore, we can infer that T is approximately true.
Since Howson’s argument makes use of Bayesian probabilities, we have to 
translate steps (1) -  (3) into probabilistic terms. Let us first of all assume that talk 
of approximate truth is precise enough to allow us express the various relations 
between an approximately true theory and the predicted evidence E without major 
problems. Let H, then, stand for the hypothesis that ‘ T is approximately true’. This 
being so, (1) and (2) suggest that Pr(E/H) is 1 or, at any rate, very close to 1, while 
Pr(E/^H) is on the contrary very close to zero. From these two likelihoods, (3) 
invites us to conclude -  assuming that indeed evidence E  turns out to hold -  that the 
probability of //(i.e. the claim that T is at least approximately true) is high. H  is the 
natural, non-miraculous alterative to the suggestion that //sim ply got E  right ‘by 
chance’.
Whatever intuitive appeal this argument might have, Howson claims it is as 
fallacious as it could possibly be since all three of its premises can be shown to be
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false. His main complaint against the first two refers to the value to be assigned to 
Pr(E/~^H). The NMA assumes, as we saw, that Pr(E/^H) is very close to zero. 
Goodman’s exotic predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, however, allow us see that this 
assumption is not as trivial as it might seem. Knowing that there are infinitely many 
alternatives to T which save the phenomena equally well (‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ simply 
illustrate this fact), it would appear that Pr(E/^H) equals “the combined chance of 
all the infinitely many worlds in which E  is true and T not approximately true”(ibid. 
45). Such a chance is hardly definable mathematically. To sidestep this problem, 
one has to assume that the prior probability of all hypotheses H i , whose union set 
constitutes {“'//}, is very small. By the probability calculus it can be shown that 
Pr(E/~'H) is proportional to the product of the priors Pr(H i ) times the likelihoods
Pr{E/Hi ) summed over all /. Hence, the value of Pr(/7,) will have to be small
enough to outweigh the high value of Pr{E/Ht), which in its turn is high simply
because the empirically adequate alternative hypotheses / / ,  by definition save the
phenomena. If we do this, however, we end up reasoning in a circle, for “there 
seems to be no way to compute this chance [i.e. ?t(E/~^H)] without begging the 
very question that the exercise of computing it is supposed to answer” (ibid. 47). In 
other words, we already need to have strong prior beliefs in the theory H the NMA 
allegedly supports in order to use the miracles consideration in its favour. But then, 
one wonders, what good is the argument?
Even if we were to grant as justified the assumption of the low value of 
?r(E/^H), this is not sufficient to guarantee the inference to the overwhelmingly
86 The rest o f Howson’s (technical) objections to the first two premises can be found in his (2000, 
43-45).
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probable truth of H , as premise (3) invites us to do. Howson’s main claim on this 
count is that the NMA commits the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’, i.e. the fallacious habit of 
ignoring the base-rates (or prior probabilities) in the computation of the posterior 
probability of a hypothesis .
Howson illustrates the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ by means of a medical example,
on
sometimes known as the ‘Harvard Medical School test’ . Suppose that a diagnostic 
test for some one disease has a zero false negative rate (i.e. that the probability that 
the test gives a negative result given that the patient really has the disease is zero) 
and, say, only a 5% false positive rate (i.e. the probability that the patient tests 
positive even though he does not have the disease is 5%). What we want to know is 
the posterior probability of the hypothesis, say D, that the patient has the disease
QQ
given that he tested positive. Despite (allegedly) deceptive appearances , the 
correct answer is not 95%, nor even ‘very high’ but is given by Bayes’ theorem,
87 There are many studies providing evidence that most people (but certainly not everyone) tend to 
neglect base-rates when engaging in probabilistic reasoning. See for example Lyon and Slovic 
(1976), Casscells et al. (1978) and Kahnemann and Tversky (1982). Bar-Hillel (1980) contains an 
informative overview o f the debate regarding the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ as well as a psychological 
explanation o f its persistence.
88 This test was actually performed in the form presented in the main text at four Harvard Medical 
School teaching hospitals by Ward Casscells and his collaborators, who published their results in 
Casscells et al. (1978). Their sample consisted of 20 house officers, 20 fourth-year medical students 
and 20 attending physicians serving in these hospitals.
89 Casscells et al. (1978, 1000) report that only an 18% of the participants in the test answered the 
question correctly. The most common answer, given by 45% o f them, was that the posterior 
probability was 95%.
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which in its simplest form reads Pr (DIE)  = ?r(D)x?r(E/D)  
Pr (E)
, and thus clearly
depends crucially on the prior probability (or base-rate) Pr(£>).
Rewriting Bayes theorem as
Pr (D/ E)  = Pr (D)
Pr(£>) + Pr(-iD) x Pr(£ 1 ~'DXy/piPr(E/ D)
Pr (£/-,£>) 
Pr(E/D)
is the Bayes factor in favour of -'D  and against D, makes the problem
transparent. No matter how small the numerator relative to the denominator in 
Bayes factor is (in the medical example it is just 0.05), this by itself says nothing 
about the posterior probability of the hypothesis we are after. Whoever answers that 
the posterior probability of the hypothesis D that the patient has the disease is 95% 
commits the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ for he ignores the prior probability in his 
computation. If the prior probability is sufficiently low, then the posterior 
probability will still be low despite an event’s having occurred (viz. the patient 
testing positive) that would be overwhelmingly unlikely (95% unlikely) to occur if 
the hypothesis that he has the disease were false.
Recall the claims of the NMA on Howson’s reconstruction: from the fact that 
a theory is very unlikely to be predictively successful given that it is false, while at 
the same time it is very likely that it is predictively successful given that it is 
approximately true, we are asked to infer that the theory is indeed approximately 
true. In other words, from the fact that the theory has got a low false positive rate 
and a close to zero false negative rate, i.e. a low Bayes factor, we are asked to infer 
that the posterior probability of the hypothesis //that theory T is approximately true 
in the face of the evidence is very high, or at any rate higher than 0.5 to justify the 
realist claim. Very much like the medical school case, reasoning this way
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exemplifies once again the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’. What proponents of NMA do, it is 
claimed, is precisely to ignore the prior probability of the hypothesis in question, 
thus committing an elementary probabilistic mistake.
It has become obvious, then, that modelling NMA in probabilistic terms 
requires one to take into account prior probabilities. Prior probabilities, though, 
seem foreign to the miracles consideration. The NMA, be it an IBE or just an 
inductive plausibility claim, describes the alleged relationship between a theory’s 
predictive success and its truth. Prima facie it appears that this relationship can 
only be captured through the likelihood values Pr{E/H) and Pr(E/^H), which are 
nonetheless shown to be insufficient to determine the required posterior probability.
Careful commentators have reacted to this line of reasoning by suggesting 
that all Howson’s arguments show is that in reality the NMA is just an enthymeme,
i.e. an argument containing an implicit premise (Lipton 2002, 583; Worrall 2007, 
144-147; forthcoming). Why, then, not simply make this implicit premise explicit 
in the form of adding the prior probabilities into the calculation? Howson does 
precisely this in his own reconstruction of ‘a sounder no-miracles argument’, only 
to conclude that the NMA is still not valid after all (cf. Howson 2000, 57). The 
reason for this latest claim has to do with the character of these prior probabilities. 
In the case of the medical example we are normally in possession of fairly reliable 
statistical frequency data, which can then be plausibly interpreted as ‘objective’ 
base-rates or prior probabilities, and which inform us about the overall incidence of 
the disease. In the scientific case, though, no such prior estimate of the relative 
frequency of true theories in the population can possibly become available. The 
only remaining option is that these probabilities are subjective estimates. Being 
subjective, it is standardly argued, they can’t possibly satisfy the claims to
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objectivity the proponents of NMA think it underwrites. Howson’s comment is 
revealing of this line of thought:
“The proponents of the No-Miracles argument regard it as sound reasoning as 
it stands, without need of any further assumptions, and in particular not 
estimates, which by their nature must be highly subjective, of how probable 
types of large-scale world are” (ibid. 55)90.
Subjective estimates are, then, foreign to the intent of NMA and Howson concludes 
that the argument is either fallacious or simply fails to deliver.
There are two ways to respond to this dilemma. First, one can deny that the 
argument is fallacious in the first place. Since the probabilistic reasoning is 
impeccable, the grounds for such a denial can only be either that Howson’s 
particular way of modelling the argument in probabilistic terms is mistaken or that 
the general decision to embed the discussion within a Bayesian framework is ill- 
motivated. Since these alleged grounds are incompatibilist in spirit, I shall discuss 
them in the next subsection of the present chapter. Secondly, one can follow 
Howson’s advice and accommodate prior probabilities in one’s Bayesian 
reconstruction of the NMA so that probabilistic validity is restored, but claim that 
the resulting argument is still a powerful consideration for realism. This possibility 
will be explored in considerable detail in the following two chapters.
3.2.3 Should the NMA Be Modelled Probabilistically at All?
One way out of the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ is to deny that a probabilistic 
reconstruction of the realist argument captures its essential aspects. Stathis Psillos
90 Emphasis in the original.
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(2004) is the main defender of this reaction to the fallacy91. Recall, first of all, his 
understanding of NMA as an instance of the general inference pattern of IBE. 
Psillos readily admits that the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ demonstrates that NMA and the 
explanation of science’s predictive success should not be equated with the 
likelihoods in Bayes’ theorem (2004,87). At the same time, however, he thinks that 
subjective prior probabilities fail to do justice to the NMA’s claims to objectivity. 
Furthermore, he is very sceptical about the prospects for ‘objectifying’ those prior 
probabilities, calling it a task which “we, presumably, know cannot be done” (ibid. 
88).
Hence, Psillos is facing the following dilemma: he either has to show that 
there is a different way to model NMA in probabilistic terms -  one that avoids both 
the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ and the issue of the subjectivity of the priors, or deny 
outright that it was ever appropriate even to seek a probabilistic reconstruction of 
the NMA.
As remarked a little earlier, Howson’s modelling option in terms of 
likelihoods is natural, since it conveys NMA’s focus on the relationship between 
predictive success and truth. Howson has also established beyond doubt that the 
likelihoods do not suffice for the realist cause. Hence, someone of Psillos’ 
persuasion is only left with the option of denying that a probabilistic reconstruction 
can ever do justice to the argument.
In his attempt independently to motivate this sort of incompatibilist stance, 
Psillos focuses his attention on the allegedly independent character of IBE. IBE, we
91 In his (2004) Psillos discusses the prospects o f casting IBE in a Bayesian framework without 
mentioning explicitly NMA. Of course, the discussion generalises straightforwardly on the 
assumption that NMA instantiates IBE.
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are told, is an independent mode of inference, which tries to strike a balance 
between amplification and epistemic warrant. As such, it contrasts at least with 
Subjective Bayesianism, which is supposed to be a non-ampliative theory 
concerned with the synchronic consistency of our degrees of belief. Thus 
conceived, Subjective Bayesianism lacks, while IBE possesses, the resources to 
capture the increase in knowledge that NMA offers (ibid. 88-89).
This argument, though, is surely weak. Psillos claims that Subjective 
Bayesianism fails to capture the ampliative character of NMA because it is just a 
non-ampliative extension of deductive logic to partial belief. If he is right, though, 
one would expect the similarly non-ampliative deductive logic to also fail as a 
framework within which to cast the informal, non-probabilistic, version of NMA. 
This conclusion, nonetheless, is untenable. Deductive logic is clearly an adequate 
framework within which the informal NMA can be systematically reconstructed. In 
fact, in section 3.1.2 we saw how the explanationist NMA can be expressed as a 
deductive argument. This is not to say, of course, that the conclusion of the NMA is 
derivable from indubitable first premises - such a proof is explicitly acknowledged 
by the arguments’ proponents as unavailable. Since the NMA is ampliative, all our 
reconstruction has of necessity included is (at least) one inductive premise. But 
none of this, of course, disqualifies deductive logic as the framework within which 
one ought to work out the details of the argument.
The same situation holds with respect to Subjective Bayesianism. The fact 
that we cannot axiomatically prove that NMA underwrites a high probability for 
our successful (particular) theories, does not imply that we cannot express it in a 
probabilistic form -  by invoking the grounds that the general framework is non- 
ampliative. All we have to do is insert an inductive premise, exactly as in the case
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of deductive logic, and this can, of course, easily be done. This inductive premise is 
none other than an assertion about the prior probability of the hypothesis in 
question. What allows for amplification in the Bayesian model is the value of the 
prior probability one will affirm and which enables the evidence to boost the 
posterior of the hypothesis appropriately. This being the case (which Psillos hints at 
but does not insist on), there seems to be no reason why Bayesianism cannot 
accommodate quite legitimately the NMA despite its non-ampliative character. 
This need not imply, of course, that Bayesianism also provides the means to justify 
the claim that the prior probability of some one hypothesis ought to be ‘reasonably 
high’; this is a separate issue. And although it surely is the all-important one in the 
debate, it is also logically independent of the false claim that Bayesianism cannot 
capture the ampliative character of the NMA.
3.3 Conclusion
There is, I have argued, no reason to think that the enterprise of trying to find 
a probabilistic reconstruction of the NMA is a fundamentally misguided one. The 
final option available to the incompatibilist would be to deny the very fundamental 
idea of Bayesianism that partial belief is probability. To the best of my knowledge, 
no one has seriously entertained this idea, especially in the face of the foundational 
merits of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, as outlined in chapter 1. It seems safe to 
conclude, then, that none of the challenges examined in this chapter succeeds in 
showing that Bayesianism is in some fundamental way incompatible with the 
NMA. This in turn invites us to consider what a proper probabilistic rendition 
would look like, an issue I tackle immediately in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Bayesianism and the No-Miracles Argument II -  
The Prospects of Compatibilism
Having rebutted claims of incompatibility I now address the task of showing 
how a Bayesian reconstruction of the argument is in fact possible and also 
explaining the philosophical insight that is provided by such a reconstruction. In 
this chapter I explain how both versions of the NMA examined earlier can be 
reconstructed probabilistically. The main theses I shall put forward are: a) Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory can be seen as a general framework within which the standard 
informal arguments become transparent; b) Subjective Bayesianism in particular 
emerges as the most suitable framework of analysis, but c) in doing so, it 
undermines the explanationist understanding of the NMA, while at the same time 
gives credence to its plausibility counterpart; and, finally, d) although such a 
Subjective Bayesian reconstruction of the NMA commits one to no particular 
epistemic attitude towards our best scientific theories, it brings out vividly the
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assumptions each such attitude tacitly presupposes. The question of whether the 
price of this construal of the NMA is the endorsement of a form of relativism is 
considered in chapter 5.
4.1 Bayesian Reconstructions of the NMA
4.1.1 The Explanationist Version
The first attempts to investigate possible ways of casting the NMA in 
Bayesian terms were made by defenders of the argument who took it to be an 
instance of IBE. This is explained by the fact that these attempts were part of the 
general reaction to van Fraassen’s charge (examined in the previous chapter) that 
IBE is probabilistically incoherent. This incorporation into mainly defensive 
responses to van Fraassen’s views, however, has meant that these Bayesian 
renditions of IBE and NMA were fragmentary in nature, typically confined to a few
09scattered remarks in different pieces in the literature .
Peter Lipton’s (2004) contains the first sustained attempt to show how IBE 
can be incorporated within the Bayesian framework. It should be noted at the outset 
that Lipton presents his case as it concerns the general inference pattern of IBE, 
rather than the NMA as a particular instantiation of that pattern. This is not 
accidental, of course, since his book’s main focus is IBE rather than the NMA. 
Still, one can easily apply his proposed reconciliation of IBE and Bayesianism to 
the explanationist NMA on the grounds that the former is standardly taken to 
instantiate IBE. This is not to say, however, that Lipton also embraces the 
explanationist NMA. In fact, he is quite explicit that the NMA qua an over-arching
92 The most important papers dealing with the Bayesian rendition o f IBE are Day and Kincaid 
(1994) and, especially, Okasha (2000).
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inference to the best explanation, distinct from the first-order inferences to 
particular theories, is unsuccessful (cf. 2004, 192ff; 2005, 354). In the previous 
chapter I, too, suggested that the distinction between first- and second-order IBEs is 
dubious but added that one can focus on the first-order inferences to particular 
theories and re-run the argument on a ‘particularist’ basis. Lipton would surely be 
more favourably inclined to those particular versions of the explanationist NMA, 
given that his own case for realism focuses on those first-order inferences to 
particular theories. At any rate, what follows is not intended to attribute to Lipton 
beliefs he does not possess; rather, it is an attempt to bring his more systematic 
approach to bear on the question of how to reconstruct the argument from a 
Bayesian standpoint.
Before coming to the details of Lipton’s proposal we need to look into some 
more features of IBE. As I emphasised in the previous chapter, IBE is considered 
by its defenders to be an independent rule of inference. Its focal point is the notion 
of explanation, which is intimately connected with the notion of understanding (cf. 
Friedman 1974,6). IBE, then, is identified by its defenders as a mode of inference 
which picks out of many competing hypotheses the one “which would, if correct, 
be the most explanatory or provide the most understanding” (Lipton 2004,59). This 
feature of IBE is emphasised frequently in the literature (cf. Psillos 2002, 617) 
because it is tantamount to the claim that IBE describes an independent mode of 
inference. In particular, special care is taken so that IBE is not understood as 
inference to the likeliest or most probable explanation. In Lipton’s own words: 
“[T]he more we must appeal to likeliness [or probability] analysed in non- 
explanatory terms to produce a defensible version of Inference to the Best 
Explanation, the less interesting that model is. Conversely, the more use we
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can make of the explanatory virtues, the closer we will come to fulfilling the 
exciting promise of Inference to the Best Explanation, of showing how 
explanatory considerations are our guide to truth” (2004, 62).
Of course there is still a link with truth. If it were not there, it could hardly be 
maintained that IBE is reliable. Hence, it is presumed that “loveliness [or the 
quality of explanation] and likeliness [or probability] will tend to go together, and 
indeed loveliness will be a guide to likeliness” (ibid. 61). In other words, the quality 
of explanation serves as a symptom of truth and that is why it is claimed that, in the 
end, both IBE and methods concerned solely with the probability of hypotheses will 
largely be in agreement.
The dominant approach to inductive reasoning from a probabilistic point of 
view is, of course, Bayesianism. In Lipton’s idiom, Bayesianism assesses the 
‘likeliness’ of a hypothesis, i.e. its probability. It follows from our discussion of 
IBE a little earlier that IBE and Bayesianism are two distinct reconstructions of 
inductive inference, not to be conflated with each other. In the previous chapter I 
denied that the two are incompatible. The question which arises, then, is how they 
relate and what consequences this relation has for NMA.
Lipton expresses the main aspect of what he takes to be the relationship 
between Bayesianism and IBE as follows:
“Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation are broadly 
compatible...[In fact], not only are [they] compatible but... they are [also] 
complementary. Bayesian conditionalisation can indeed be an engine of 
inference, but it is run in part on explanationist tracks” (ibid. 106-107).
Put this way, it is not entirely clear how exactly IBE complements Bayesianism. In 
fact, the text reads as if IBE constrains Bayesianism in certain respects. A little
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later, though, we get the opposite impression. This is Lipton again, elaborating on 
his previous quote:
“One way of putting [my proposal] is that explanatory considerations 
provide a central heuristic we use to follow the process of 
conditionalisation, a heuristic we need because we are not very good at 
making the probabilistic calculations directly” (ibid. 106).
Hence, it seems that IBE is here taken to be something like an auxiliary device to 
probabilistic reasoning aimed at everyday practice due to ease of implementation 
rather than a foundationally sound and independent mode of inductive inference. 
As we shall see shortly, deciding on this issue is crucial for assessing the prospects 
of the explanationist NMA.
In attempting to build a bridge between Bayesianism and IBE, Lipton singles 
out the following four elements which he believes link the two approaches: 1) 
explanatory considerations supply the values of both the prior probabilities and the 
likelihoods found on the right hand side of Bayes’ theorem; 2) they also help us 
determine which pieces of evidence count as relevant for conditionalisation; 3) IBE 
sheds light on the context of discovery, whereas Bayesianism operates solely within 
the context of justification; and 4) explanation-based reasoning can be seen as a 
useful heuristic, which replaces quite abstract and cumbersome probabilistic 
reasoning.
Elements (2), (3) and (4) can indeed plausibly be seen as complementing 
Bayesian reasoning. The reason for this, though, is that they operate on different 
planes from Bayesianism, i.e. either within the context of discovery, as in (3), or on 
the descriptive level of everyday habits, as in (4), or finally, as auxiliaries to the 
inference process itself, as in (2). Bayesianism, nonetheless, is a theory of
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inference, a rational reconstruction of how people ought to reason. As such, its 
place is within the context of justification and the realm of normativity. Now, what 
makes the investigation of the relations between IBE and Bayesianism interesting is 
precisely the fact that IBE claims to be normatively binding as well. IBE is not 
intended simply as a faithful description of our inferential practices. Instead, it 
professes to strike a balance between amplification and epistemic warrant that other 
approaches to inductive reasoning fail to capture and that is why it is alleged to 
provide good normative reasons to follow its dictates. From the normative point of 
view, the only element which carries any real significance is (1), that is, how 
explanatory considerations influence the determination of the terms on the right 
hand side of Bayes’ theorem.
In claiming that explanatory considerations determine the values of the prior 
probability and the likelihoods in Bayes’ theorem, Lipton follows Okasha’s 
proposal, analysed in his (2000,702-704)93. In that paper, Okasha suggested that if 
a theory Tis a better explanation of the evidence E  than T \  then either Pr(7)>Pr(r') 
or ¥x(E/T)>¥x(E/T or both. Given that realists typically argue for approximate 
rather than total truth, however, we should extend Okasha’s reconstruction as 
follows: let //stand for T i s  approximately true’ and H ’ for iT ’ is approximately 
true’, as introduced in chapter 3. Okasha’s proposal would now suggest that if a 
theory T is a better explanation of the evidence E  than T \  then either Pr(//)>Pr(/T) 
or ¥x{E/H)>¥x{E/H'), or both.
As we saw also in the previous chapter when discussing the ‘Base-Rate 
Fallacy’, it is quite natural to identify at least some aspects of explanation with the 
likelihoods in Bayes’ theorem. Prima facie it may seem that the likelihoods are
93 A similar picture arises out o f Day and Kincaid’s (1994, 285-286) (more sketchy) analysis.
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occasionally easy to determine. In case an explanatory theory T deductively implies 
the evidence E , Pr(£/7) = 1 and, hence, the explanation is as good as it can get. In 
discussing the issue of realism, however, we are typically interested in arguing that 
T is probably ‘approximately true’ rather than fully true. Letting //stand, as before, 
for T  is approximately true’, the question arises whether when T deductively 
entails E, H  also entails E. Admittedly, this is a very hard question to answer 
unequivocally in the absence of a precise notion of ‘approximate truth’. It seems 
that realists want to argue that, intuitively at least, it is quite plausible to maintain 
that when T entails E, then Pr(E/H) ~ 1. This contention, nonetheless, can be 
doubted. Though there is clearly a problem here for further investigation, for our 
purposes in this thesis I shall grant the intuitive pull of the realists’ case and accept 
that when T entails E, Pr (E/H) ~ 1.
Moreover, there are cases where, even though T does not entail E, “accepted” 
statistical theories (e.g. those of statistical mechanics) fix ?r(E/T) (and so arguably 
Pr (E/H)) unequivocally. The same cannot, of course, be said for the ‘false positive’ 
rate Pr(EhH), which is also relevant in the determination of a hypothesis’ 
posterior. Here, one might indeed seemingly plausibly claim that explanatory 
considerations of some sort relating to the quality of the explanation are involved. 
Of course, we know from the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’ objection that even if the 
likelihoods can be unequivocally determined, they alone do not suffice to determine 
posterior probabilities, so that we are still unable to infer anything with respect to 
the (approximate) truth of our theories.
IBE and NMA (as an instantiation of it) though, focus on (approximate) truth, 
which in turn means that assumptions about prior probabilities need to be made as 
well. It might be thought that resorting to prior probabilities is indeed a natural way
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to codify the so-called a priori explanatory virtues of scientific theories. Such 
virtues are standardly taken to include our theories’ ability to unify seemingly 
diverse phenomena under the same underlying theoretical principles (thus 
simplifying our world-picture), and their relations, deductive or inductive, to other 
highly confirmed theories. These virtues seem to reflect global features of scientific 
theories, independently of the particular piece of evidence they are called forth to 
explain. Lipton’s suggestion, then, is to take explanatory considerations as a means 
to evaluate these a priori virtues in terms of understanding, and on this basis assign 
the relevant prior probabilities (Lipton 2004, 113)94. In this way, not only do we 
avoid the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’, but we do it on the basis of the very explanatory 
considerations IBE is preaching. Some aspects of what makes a theory explanatory 
are reflected in the likelihoods, others in the prior probabilities. Although he would 
seem to have a better case concerning the priors than concerning the likelihoods, 
the crucial point of Lipton’s proposal is that what determine the assignment of 
whatever probabilities we need are explanatory considerations.
On this approach, the explanationist NMA, then, can be reformulated as 
follows: explanatory considerations support the non-miraculous conclusion that our 
(individual) best theories are (approximately) true on the basis of creating the 
rationale for 1) a low Bayes factor, which, informally speaking, captures the 
intuition that it would be a miracle if our theory were (wholly) false but 
predictively successful, and 2) a relatively high prior probability, which reflects the 
‘miracle’ of theories characterised by the aforementioned a priori virtues being 
(wholly) false.
94 In fact, Wesley Salmon in his (1990,283-285) had already suggested the association o f these a 
priori virtues with the prior probabilities in Bayes’ theorem.
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This might sound plausible but there are in fact some serious problems. In 
assessing Lipton’s proposal, we have to distinguish between two cases: a) IBE and 
explanation as a descriptive account of how people reason in real life (tacitly or 
explicitly) in determining the values of the prior probability and the likelihoods in 
Bayes’ theorem, b) IBE as a prescriptive constraint on prior probabilities and 
likelihoods. It might very well be the case that people do think in terms of some 
(rather vague) notion of explanation in engaging in inductive reasoning in their 
everyday affairs and that scientists and even philosophers do the same when they 
try to codify NMA in terms of probabilities. If so, then IBE becomes a contribution 
to the investigation of human psychology and actual mechanisms of thought. 
Construed this way, however, there is no normative import of the sort the defenders 
of IBE profess. Recall that IBE is supposed to be an independent and reliable rule 
of inference. The only way to show this is to present an argument that explanatory 
considerations of the sort presented above suffice to uniquely fix  the prior 
probability in Bayes’ theorem to a sufficiently high, and the Bayes factor to a 
sufficiently low, degree. Only then would we be warranted to infer to the 
(approximate) truth of our theories through the explanationist NMA. And clearly it 
is quite possible that descriptively speaking some agents may fail to assign such 
values to the priors and to the Bayes factor. The reliability claim can only be 
defended on normative grounds.
Surprisingly enough, neither Lipton nor Okasha have anything to say in 
defence of the normative reading of the relation between IBE and Bayesianism. 
Lipton in particular is adamant that his purposes are only descriptive:
“My suggestion is that explanatory considerations of the sort to which 
Inference to the Best Explanation appeals are often more accessible than
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those probabilistic principles to the inquirer on the street or in the laboratory, 
and provide an effective surrogate for certain components of the Bayesian 
calculation. On this proposal, the resulting transition of probabilities in the 
face of new evidence might well be just as the Bayesian says, but the process 
that actually brings it about is explanationist” (ibid. 114).
It appears that Lipton intends explanationism as an auxiliary device for Bayesian 
reasoning, one that allows the layman to reason, while at the same time relieving 
him of excessive computational burdens. But if this is how we ought to understand 
the relationship between Bayesianism and IBE, then one wonders how the 
explanationist can still uphold the claim that IBE is a distinct and fundamental 
mode of inductive inference.
Okasha, on the other hand, does not take a stance on the issue, thinking it “a 
fundamental and unresolved question .. .whether the Bayesians are explaining, or 
just representing [IBE]” (2000, 706)95. If the Bayesians only represent IBE, then 
they admit that IBE plays a more fundamental role than Bayesian techniques. On 
this reading IBE presumably constrains Bayesianism by fixing the prior 
probabilities. If, on the other hand, they explain IBE, then they “deny that there is a 
more fundamental sort of inductive reasoning [than the Bayesian apparatus]” (ibid. 
706)96.. Though Okasha refuses to take sides, it remains true that if he intends IBE 
as a normatively binding and distinct mode of inference, he has to join those who 
think that Bayesianism only represents IBE.
The moral of the discussion so far, then, is that the explanationist NMA can 
be given a probabilistic representation faithful to the claims of objectivity IBE
95 Emphasis in the original.
96 Emphasis in the original.
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raises only if one can provide a convincing argument to the effect that explanatory 
considerations somehow impose normative constraints on our assignment of prior 
probabilities and likelihoods to our best theories. We have seen that Lipton’s and 
Okasha’s approaches fall short of this requirement. It is quite striking, though, that 
no recent defender of the explanationist NMA has seriously considered Shimony’s 
account of tempered personalism, introduced in chapter 1, as a possible way to 
bring together the normative import of this particular understanding o f NMA and 
Bayesianism. As we shall see next, Shimony’s proposal, although put forth much 
earlier than the explanationist NMA, seems prima facie perfectly tailored to it.
4.1.2 Tempered Personalism and the Explanationist NMA
As we saw in chapter 1, Abner Shimony’s tempered personalism endorses a 
mild constraint on the prior probability of a hypothesis. More specifically, if a 
scientific hypothesis has been ‘seriously proposed’, it deserves a prior probability 
sufficiently high so that convergence of opinion can occur within a ‘reasonable 
amount’ of time. Although the exact value of the prior is not (and, presumably, 
cannot be) specified, prior probabilities are not subject solely to the constraints of 
the axioms of probability.
Evidently, much rests on what a ‘seriously proposed hypothesis’ is, on what a 
‘reasonable amount of time’ is and how these can be identified in particular 
circumstances. Shimony tried to avoid outright subjectivism in the identification of 
such ‘serious hypotheses’, proposing “to formulate some methodologically sensible 
guidelines for decisions on this question” (Shimony 1970, 110). Such guidelines 
include the clarity of exposition of a scientific theory and the amount of 
‘intellectual freshness’ it brings to the community of experts. He refused,
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nonetheless, to turn these guidelines into a sharp set of conditions “because of the 
danger of arbitrariness and of diminishing the flexibility of the scientific method” 
(ibid. 110). Consequently, some amount of subjective judgement is preserved in 
Shimony’s account. Furthermore, as we noted in chapter 1, the situation is similar 
with respect to what a ‘reasonable amount of time’ is. Shimony never specified the 
form or duration of the process, which would produce his ‘envisaged observations’. 
Presumably a fair amount of subjective judgement would also have to be involved 
in specifying and conducting the research required to yield the necessary 
observations, so that, ultimately, convergence of opinion can take place. It is 
arguable, however, that in today’s science at least we are frequently in possession 
of quite strong intuitions regarding what constitutes serious science and how it 
should be conducted. Grant this and the main issue becomes that of the justification 
of the tempering condition.
This is the potential meeting point between Shimony’s approach and the 
explanationist NMA. Recall the main line of defence on behalf of the latter: NMA 
instantiates IBE and IBE is shown to be reliable by the success of NMA. This circle 
has been declared non-vicious by the explanationists and this is why they claim that 
the explanationist NMA has normative force. Shimony, on the other hand, has 
offered a similarly circular argument in his attempt to justify his proposed 
constraint on the priors. The tempering condition allows the posterior probabilities 
o f ‘seriously proposed hypotheses’ to converge quickly. In its turn, the tempering 
condition is itself justified on the basis of the presumption that these ‘seriously 
proposed hypotheses’ which our science regularly produces somehow track the 
truth and, hence, deserve a higher prior probability. Shimony’s grounds for this last 
claim seem to rest on the evolutionary success of scientific and everyday induction,
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thus making his reasoning circular. Much like the explanationists, Shimony 
declares this circularity harmless. Here is his rationale:
“I claim, however, that the circularity is non-vicious in the following sense: 
the theory as a whole is open to critical evaluation in the light o f experience, 
fo r the reciprocal support o f a methodology and a scientific world picture
0 7does not render it impregnable to criticism” (ibid. 159-160) .
Leaving the viability of such proposals aside for the moment, Shimony’s 
argument provides a hint about how to codify the explanationist NMA in Bayesian 
terms in a way that fills the normative void in Lipton’s approach. This void, 
remember, consisted in the absence of an argument showing how explanatory 
considerations constrain the ‘reasonable’ values of the prior probabilities and the 
likelihood Pr(EhH). As we shall see in a moment, the explanationist can invoke 
general epistemological considerations in order to determine the value for 
Pr (EhH). Consequently, the only open question concerns the way that he can also 
constrain the values of the prior probabilities. In order to begin answering this last 
question we must keep in mind that the normative import of the informal 
explanationist NMA relies on an (allegedly) non-viciously circular argument for the 
approximate truth of a theory T on the basis of its empirical success. The 
contribution of Shimony’s proposal, then, lies in the fact that it shows that 
circularity of this alleged non-vicious sort can be captured by the Bayesian 
framework. Consequently, the explanationist only needs to formulate an (allegedly) 
non-vicious circular argument with reference to the prior probabilities and show 
how such an argument introduces the necessary constraints for normativity.
97 Emphasis in the original.
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Before we come to the priors, however, we must first see how general 
epistemological considerations provide reasons in favour of a low value for 
Pr (EhH). Those reasons derive from the explanationist’s decision to adopt an 
empiricist epistemological standpoint and seek an explanation for science’s 
empirical success. Empirical success cries out for explanation only because it 
carries considerable epistemic significance. Its attainment is thought to be a 
remarkable feat and, hence, a valuable source of information regarding the 
epistemic merit of our theories. This implies, however, that empirical success is 
also thought to be a virtue that is very hard to reach. Recall from chapter 3 that the 
main worry for NMA comes from the possibility that our empirically successful 
theories are (radically) false and that, in due course, other empirically successful 
theories, hitherto unknown, will replace them. Yet, if it were fairly uncontroversial 
that all (or even most) of the logically possible future competitors to our theories 
will be empirically successful, that would amount to saying that empirical success 
is so easy to achieve that it can hardly be of any exceptional epistemic value to us 
in the first place.
We can express this thought more formally as follows: by the probability 
calculus we know that Pr (EhH) = ^ ^  ^  Pr ( // ,)  x Pr(£ / / / , ) ,  where H , refers
to the (mutually exclusive) hypotheses whose union set is equivalent to {_,H}. It 
has just been argued that adopting the empiricist standpoint amounts to maintaining 
that a theory’s achieving empirical success is not a very frequent phenomenon of 
scientific life. This, however, is equivalent to saying that most of the future 
competitors to current successful theories will, in fact, fail to be empirically 
successful. Hence, the explanationist is free to think that Pr(E/Hi ) is low for most
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of the possible future competitors to our theories comprising {—■//}. To conclude 
that Pr {EhH) will also be low we need only further assume that the sum of the 
prior probabilities of the few (mutually exclusive) successful theories belonging in 
{—•//} is strictly smaller than Pr(“■//). This, however, is an assumption that we can 
grant the explanationist. Indeed, denying this assumption amounts to assigning to 
the few successful but still unknown theories a significantly higher prior probability 
than to the many unsuccessful ones. But, surely, given that {—*//} is partitioned by 
theories hitherto unknown, there is hardly any reason for such a differential 
treatment. Consequently, the explanationist may reasonably assume Pr {EhH) to be 
low.
Let’s now move on to the prior probabilities for our current theories. Here 
there are no independent considerations deriving from the adoption of an empiricist 
epistemology to help us. For this reason, the explanationist must allude to what he 
thinks is the main source of normative import for the informal version of his NMA, 
namely (allegedly) non-vicious circularity. Shimony’s ‘tempered personalism’ 
showed us that this sort of circularity can be accommodated within the Bayesian 
framework. Here, then, is how the explanationist may attempt to constrain prior 
probabilities through the invocation of (allegedly non-vicious) rule-circularity:
A Bayesian-explanationist NMA
Assign theories proposed through IBE non-negligible priors. Empirical success will 
eventually raise their posterior probability to a degree that will allow us to hold that 
they are more likely to be (approximately) true than not. Since the posterior is now 
high enough, IBE is probably reliable. Hence, our initial assignment of a non-
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negligible prior is justified on the grounds that IBE has been shown probably 
reliable.
This Bayesian-explanationist NMA is as rule-circular as the original informal 
NMA. IBE is used essentially in the determination of the prior probability, since it 
becomes the criterion for determining which hypotheses will be assigned non- 
negligible priors. In this way it influences crucially the posterior of the hypotheses, 
whose value the reliability of IBE itself depends on. Its success, therefore, also 
depends on the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments in general. What we have 
shown so far, though, is that within Bayesianism there is room for the formulation 
of such arguments. Hence, not only are there good reasons to doubt the claims of 
the incompatibilists, but we now also have a positive argument for compatibilism.
This is not to say, however, that rule-circular arguments are, in fact, 
legitimate. In chapter 3 I examined some serious problems regarding their 
prospects. The main worry such arguments have to face refers to their professed 
property not to include their conclusion in their premises. I now wish to argue, in
Q O
tandem with all those critical of such arguments , that one cannot legitimately use 
a rule of inference without prior knowledge of its reliability. In the case of the 
explanationist NMA this means that one is not entitled to use IBE without 
knowledge of its reliability. Here is the reason. The explanationist claims that NMA 
shows IBE to be reliable. NMA, though, already uses IBE. Hence, the 
explanationist ends up supporting the following paradoxical schema: we claim 
knowledge of the fact that science tracks truth on the basis of a rule of inference we 
use without knowing whether it is reliable or not in the first place! This schema, I
98 See, for example, Howson (2000, ch. 2), Worrall (1999, 2000b), Musgrave (2006, 314-315).
169
think, is truly paradoxical. NMA can only go through if we know that IBE is 
reliable. And if only the conclusion of NMA can establish the reliability of IBE, 
then the (approximate) truth of our theories must be a premise in the argument.
This line of reasoning makes rule-circular arguments as viciously circular as it 
gets. The explanationists will of course respond that, on their conception, all we 
need is that it be objectively the case that our rule of inference is reliable regardless 
of our knowledge. This response, nonetheless, merely retains the mystery of 
inferring knowledge from ignorance, since the knowledge of whether our theories 
are approximately true is inferred by means of a rule of inference whose credentials 
are unknown to us".
These general doubts on the possibility of benign circularity apply equally 
well to the Bayesian-explanationist NMA. Recall, this argument is structurally 
identical to the informal NMA. Hence, it is not permissible to assign non-negligible 
priors to theories invented through IBE on the basis of its reliability, since its 
reliability hinges on the posterior probability the prior itself gives rise to. To fix the 
prior we need independent reasons of a sort circularity is unable to provide. If that 
is so, then Shimony’s own defence of harmless circularity, mentioned earlier, fails. 
Recall his main idea: despite the ‘reciprocal support of a methodology and a 
scientific world picture’, scientific theories are still open to criticism and ‘critical 
evaluation in the light of experience’. If my criticism of rule-circularity is well-
99 Peter Lipton seems almost to concur, despite the fact that he clearly does not intend to. Towards 
the end o f his discussion o f the circularity objection to the reliabilist version o f NMA he writes: “So 
I conclude that, while the [explanationist] miracle argument is no argument against the inductive 
sceptic or the instrumentalist, the circularity objection does not show that realists are not entitled to 
use it. The argument is circular against non-realists, but not for realists themselves” (2004, 192). 
But, surely, if  one is already a realist, he needs no further arguments to turn into one!
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founded, though, it remains mysterious how a thesis supported by a circular 
argument is open to criticism in the way that Shimony asserts. It simply can’t be 
that the explicit inclusion of an argument’s conclusion among its premises leaves 
the argument open to criticism.
So far, then, I have argued 1) that a Bayesian formulation of the 
explanationist NMA, which captures all its essentials, is possible, and 2) that the 
explanationist NMA, no matter how it is formulated, faces insuperable difficulties. 
(1) is both an amendment to Lipton’s normatively weak account and a 
counterexample to the incompatibilist claim advanced by Psillos (2004) and 
discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. that the explanationist NMA ought not to be 
modelled in Bayesian terms if it is to be successful. It was shown that the decision 
to formulate the argument probabilistically has nothing to do with its success, since 
our Bayesian reconstruction misses none of its essential elements. It was further 
maintained, nonetheless, that explanationism fails on independent grounds, i.e. on 
the basis of its inability to yield a satisfactory defence of the epistemic claim that 
we have good reasons to think that science yields approximately true theories.
One final remark: I have argued that the informal explanationist NMA and its 
Bayesian counterpart stand or fall together. I have also noted that it is very 
surprising that none of the explanationists has seriously considered the prospects of 
a Shimony-type Bayesian explanationist NMA. The reason for this neglect can 
perhaps be traced to the fact that, when probabilistically formulated, the circularity 
involved in the argument becomes too obvious for the argument to be taken 
seriously. Hence, Psillos’ strong remark that “an objectivisation of Bayesianism is 
... something that we, presumably, know cannot be done” (Psillos 2004, 88). 
Incompatibilists have tried to salvage the argument by renouncing probabilistic talk
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altogether. It has been shown, nonetheless, that Bayesianism should be the least of 
their concerns. The Bayesian framework is flexible enough to capture the main 
message of all strands of epistemology. It is also rigorous enough to expose (at least 
some of) their defects. The explanationist NMA is a case in hand. A consistent 
explanationist ought either to defend or reject both formulations of the argument. 
There were already good reasons for rejection based solely on the analysis of the 
informal version. A careful analysis and contraposition to it of the Bayesian version 
makes these reasons even more evident.
4.1.3 Can Frequencies Help Us Out?
Rejecting the explanationist NMA on the basis of our inability to justify non­
trivial constraints on prior probabilities through explanatory considerations is bad 
news not only for explanationism but also for those with high hopes for the NMA. 
In its explanationist version the NMA is intended as an argument with heavy 
normative import, a feature which also explains its appeal. Is there perhaps some 
other way to constrain the priors in order to bring these hopes to fruition? It has 
long been known that the Principle of Indifference faces important conceptual 
obstacles, already discussed in chapter 1 -  sufficiently many, I would say, so as not 
to merit any further discussion. It remains to be seen whether Empirically-based 
Subjective Bayesianism or Objective Bayesianism, also discussed in chapter 1, can 
offer a satisfactory answer.
Both these theories propose to introduce further objective constraints into 
Bayesianism with the help of empirical data in the form of fairly reliable statistical 
information. Hence, fixing the prior probability of a theory’s being (approximately) 
true means that we would need information with respect to the frequency of the
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occurrence of (approximately) true theories among (some specification of) the 
relevant population of scientific theories. But since this is the objective of NMA 
itself, i.e. knowledge of which theories can be justifiably considered to be 
approximately true, such estimates cannot be had. Magnus and Callender correctly 
note in this connection that “if we had [independent grounds for thinking that a 
theory is very likely true], the no-miracles argument would be superfluous” (2004, 
328). Indeed, obtaining reliable estimates regarding the frequency of the occurrence 
of approximately true theories means that a method is available, which allows us to 
reliably judge whether a given theory is approximately true or not. But surely, i f  
there is such a method, the obvious thing to do would be to apply this very method 
on our current theories in order to find out whether they are (approximately) true 
rather than invoke the NMA.
The only kind of information available to us, through which we might attempt 
to constrain the priors, is statistical information about the predictive success of past 
and present “accepted” theories. This proposal originates in Salmon (1990), who 
claims that “[prior probabilities] can be understood as our best estimates of the 
frequencies with which certain kinds of hypotheses succeed” (270). The use of such 
information to fix the priors, however, would surely turn the NMA into a non- 
sequitur. What the NMA attempts to do is somehow allow us to infer (approximate) 
truth from predictive success. By letting information regarding the frequencies of 
success of certain theories to fix the prior probability of (approximate) truth, 
though, we are implicitly presupposing that predictive success is, in fact, a reliable 
indicator of truth, i.e. precisely what the NMA aspires to conclude100.
100 Similar critical considerations to the ones in the main text can be found in Howson (2000,46-47) 
and Worrall (forthcoming).
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Even if such information were allowed (somehow) to fix the priors, though, 
there would still be a remaining issue: ‘the reference-class problem’. Recall from 
chapter 1 that frequencies require a collective, and there are many collectives that 
any given event might be considered to be an element of. Consequently, many 
different collectives can serve as the basis for measuring the frequency of 
empirically successful theories, and a question naturally arises as to which one is 
the most appropriate. As it turns out, this question is extremely hard to answer.
To begin with, consider the collective including all possible rivals of a given 
theory T. The problem with this specification is that the resulting collective seems 
to include the (non-denumerable) infinity of all the ‘grue-like’ variants of T, which 
makes the determination of the relevant frequency mathematically impossible. 
Another option would be to constrain attention to all rivals of Tactually articulated 
in the history of science so far. This proposal, however, is ambiguous as it stands. 
Are we to include all theories examined under the vague heading ‘history of 
science’ or only the ones classified as ‘mature science’? If we opt for the first 
alternative, we run the danger of underestimating our chances due to the large 
number of predictively unsuccessful ‘wild guesses’ articulated in the course of 
history. Even if we opt for the second alternative, however, things are no better, 
since theories falling under the label ‘mature science’ are by definition empirically 
successful (cf. Magnus and Callender 2004, 326). We would then reach the other 
extreme, i.e. that of overestimating our chances. Hence, even if frequencies of 
success could somehow fix prior probabilities, the task of selecting the reference- 
class these frequencies necessarily assume in a meaningful and, at the same time, 
non question-begging way seems insurmountable indeed.
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It seems fair to conclude, then, that the prospects for justifying non-trivial 
constraints on the prior probability of a theory being (approximately) true through 
frequency information are also very dim101. This in turn means (in the absence of 
some further and so-far-unarticulated argument) that the sole available 
interpretational context that remains for one who seeks a probabilistic 
reconstruction for NMA is Subjective Bayesianism. Indeed, the impossibility of 
constraining prior probabilities through frequency information means that 
Empirically-based Subjective Bayesianism in particular fails to add anything to 
pure personalism with respect to this particular issue. So, is NMA in any way 
compatible with Bayesian personalism? And if so, what does this mean for NMA?
4.1.4 NMA as a Plausibility Argument
Our discussion of explanationism a little earlier led us to the conclusion that 
the explanationist way of objectifying prior probabilities is impermissible. 
Consequently, the explanationist’s attempt to move beyond Subjective Bayesianism 
and towards a more objective account has failed too. It appears, though, that the 
alternative understanding of NMA as a plausibility argument is much more within 
the spirit of Subjective Bayesianism. Recall the crux of that version of the 
argument: our ‘inductive intuition’ somehow assures us that the empirical success 
of our best theories is not to be attributed to chance, despite the fact that, in 
principle at least, one cannot rule out the possibility that future theories, radically 
different from ours, will eventually overthrow them and take their place. Thus
101 My argument is confined to the context o f NMA. All too frequently we are in possession of  
statistical data that it would be too far-fetched not to call reliable. Hence, there are cases one might 
reasonably claim that the quest to objective priors is in fact successful.
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stated, it becomes obvious that empirical success does not suffice alone to establish 
the realist thesis. In fact, this is nothing other than the informal counterpart of the 
‘Base-Rate Fallacy’. What is required is a presumption in favour of our theories, 
which is afforded by our ‘inductive intuition’ on the basis of what I earlier called 
the a priori virtues of our theories (simplicity, fruitfulness etc.). This presumption, 
though, claim proponents of the plausibility version, is not founded on any 
argument, for any such argument would require further non-trivial premises and so 
on ad infinitum. The only way to break the regress is by taking a stance 
‘dogmatically’. Our strong intuitions on this issue ‘justify’ the realist stance.
It seems quite convincing to suggest that Subjective Bayesianism in particular 
is in a position to convey the fundamental idea of the plausibility understanding of 
the NMA. Our optimistic intuition towards our theories is captured by assigning 
relatively high prior probabilities to the approximate truth of our (particular) 
theories and, correspondingly, low priors to that of the as-yet-unknown but always 
possible future challengers. These prior probabilities are, as Colin Howson has put 
it, “[highly subjective estimates] of how probable types of large-scale world are” 
(2000, 55). There is no further argument that can be given in their favour. But, 
similarly, there is no further argument which can be given to support the dictates of 
our ‘inductive intuition’.
A natural reaction to this line of reasoning is that it makes the NMA 
essentially powerless. This worry revolves, I think, not so much around Subjective 
Bayesianism102 as it does around the notion o f‘inductive intuition’. How can such a 
vague and intuitive notion form the basis of the substantive claim the NMA seeks
102 Many people think that there is also a problem with Subjective Bayesianism. I deal with this 
problem in the next chapter in detail.
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to support? The only available answer to this question is that, although this version 
of the argument might indeed be an unsatisfactory defence of realism when 
compared to the aspirations of the committed realist, it still remains the only 
defensible construal of NMA. John Worrall (forthcoming) has argued persuasively 
that the NMA qua a plausibility argument merely sets realism as the ‘default 
position’ in the debate. No more than this can be expected from the argument, since 
NMA was never intended as a demonstration of the truth of realism. On the 
contrary, being inductive in character, it rests on certain presuppositions which, on 
pain of infinite regress, at some point have to be taken ‘on faith’. Indeed, having 
already seen the inadequacy of trying to justify these assumptions on the basis of 
allegedly non-viciously circular arguments, retorting to intuition remains the only 
open option. Furthermore, this situation is structurally no different from any 
content-increasing inference we perform in our everyday lives, and for whose 
legitimacy we are seldom in doubt. If so, then there remains no reason to be
i msuspicious of the workings of intuition in scientific matters either . Worrall 
concludes:
“The intuitions set some form of realism as the default position: there is no 
more to the ‘argument’ than that. The realist might like to say something 
stronger, but there is nothing stronger to say that anyone should like” (ibid.). 
This ‘default position’, I have further claimed, can be faithfully reconstructed 
within Subjective Bayesianism and takes the form of subjective prior probabilities. 
Without them, empirical success has no bite and the argument has no impact. The 
nature o f ‘inductive intuition’, though, is no different from the nature of subjective
103 A fuller assessment and defence o f the normative weight o f the ‘intuitive’ NMA is contained in 
chapter 5.
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priors: both are primitive and cannot be argued for any further. Worrall seems to 
concur with this, saying:
“This assignment of a prior is, of course, on the personalist Bayesian 
approach, to be thought of as simply reflecting a personal judgement about 
the plausibility of the theory, and not as any sort of reflection of some 
‘objective chance’ that the theory is true... Of course, as will be very clear, 
I share this intuition ... .” (ibid.).
This concludes the argument for points (a), (b) and (c) stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, i.e. that Bayesian Confirmation Theory broadly understood makes 
both versions of the argument transparent (and, thus, supports a compatibilist 
stance) and that Subjective Bayesianism in particular, being the most suitable 
interpretational context, vindicates the plausibility version of NMA rather than its 
explanationist counterpart. If all this is true, should one be a realist or not?
4.2 Adjudicating the Competitors
4.2.1 Can the NMA be Resisted?
The tenability of realism centrally relies on the success of the NMA. Having 
already argued that only the plausibility variant delivers its (modest) promise, we 
have to examine the issue of whether there are good grounds for denying the 
dictates of our intuition. Prima facie it might seem that no further argument is 
possible, since the validity of the content of our ‘inductive intuition’ is to be 
decided on ‘dogmatic’ grounds. It might seem, that is, that the realist simply 
‘decides’ about the validity of his intuition and asserts the conclusion of the 
argument, while the anti-realist merely disagrees. Put this way, the realist and the
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anti-realist end up talking past each other without any prospects for mutual 
understanding and fruitful debate.
Although this picture is to some extent an accurate depiction of the situation, 
there are still kinds of considerations which reasonably influence one’s evaluation 
of his intuition. One such consideration has been put forth by van Fraassen (1980) 
and forms the backbone of his constructive empiricism. The reason, van Fraassen 
claims, which allows us infer only to the empirical adequacy of our theories rather 
than their (approximate) truth is that our ‘inductive intuition’ is reliable only with 
respect to the observable realm. In other words, there is a difference in kind 
between the observable and unobservable domains of the world, which appears to 
be all important when it comes to our content-increasing inferences. This in 
Bayesian terms means that there is a relatively high prior probability that a given 
theory is empirically adequate and a low prior probability that it is actually 
(approximately) true on the basis of the qualitative difference between what counts 
as observable and what as unobservable.
Arguably, such a consideration might influence our evaluation of the reach of 
our ‘inductive intuition’. This consideration, however, faces sharp objections. The 
standard realist response, for example, is to deny that there is a meaningful 
observable vs. unobservable distinction. What counts as observable and what as 
unobservable, we are told, forms a continuum, such that any sharp line across it is 
inevitably philosophically ill-motivated (cf. Maxwell 1962; Psillos 1999,193-200). 
But this response is not without its own problems. On the one hand, the dichotomy 
is intuitively evident, despite the existence of some limiting cases which are by
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nature more problematic104. On the other hand, it is unclear how denying this 
dichotomy will serve the positive aim of the realist to provide an argument for his 
thesis. Indeed, if there is no clear-cut line between the observable and the 
unobservable, then, in principle at least, the very basis of NMA, i.e. the empirical 
success of science, is not an uncontroversial issue any more. I doubt, though, 
whether the realist will welcome this consequence.
A more appropriate response to van Fraassen’s challenge ought to proceed as 
follows. Even if we accept that there is a meaningful distinction between the 
observable and unobservable domains of reality, there is still reason to doubt that 
the reliability of our ‘inductive intuition’ fails to extend beyond the observable 
realm. Our inferences to the truth of theoretical claims are structurally no different 
from inferences we perform in our everyday lives for more mundane affairs. They 
are also no different from those we engage in at the purely empirical level, in order 
to arrive at van Fraassen-style empirical adequacy claims. After all, we learned 
from Goodman that underdetermination threatens the purely inductive 
generalisations that we all are inclined to make just as it threatens ‘still more 
ampliative inferences’ to universal theories. Both involve consideration of the a 
priori virtues of our hypotheses, like simplicity and fruitfulness, where ‘inductive 
intuition’ comes into play. Contrary to van Fraassen’s claims, then, it seems natural 
to suppose that transferring an ampliative mode of inference, which has proved 
very successful so far in its applications to the observable realm, to that of the 
unobservable, should enhance, rather than decrease, our confidence in the
104 Van Fraassen’s own response to such limiting cases is that they only show ‘observable’ to be a 
vague predicate, not that they undermine the principled distinction between the observable and the 
unobservable (cf. 1980, 16).
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(approximate) truth of the hypotheses regarding the latter. Consequently, the 
epistemic significance of the distinction between the observable and unobservable 
parts of the world seems insufficient on its own to turn the balance in favour of 
constructive empiricism and set this rather than realism as the default position105.
However, the most celebrated argument in this discussion along with the 
NMA, namely the ‘pessimistic induction’ threatens exactly to drive a wedge 
between scientific inferences at the observational and at the theoretical level. 
Science seems to be cumulative at the empirical level, each theory-change adding 
to our predictive powers at the observational level, and yet, so the ‘pessimistic 
induction’ supposes, at the level of the ‘deep structural’ claims that our theories 
make we see radical change in the history of science. Consequently, the only 
sensible inductive inference at that theoretical level is that even our current theories 
are likely to be (radically) false. Indeed, this has been repeatedly presented as the 
main counter-argument to the NMA and, if successful, would be sufficient to 
remove realism from being the ‘default position’. What would be put in its place, of 
course, is not easy to see. The ‘pessimistic induction’ aims merely at denying the 
force of the NMA and not at putting forward any alternative positive account of 
scientific knowledge. Hence, its success could be used to motivate constructive 
empiricism as much as it has been explicitly used to motivate Epistemic Structural 
Realism106.
105 Similar considerations can be found in Psillos (1999, 211-215), though with reference to IBE 
rather than ‘inductive intuition’.
106 It is quite striking how very little use van Fraassen has made o f the ‘pessimistic induction’ 
throughout his writings. To the best o f my knowledge, he refers explicitly to, and embraces, this 
argument (still without naming it) only in his (2006, 288ff), on his way to criticising structural 
realism. One possible explanation o f this continuous absence is his strong aversion towards
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The ‘pessimistic induction’ aims to undercut the inductive strength of NMA 
through a list of alleged radical theory-changes, explicitly offered for the first time 
by Laudan (1981). These counter-examples to the realist inference consist of 
theories once considered (approximately) true on the basis of their empirical 
success, but which were subsequently abandoned as (radically) false. On this basis,
1 (Y1the ‘pessimistic induction’ is usually reconstructed as a reductio of the claim that 
there is a connection between empirical success and truth, a claim which much (but 
not all, as we have seen) of NMA rests on.
In an interesting recent paper, however, Peter Lewis (2001) suggested that a 
probabilistic reading of the argument shows that the ‘pessimistic induction’ is not a 
valid reductio of the connection between success and truth, since, like the NMA 
according to Howson, it also commits the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’. As a result, Lewis 
concludes, the realist is not threatened by the argument. Here is how he reconstructs 
the reductio:
(1) “Assume that the success of a theory is a reliable test for its truth.
(2) Most current scientific theories are successful.
(3) So most current scientific theories are true.
(4) Then most past scientific theories are false, since they differ from current 
theories in significant ways.
(5) Many of these false past theories were successful.
metaphysics. If any inference to anything unobservable (including structure) “[sinks] us into this 
metaphysical morass that swallows all seekers for the true foundations o f  being” (ibid. 303), one 
(presumably) hardly needs a historical argument from discontinuity to discredit (any version of) the 
realist thesis.
107 For example see Psillos (1999, 102-103) and Lewis (2001).
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(6) So the success of a theory is not in fact a reliable test for its truth” (ibid.
373)l0S.
Lewis’ strategy, very much like (but independently of) Howson’s with reference to 
NMA, is to translate this argument into probabilistic terms. Hence, reliability is to 
be expressed in terms of the false positive and false negative rate
Pr (~^E/H). Saying that ‘the success of a theory is a reliable test for its truth’, as the 
realist does, amounts to saying that these two probabilities are small. Lewis’ 
ultimate aim is to show that Laudan’s reductio in fact fails to use the history of 
theory-change in science to establish that these probabilities are, on the contrary, 
high.
Lewis extracts a value for the posterior probability Pr(~^H/E) from Laudan’s 
assertion that “for every highly successful theory in the past of science which we 
now believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could find half a dozen once 
successful theories which we now regard as substantially non-referring” (1981, 
123). This value (which, of course, Lewis does not expect us to take too seriously, 
but simply uses as a ‘ball park figure’ given Laudan’s formulation) is ? t(~ 'H /E ) =  
6/7. Following Magnus and Callender (2004,326), Vx{^H/E) is best understood as 
the posterior probability that an arbitrary member of the set of past theories merited 
(as judged by current lights) on the basis of its past empirical success. Lewis argues 
that it is fallacious to infer from this probability anything with respect to either the 
false positive Pr(E/~'H) or the false negative rates Pr(-^E/H), since doing so would
108 Throughout his paper Lewis omits any reference to ‘approximate truth’ and talks of ‘truth’ 
simpliciter. In the main text I follow his usage for ease o f exposition, since my main criticism 
revolves around his appreciation o f the logic o f the argument rather than the concept of 
‘approximate truth’. It suffices to note that the argument stands intact by substituting ‘approximate 
truth’ for Lewis’ ‘truth’ (cf. Psillos 1999, 102-104).
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amount to committing the fallacy of ignoring the base-rates or prior probabilities, 
exactly as in the NMA case examined in chapter 3. Indeed, re-using the formula for
the posterior probability which involved the Bayes factor i-e-
p r/ z r \
Pr(H  / E) = ----------------------- ^ — — y-----------, it becomes obvious that a
P r(# ) + Pr(-iff) x  ^ ^  /P t ( E / H )
small posterior probability ?r(H/E) = 1 - Pr(-'H/E) = 1/7 does not by itself imply 
that the Bayes factor is large enough to signify that empirical success is an 
unreliable test for truth. What is also required is consideration of the relevant prior 
probabilities. It could be the case that the prior probability of our theory is so small 
that even a low Bayes factor fails to raise the posterior probability to any significant 
level. Hence, Lewis concludes that the move from (4) and (5) to (6) is invalid.
Lewis in fact suggests that his analysis “provides a natural way for a realist to 
explain Laudan’s historical evidence” (2001, 376). In probabilistic terms, all the 
realist needs to do in order to avoid the reductio is blame the prior probabilities of 
those past theories for the low value of the resulting posterior for truth instead of 
the Bayes factor. In words, “the realist can interpret Laudan’s historical cases, not 
as evidence against the reliability of success as a test for truth, but merely as 
evidence of the scarcity of true theories in the past” (ibid. 377). Put more simply, 
science is better today and that is why it is natural for our theories to enjoy higher 
prior probabilities than it used to be the case.
Lewis is surely right that from a low posterior probability for truth it is not 
valid to infer to a high Bayes factor (i.e. infer that success is an unreliable test for 
truth). He is also right that the line of defence he suggests is open to the realist. This 
is not to say, however, that the way he has presented and evaluated the situation 
does justice to the ‘pessimistic induction’.
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Lewis claims that the move from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid. He writes:
“In affirming that success provides a reliable test for truth, the realist is 
claiming that the rates of false positives and false negatives are low. If this is 
indeed the case, then if most current scientific theories are successful, it 
follows deductively that most current theories are true, as required by the 
realist” (ibid. 375).
The only way for (3) to follow deductively from (1) and (2) is to somehow read (1) 
and (2) as fixing the prior probability of a current theory at a sufficiently high 
degree. Indeed, Lewis interprets premise (2) as asserting that the prior probability 
of success Pr(£) is sufficiently high. As Magnus and Callender, however, correctly 
note,
“on the assumption that success is a reliable indicator of truth, [asserting 
that Pr(£) is high] is tantamount to assuming that any arbitrary member of 
the population is likely to be true. If [the prior probability] is low (and 
how can we know if it is not?), then [the assumption about a high Pr(£)] 
fails and the conclusion [that our theories are probably true] does not 
follow” (2004, 325).
To see why this is so one has only to consider the expansion for Pr(£)= 
P r ( / /)P r (£ // /)  + P r(- i/7 )P r(£ /- i//) . If success is a reliable test for truth, as 
assumption (1) dictates, both the false positive ¥x(E/~'H) and the false negative 
P r r a t e s  are low. Hence, the Only way for Pr(£) to be sufficiently high is that 
the prior probability Pr(H) is also high. Without this assumption, as we have seen, 
the NMA commits the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’.
Lewis in fact extracts the prior probability assumption from (2), i.e. the fact 
that most current theories are successful, combined with (1). This, of course, is the
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indispensable inductive assumption the realist must affirm if his reasoning is to go 
through. I suggest, nonetheless, that the most plausible way to understand Lewis’ 
rendition of the ‘pessimistic induction’ is on the basis of this very assumption of 
high prior probability. In other words, what Lewis ought to have taken Laudan to 
be really suggesting from the very beginning through his counter-examples is the 
following: assuming that the prior probability o f  our past theories being true was 
as high as that o f  our current theories, evidence from the history of science entails 
that empirical success is not a reliable test for truth.
Reformulated this way (with, in effect, an extra premise about the priors), the 
argument becomes valid. As in all good reductios, the anti-realist must assume all 
that the realist assumes and create a contradiction. By adopting the realist’s 
inductive assumptions in the form of the prior probabilities, Lewis’ pessimistic 
inducer merely extends the realist’s current inductive optimism to past theories. In 
this way, he is able to present his counter-examples in the form of past theories 
with the following two characteristics: a) they had been highly accredited by our 
‘inductive intuition’ (i.e. assigned high prior probability) at the time that they were 
entertained seriously, and b) they were later (allegedly) proven false. With (a) and 
(b) in place, the reductio is valid: empirical success is no longer a reliable test for 
truth.
Consequently, Lewis’ original reconstruction of the ‘pessimistic induction’ 
has missed the following premise (call it MP):
Those past successful theories which have been declared false by current 
lights were justifiably highly accredited by our ‘inductive intuition’ at the 
time they were entertained seriously.
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With (MP) alongside premises (4) and (5) in Lewis’ reconstruction (6) follows 
logically and the reductio delivers its intended result. In more informal terms, (MP) 
further explicates the obvious consideration that for the counter-examples to have 
any force against the claim that success is a reliable test for truth, those past 
theories must bear some essential epistemic similarities with their forerunners. One 
of them, codified in assumption (5), is that they were empirically successful. 
Another one, codified in (MP), is that they were also worth taking seriously on the 
basis of inductive grounds in the first place.
To be sure, the ‘pessimistic induction’ is as much an inductive argument as 
the NMA is. Hence, there is ample room for questioning its logical force. The 
realist can respond in three (mutually compatible) ways: a) he can attack premise
(4) and suggest that it is not the case that past theories were (wholly) false, thus' 
restoring historical continuity on the theoretical level. This response, pursued over 
the years by Hardin and Rosenberg (1982), Kitcher (1993) and Psillos (1999,108- 
114), is well-documented, so nothing else will be said here, b) Alternatively, the 
realist can attempt to resist premise (5) and the claim that these past theories were 
genuinely empirically successful. This kind of reaction has been suggested by 
Worrall (1988, 1989a, 1994) and has also been extensively discussed109. What is 
important for present purposes is that both (a) and (b) aim to cut down the size of 
Laudan’s list of false but successful theories and, thus, on this probabilistic 
rendition of the argument, reduce the value of Yr(pH/E). Finally, there is another
109 Worrall, o f course, does not believe that this strategy takes all force from the PI but only that 
Laudan has tended to overstate his case (cf. 1989a, 154-155; 1994, 335). After all, it is this 
remaining force o f the ‘pessimistic induction’ that led Worrall to put forth Epistemic Structural 
Realism as the only defensible realist position.
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escape route available to the realist, namely Lewis’ option. So, c) the realist can 
also resist (MP) and claim that the prior probability of those successful but false 
past theories was not as high as the prior probability of current scientific theories. 
The success of this move, nonetheless, presupposes that some principled distinction 
can be drawn between today’s theories and past theories with respect to their 
fundamental inductive merit before any evidence comes in. Lewis’ analysis has 
little to say towards this goal, except for the assertion that “[the realist’s 
interpretation of Laudan’s counter-examples] commits the convergent realist to the 
empirical claim that successful theories were rare in the past and are common 
today...” (Lewis 2001,377). It is certainly true that Lewis’ recommended reaction 
to the ‘pessimistic induction’ commits the realist to the claim that past theories 
deserved low prior probabilities. Whether such a commitment isjustified, though, is 
a separate issue. On this count, the failure of all attempts so far to single out an 
uncontroversial measure of the a priori virtues prior probabilities codify, like 
simplicity or unity, casts doubt on the prospects of finding a convincing positive 
argument for distinguishing between present and past theories in terms of their 
fundamental inductive merit.
Far from being fallacious, then, the ‘pessimistic induction’ can indeed pose a 
threat to the realist position in the following two ways: '
1. Assume that one accepts that Laudan’s counter-examples suffice to 
generate a high Pr(~^H/E) and, thus, a low Pr(H/E) for past theories.
2. Further assume that one fails to find a principled distinction between past 
and present theories, which can give rise to differential prior probabilities, 
but,
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3. One is also unwilling to give up the belief that empirical success is a 
reliable test for truth.
4. It follows, then, that one ought to hold low prior probabilities of truth for 
current theories, which amounts to a withdrawal from the realist ‘default’.
Alternatively:
1'. Again take Pr(~^HZE) to be high and, thus, ?t(HZE) to be low.
2'. Also assume that there are no grounds for differential prior probabilities, 
but,
3'. Take these prior probabilities to be uniformly high across the history of 
science.
4'. It follows, then, that empirical success is no longer a reliable test for truth, 
as Lewis’ original reductio had it.
It is also interesting to note that it is not clear at all whether Laudan himself 
intended the ‘pessimistic induction’ as a reductio of the reliability of success as a 
test for truth rather than a reductio of the realist ‘default’. Laudan asks the 
following question: “is there any plausibility to the suggestion ... that explanatory 
success can be taken as a rational warrant for a judgement of approximate truth?” 
(1981, 121). His answer is, of course, negative. As stated, however, it is unclear 
where exactly he thinks that the problem lies. Is success somehow inherently 
deficient as a test for truth or is it just insufficient to yield rational warrant for a 
claim of approximate truth, due to the extreme prior implausibility of theoretical 
science? It is hardly surprising, of course, that we cannot tell from Laudan’s 
presentation what he thinks the main problem is. This is because his argument 
consists of an informal inductive claim, whose structure becomes transparent only 
under the lights of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
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Though interesting in its own right, I shall not offer an exegesis of Laudan’s 
paper and his ‘real’ thoughts. I think, however, that the ‘pessimistic induction’ is 
more convincing as a reductio of the realist ‘default’ rather than the reliability of 
testing. Indeed, it would be too far-fetched to deny the basic empiricist presumption 
that empirical testing is the only reliable tool we can use in order to increase our 
knowledge of the world. Consequently, what the past record of false but 
empirically successful theories seems to suggest is that we should be overly 
cautious when evaluating the prior plausibility of current scientific theories.
As I said earlier, it is by no means trivial which epistemic position the success 
of the ‘pessimistic induction’ commits one to. All that can be concluded from this 
line of argument is that one has no reasons to be a realist. If this is the case, 
however, the ‘pessimistic induction’ has successfully, though by no means 
conclusively, undermined the NMA.
4.2.2 Should we be Realists, Constructive Empiricists, Structuralists or 
what?
In their recent paper (2004), Magnus and Callender attempted to give an 
explanation of “the feeling of futility in the realism debates” (327) by offering a 
probabilistic reconstruction of these debates. By endorsing the charge that both the 
NMA and the ‘pessimistic induction’ commit the Base-Rate Fallacy, their main 
diagnosis of this pathological state of affairs is that realists and anti-realists talk 
past each other:
“anti-realists responding to the no-miracles argument seek to increase 
[Pr(-^H/E)} ... [while] realists responding to the pessimistic induction seek to 
lower the value for [Pr(E /^H )Y  (ibid. 327).
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We have seen, nonetheless, that one can reconstruct both arguments by taking into 
account prior probabilities or base-rates in a way that allows both sides to talk 
about the same thing and (at least) agree on what premises they disagree upon.
In fact, one can be even more optimistic than this. By revealing the 
presuppositions of each argument, the foregoing analysis also shows, I think, the 
extent to which there can be fruitful debate concerning the issue of realism. As we 
have seen, the success of NMA hinges to a large extent on the prior probability one 
will assign to the approximate truth of our best theories. I have argued that there are 
kinds of considerations which can influence our prior degrees of belief. There are, 
for example, perfectly legitimate philosophical considerations which tell against the 
observable vs. unobservable dichotomy as a suitable motivation for constructive 
empiricism. It has also been shown that the ‘pessimistic induction’ is still a serious 
threat to realism, although by no means a presuppositionless one either. Quite 
inevitably, these considerations take the form of plausibility arguments and, hence, 
rest on further non-trivial assumptions. This fact notwithstanding, a Bayesian 
reconstruction of the debate contributes a rigorous conceptual apparatus which 
allows us to see the picture more clearly and appreciate the import of all the tacit 
presuppositions the standard informal arguments are committed to.
Having said this, though, we reach the real source of the ‘feeling of ennui’ 
that Magnus and Callender perceive in the debates. This is no other than the 
unfortunate (re)discovery of the fact that it is always possible to attribute the 
disagreement between realists and anti-realists to something on which unequivocal 
agreement is just not possible! This thing is no other than prior probabilities. In this 
chapter I maintained that, among the Bayesian variants, only Subjective 
Bayesianism can do justice to the real import of the main arguments in the debate.
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Nonetheless, Bayesian personalism abstains from definitively constraining the prior 
probabilities beyond the restrictions set by the formal axioms of the probability 
calculus. This being so, the option is always open to blame the priors for any 
difference of opinion, under the sole constraint that the formal axioms of 
probability are not violated.
This fact, of course, trivially entails that a Bayesian reconstruction of the 
realism debate fails to decide the issue. In other words, Bayesianism cannot dictate 
what stance we have to take. If one’s ‘inductive intuition’ is strong enough, then 
belief in the reliability of success as a test for truth is enough to make him a realist. 
A negative assessment of the efficacy of one’s ‘inductive intuition’, though, would 
not suffice for the realist thesis. Which stance it would result in is a separate 
question. A constructive empiricist would hold a high prior probability that our best 
theories are empirically adequate while structuralists that our theories are only 
(approximately) structurally true110. Which of these ‘default positions’ is the right 
one, though, on the basis of some external objective criterion is a question that 
cannot be answered by Subjective Bayesianism. All that Bayesianism can do is 
accurately describe the situation, reveal hidden assumptions and bring to light the 
logic of the situation. When it comes to substantive issues, it has to remain silent.
It is, of course, possible, within the context of Bayesianism to reconstruct 
faithfully various episodes in the history of science and explain the reasons that 
made the adherents of one or other philosophical position change their minds on the 
basis of evidence. A classic example of such kind of historical reconstruction is
110 An implicit (but permissible) assumption at this point is that the constructive empiricist and the 
structuralist recognise success as a reliable test for empirical adequacy and approximate structural 
truth respectively.
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Dorling (1992), in which we find, among others, an extensive discussion and 
reconstruction of the debate on atomic realism. Dorling explains how using 
Bayesian conditionalisation accounts for actual cases of conversion from 
positivist/instrumentalist views of the atom to atomic realism on the basis of 
evidence. Note, though, that Dorling’s task is essentially descriptive. What he is 
after is an explanation of the behaviour of actual scientists in the history of science 
rather than a definitive, normatively binding response to the question ‘should we be 
realists?’. I do not doubt that reconstructions such as Dorling’s are perfectly 
legitimate within a Bayesian framework of analysis. Yet, it should be equally clear 
that they do not address the normative issue of whether belief in the (approximate) 
truth of our theories is warranted or not, which is the central question of the realism 
debate.
This conclusion seems to contradict Magnus and Callender’s own assessment 
of Dorling’s endeavours. After praising Dorling for presenting “retail arguments 
about particular entities” (2004, 329) they continue:
“In Dorling’s cases, there may well be some plausible set of priors available, 
priors that realists and anti-realists could have agreed on before all the 
evidence came in. In the present wholesale case, however, where the entire 
fate of realism or anti-realism seems bound up with the priors, we can’t 
imagine how one could find a reasonable set of priors” (329).
Magnus and Callender’s conclusion rests heavily on the assumption that there is a 
significant difference between what they call ‘wholesale arguments’ for and against 
realism in general and other ‘retail’ ones, which allegedly refer only to particular 
entities. I have already endorsed Worrall’s (forthcoming) criticism of this 
distinction when discussing the IBE-version of the NMA, which also makes use of
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(a version of) it. To repeat briefly, it is very difficult to see what the alleged 
‘wholesale’ element could be that Magnus and Callender (following Boyd and 
Psillos and their talk of ‘scientific methodology in general’) have allegedly 
identified except for the union of all the ‘retail’ arguments for particular entities. If 
we grant this plausible understanding of ‘wholesale arguments’ or ‘scientific 
methodology in general’, both the NMA and the ‘pessimistic induction’ can be re­
run with reference to particular entities only, as Magnus and Callender want it. 
Hence, if there are cases in the history of science where a reasonable assignment of 
priors could be agreed on, then the same ought to hold when one discusses the 
realism issue in more abstract terms.
But even if it is possible to discuss the issue of realism from a general 
perspective with ‘priors that realists and anti-realists could have agreed on before 
all the evidence came in’ in place, it is still mysterious how such treatment can have 
any normative import whatsoever. Indeed, all that is asserted here is that at a 
particular point in time, some number of scientists actually agreed upon some set of 
priors that seemed plausible at the time. Again, though, this descriptive statement 
by itself does nothing towards resolving the normative issue of whether a realist 
epistemic stance is warranted.
In short, Bayesianism can only (re)affirm that the only compelling reasons 
for one to change his mind on the realism issue are reasons of internal coherence. 
The realist who views the history of science in the same way as Laudan and sees no 
difference in kind between past and current theories and who is a committed 
empiricist can convert to anti-realism or structuralism. This will happen, though, 
only because clinging onto realism is not coherent any more with the rest of the 
details of his own scientific worldview and not because those other stances have
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somehow proven ‘superior to’ the realist view in some objective sense or against an 
objective common measure. Saying this much, though, is not incoherent with my 
claim that a Subjective Bayesian reconstruction of the NMA vindicates the 
‘intuitive’ understanding of it as a plausibility argument rather than its IBE 
counterpart. It is just another way of recognising the impotence of NMA to provide 
anything like a proof of (the probability of) its conclusion from first principles.
One might protest at this point that I am merely rephrasing the problem of 
induction in its general form, i.e. the impossibility of providing conclusive reasons 
for the truth (or probable truth) of any non-trivial proposition. Well, this is indeed 
accurate but I don’t see why it should be the reason for protest. All that is asserted 
here is that in the end, it is always possible to blame the priors for any prima facie 
irreconcilable difference of opinion. In the absence of an argument for 
demonstrably objective priors (some of the proposals to this aim were discussed 
and found inadequate in the course of our treatment), such disagreements are bound 
to be irreconcilable. It is true that the only remaining interpretation, i.e. Subjective 
Bayesianism “also respects Hume’s argument that there is no sound inductive 
argument from experiential data that does not incorporate an inductive premise, and 
it also tells us what the inductive premise will look like: it will be a probability 
assignment that is not deducible from the probability axioms” (Howson 2000, 
134)111. Hence, it is true that on a Bayesian analysis, much of the difference of 
opinion which is observed in the realism debate is to be attributed to the all time 
classic problem of induction. Does this present special problems for our analysis?
Some would argue that it does. There is a wide presumption that “most 
realists [do not] see the no-miracles argument as solving the problem of induction;
111 Emphasis in the original.
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rightly or wrongly, that problem is being bracketed here [i.e. in their paper] 
(assumed ‘solved’ or ‘unresolvable’)” (Magnus and Callender 2004,323). It would 
seem to follow from this widespread sentiment that my analysis misses the point. 
Nonetheless appearances are deceptive here. Ignoring the problem of induction 
amounts to transforming both the NMA and the ‘pessimistic induction’ into 
instantiations of the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’. Correcting this fallacy means that one has 
to take these inductive assumptions into account in the form of prior probabilities. 
Now, if the problem is recognised as ‘solved’, then there ought to be a unique prior 
probability assignment. We have seen that there isn’t. If it is recognised as 
‘irresolvable’, there ought to be at least a consideration of the consequences of this 
situation for the problem in hand. Typically, though, such consideration is missing 
from the debate. One can only assume that confusion reigns. A Bayesian 
reconstruction of the realism debate is itself a very convincing reductio of the 
decision to ‘bracket’ the problem of induction. Instead of doing so, one ought to 
take it seriously into account and evaluate its import. Even if this decision brings 
with it feelings of ‘ennui’.
This concludes my argument for thesis (d), i.e. that, although Bayesianism 
fails to decide the question of the appropriate epistemic attitude towards our best 
scientific theories, it still contributes a lot towards bringing out assumptions the 
standard competing stances are tacitly committed to. If anything, it is the inductive 
nature of these assumptions, codified in the prior probabilities, rather than 
fallacious reasoning, which is responsible for the often-expressed sentiments of 
futility regarding the prospects of the debate.
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4.3 Conclusion
Taking stock, the main message of the last two chapters is that Bayesianism 
enjoys some kind of qualified success in its involvement in the realism debate. 
Although it is a legitimate and valuable tool for analysing and evaluating the main 
arguments for and against realism, it does not add much to our (already informally 
stated) reasons for deciding which side to take. I do not think that this qualification 
renders the Bayesian framework useless. But it is also true that we should not 
expect more from it than it can promise. There remains one more issue to examine, 
namely the possibility that our Subjective Bayesian reconstruction of the debate has 
somehow undermined all prospects for a solution and, in this way, surrendered the 
case to the relativist. In the next chapter I investigate this accusation arguing 
against the common tendency to relate Subjective Bayesianism with some form of 
relativism.
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Chapter 5
Subjective Bayesianism, Relativism and 
Epistemology
In the last two chapters I argued that a reconstruction of the realism debate 
within the framework of Subjective Bayesianism, though possible, fails to decide 
the issue; indeed, it fails even add to the informal considerations for or against the 
various possible doxastic attitudes towards our theories. In this chapter I wish to 
examine the following possible objection to my conclusion. It is no wonder, it 
might be claimed, that Subjective Bayesianism fails to support any of the 
competing attitudes towards our best theories because Subjective Bayesianism 
precludes from the outset any such solution. Instead of failing to add anything to 
our informally stated reasons for belief, a Subjective Bayesian analysis rather 
undermines the strength of any argument we can possibly come up with. Hence, the 
widespread sentiment amongst contemporary philosophers that endorsing 
Subjective Bayesianism amounts to endorsing some form of relativism. My first 
aim, then, will be to deny that there is any special, a priori relationship between
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Subjective Bayesianism and relativism. The problem of relativism is a much more 
fundamental issue and has to be countered on general epistemological grounds 
rather than on the basis of one’s interpretational stance towards the probability 
calculus. Still, there is an inverse connection between relativism and one’s 
interpretation of the probability calculus. Should an effective answer to the problem 
be found on general epistemological grounds, we can expect this answer to have an 
impact on our ways of interpreting partial belief. My second aim, then, is to explore 
the nature of this relationship by critically reviewing the main answers to the 
relativist challenge from the standpoint of fundamental epistemology. I shall argue 
for the following theses: a) we can hope to resist the relativist challenge only from 
the standpoint of traditional foundationalist epistemology, b) the ‘intuitive’ NMA is 
the only version of the realist argument respecting the guidelines of 
foundationalism, thus carrying significant normative force, and c) Subjective 
Bayesianism endorses this normative element.
5.1 The Alleged Link Between Subjective Bayesianism and Relativism
It is widely held that Subjective Bayesianism is too subjective to provide a 
satisfactory endorsement of the NMA. Here is a sample of the ways this complaint 
has been expressed:
“[T]he subjective theory of probability ... [is] ... an example of the 
application of the relatmstic mentality to such an increasingly important 
branch of modem mathematics as the probability calculus, and as an essential 
part of the new vision of science which we want to give in an irrationalist, 
and, as we shall say, probabilist form” (De Finetti 1931,172; my emphasis).
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“[The Subjective Bayesian] view of the principles of probabilities makes 
them like a system of deduction, but it is only like a system of deduction 
where the choice of premises is a matter of w him .. .where we end up depends 
on where we begin, and where we begin is arbitrary, so far as truth is 
concerned. So we have no reason whatsoever to suppose that science is taking 
us towards the truth or even towards empirical adequacy. On [the 
personalist’s] analysis, the price of taking Hume seriously is radical 
scepticism [perhaps ‘relativism’ would be a more accurate term], and this is a 
price he feels obliged to pay” (Lipton 2002, 583).
“[P]rior probability [assignments] are no less idiosyncratic (from the point of 
view of the Subjective Bayesian) than specifying [them] by, say, consulting a 
soothsayer” (Psillos 2004, 87).
“ [A]ny reason for fixing one’s priors counts as legitimate in a Bayesian 
context. According to standard Bayesian epistemology, priors ... are up for 
grabs, meaning that one assignment of priors is as good as any other, 
provided both are coherent ...”112 (Douven 2005, 340)
Even Worrall, who has explicitly endorsed our subjective Bayesian formulation of 
his preferred ‘intuitive’ NMA, has expressed reservations regarding the ability of 
Subjective Bayesianism to convey the weight of our intuitions:
“It is not that [the Subjective] Bayesian rendition [of NMA] seems to me 
incorrect in any way... The assumption that, in cases where the NMA- 
intuitions kick in most strongly, the ‘prior’ of the theory concerned is at
112 Emphasis in the original.
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least reasonably high seems just a ... way of reflecting our intuitive 
judgment about the unity or simplicity of that theory ... (Indeed the 
intuitions here seem stronger: they characterise, in a way that (personalist) 
Bayesianism declares impossible, those cases in which it is, and those in 
which it is not, reasonable to assume a reasonably high prior. It is not a 
subjective matter that a theory claiming that planets move in ellipses is 
simpler than one that claims that their orbits are some Jeffreys-style 
monstrosity.)” (Worrall 2007, 146-147)113.
By declaring the value of the prior probabilities a subjective matter, the 
Bayesian seems to be willing to consider any probability assignment whatsoever as 
legitimate under the sole condition that the assignment under consideration satisfies 
the axioms of probability. This means, though, that any hope of providing a rational 
method for resolving disagreement on substantive issues is lost at the outset. On a 
personalist construal any coherent view, no matter how intuitively outrageous, will 
be deemed on an equal footing with any other and in particular on an equal footing 
with some altogether more sensible view involving ‘serious’ priors.
This consequence is, of course, no different from a version of relativism 
regarding non-trivial, substantive beliefs. Bas van Fraassen characterises such a 
form of relativism thus:
“Irenic relativism holds: there is (1) no objective criterion or rightness for 
opinion, and (/or) (2) no non-trivial criterion of rationality -  anything goes, 
there is no truth except truth-for-you” (1989,176).
Van Fraassen’s formulation indicates that he thinks that (1) differs from (2) in some 
significant way. It is not clear at all, however, that there is any difference between
113 Emphasis in the original.
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them. The emphasis in both (1) and (2) is on the criterion for rightness of opinion 
and rationality, i.e. the means that we have for deciding which opinions count as 
right or rational. Consequently, (1) and (2) seem to be just logically equivalent 
ways of saying the same thing, namely that irenic relativism holds that we have no 
means for deciding which substantive beliefs are right/rational. Irrespective of 
whether (1) and (2) are logically equivalent, however, the fact remains: if it is 
possible for two different agents, who both respect the constraints set by the axioms 
of probability, to simultaneously assign quite different degrees of belief to the same 
set of substantive propositions with equal right, then “justified opinion” becomes 
agent-relative. Hence the charge that Subjective Bayesianism commits one to a 
version of relativism, from which it follows trivially that our Bayesian-‘intuitive’ 
NMA is of limited value, since it is an argument for just one of the many 
contradictory, but equally legitimate, views one can have on the issue of the (likely) 
truth of our current best scientific theories.
In order to answer to this accusation, one must clarify the relationship 
between Subjective Bayesianism and ‘scientific rationality’. One thing we must 
note at the outset is that some elements in Subjective Bayesianism are as objective 
as it gets. These elements are supplied by the basic requirement that, at any given 
time, an agent’s degrees of belief must satisfy the axioms of probability. As we saw 
in chapter 1, one can provide powerful reasons for according objective status to 
those axioms, reasons which, in historical order, originated in the from of 
synchronic Dutch-book arguments and culminated with the formulation of a 
soundness and completeness theorem for probability theory. It is now arguable that 
these results vindicate Ramsey’s insight that the axioms of probability are best
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viewed as logical constraints directly analogous to those of deductive logic (cf. 
Ramsey 1926, 82; Howson 2000, 127-134).
It is certainly true that both deductive logic and Subjective Bayesianism qua 
the logic of partial belief will be central elements of any sensible conception of 
‘scientific rationality’. Indeed, any plausible account of scientific reasoning must 
contain at least a set of universally applicable standards, which will ensure the 
internal coherence of all scientific investigations. The crucial issue, then, becomes 
whether such standards exhaust the correct theory o f ‘scientific rationality’ or not.
If it turns out that deductive and probabilistic logic exhaust the correct theory 
of ‘scientific rationality’, then there is no doubt that endorsing Subjective 
Bayesianism entails relativism and ‘truth-for-you’ regarding substantive issues as 
the inevitable outcome. Indeed, if all there is to ‘scientific rationality’ is a set of 
standards regarding the coherence of one’s degrees of beliefs, then nothing 
precludes the justifiable assignment of very different (coherent) degrees of belief to 
the same set of synthetic propositions. This, however, amounts to succumbing to 
the relativist thesis that there can be no non-trivial criterion for justified opinion. If 
it can be maintained, on the other hand, that ‘scientific rationality’ involves further 
elements than just standards of coherence, then endorsing Subjective Bayesianism 
is not inconsistent with a more objective account of scientific knowledge and 
relativism ceases to be a threat.
On this question, I think the reader will agree that the claim that ‘probabilistic 
coherence exhausts the correct theory o f ‘scientific rationality” is not an integral 
part of any sensible understanding of the Subjective Bayesian interpretation of the 
probability calculus. Even if it is true that in the end all there is to ‘scientific 
rationality’ is standards of probabilistic coherence, this can’t solely be the result of
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endorsing a particular theory like Subjective Bayesianism, which only explicates 
those standards. On the contrary, whether an acceptable theory of ‘scientific 
rationality’ can include non-logical constraints will have to be decided through an 
independent investigation of our ability to justify certain kinds of content- 
increasing inferences.
Colin Howson, a Subjective Bayesian, agrees:
“I have scrupulously avoided discussing scientific rationality, partly because 
it is a highly contested area, but mainly because this [i.e. Hume’s Problem, in 
which Howson articulates the logical interpretation of subjective probability I 
have adopted in this thesis] is a book about logic, not about rationality. The 
rules, if there are any, determining what is rational and what is not to believe 
or do I am happy to leave to others to fight over” (2000,239; my emphasis). 
Howson correctly distinguishes between a theory of logic and a theory o f‘scientific 
rationality’. Subjective Bayesianism, as expounded by Howson, is a theory of logic, 
not a theory of rationality. Consequently, endorsing Subjective Bayesianism does 
not commit one to the view that all there is to ‘scientific rationality is standards of 
coherence’, and, a fortiori, to relativism regarding substantive questions.
Howson, to be sure, is not very optimistic about the prospects of a substantive 
theory of rationality. His previous remark continues as follows: “But what I do 
believe, and I believe that this extended footnote to Hume shows, is that no theory 
of rationality that is not entirely question-begging can tell us what is rational to 
believe about the future, whether based on what the past has displayed or not” (ibid. 
239). His pessimism, however, does not derive from the fact that Subjective 
Bayesianism explicates the logic of partial belief. Instead, it derives from Howson’s 
conviction that any non-logical constraint we may propose as a requirement of
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rationality ends up being question-begging. Surely, though, this is Howson’s 
verdict of an independent investigation, which focuses on the epistemological 
merits of our content-increasing inferences and the kind of justification we can 
hope to achieve for them rather than the character of Subjective Bayesianism per 
se. And on this count, there might be some room for disagreement.
I conclude, then, that the decision to employ the Subjective Bayesian 
framework of analysis in our reconstruction of the realism debate does not by itself 
commit one to any form of relativism. The relativist threat stems, instead, from our 
seeming inability to devise independent standards sufficient to vindicate our 
content-increasing inferences. Consequently, the focus of our investigation should 
be directed towards the fundamental epistemological assumptions underwriting our 
content-increasing inferences and to possible ways in which those assumptions 
might be justified. Should our attempts prove successful, we will have succeeded in 
vindicating the normative force of the NMA, which, in the end, is just another 
content-increasing inference. And by doing so, we will have also managed to offer 
an argument to the effect that some of the possible prior probability assignments, 
which will inevitably appear in any Bayesian reconstruction of the argument, are 
more ‘reasonable’ than others.
5.2 The Epistemological Problem of Relativism
5.2.1 Internalist Foundationalism: The Source (?) of The Problem
One increasingly popular diagnosis of the difficulties facing our attempts to 
tackle the problem of relativism adequately locates the defect in our preferred 
method for justifying our substantive beliefs. Recall from the previous section (pp. 
200-201) that relativism is understood in van Fraassen’s sense, i.e. as the thesis that
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we have no means for deciding which of our substantive beliefs are right/rational. 
All problems then, it is said, arise out of our insistence on following an internalist 
variant offoundationalism as a method of justification, according to which a belief 
is justified if and only if we know that it is derivable from foundations that are 
themselves solid (that is, do not need a foundation in their turn). Both intemalism 
and foundationalism trace their origin at least to Descartes’ assertion in the ‘First 
Meditation’ that
“I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely 
certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently 
false .... Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built 
on them collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic 
principles on which all my former beliefs rested” (1641,17).
It should be clear, of course, that by endorsing ‘internalist foundationalism’ one is 
not thereby committed to Descartes’ own rationalist solution to the problem of 
justified belief. Indeed, it could very well be the case that the solid foundations of 
knowledge do not resemble at all Descartes’ ‘cogito’ or his benevolent God, who 
guarantees that no evil demon is deluding us, but consist instead of some basic 
observation statements accessible through our senses and in need of no further 
defence. In other words, ‘internalist foundationalism’ is consistent with both 
rationalist and empiricist epistemology, since it makes reference only to the 
structure of justification rather than the potential sources of our fundamental 
beliefs.
‘ Internalist foundationalism’, then, holds that a belief is justified only if it has 
been derived by truth-preserving means from some other beliefs which are known 
to be true and, hence, can function as safe foundations. Suppose, however, that
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proposition^ is affirmed on the basis of being derivable from proposition B, which 
is known to be true. But, surely, if proposition B were to count as secure basis for 
A, it ought to have been derived from a further more basic proposition C, which is 
also known to be true and which, in turn, owes its foundational status to an even 
more basic proposition D and so on and so forth. The only way to break the regress 
in a non-circular way is to find an axiomatic starting point, which is not in need of 
further support. But of course, the argument continues, there is no principled way to 
help us decide unequivocally what this starting point should be when it comes to 
our fundamental substantive beliefs. Different people will take different 
propositions as their fundamental beliefs; in the absence of a sharp criterion 
determining which are the right ones, if we are ever justified in believing in any 
possible fundamental proposition, then we seem to be justified in believing in all of 
them. This means, however, that different opinions on some one issue will end up 
being equally justified, having been derived from equally justifiably held 
foundations. Relativism and ‘truth-for-you’ on substantive matters seems to be the 
inevitable outcome.
It is no wonder then, it is argued, that there has been no satisfactory solution 
to the problem of the justification of our content-increasing inferences so far 
because the very method of justification employed (i.e. ‘internalist 
foundationalism’) already precludes from the outset any satisfactory solution. Our 
seeming inability to determine unequivocally which beliefs are to serve as the 
foundation for justified substantive opinion means that our quest for the 
fundamental level of secure first principles is bound to lead us either to a never- 
ending process of seeking the ultimate reasons for belief or to outright relativism.
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5.2.2 The Externalist Perspective
It follows from this description of the problem that perhaps our difficulties 
will be resolved to some extent if we switch from the problematic ‘internalist 
foundationalism’ to a different method of justification for our beliefs. One way to 
do this is to abandon the ‘internalist’ component o f ‘internalist foundationalism’ in 
favour of externalism or reliabilism in epistemology. I have already outlined and 
criticised various aspects of the externalist philosophical outlook in previous 
chapters, mostly in connection with the explanationist version of the NMA. My 
primary interest at this point is to meet the challenge of a potential rejoinder to my 
criticisms there, namely that those criticisms stem from an undue neglect of the 
subtle details of the externalist theory of justification and the aims it purports to 
serve. Hence, in this section I defend my earlier criticisms with explicit reference to 
the viability of the basic epistemological presuppositions underlying externalism.
In outlining the essential elements of the (informal) explanationist NMA in 
chapter 3 ,1 noted that its most controversial aspect is its allegedly “virtuously” 
circular nature. To repeat briefly, on the explanationist reading the NMA is a meta- 
IBE: it asserts that we have reasons to believe that scientific methodology delivers 
(approximate) theoretical truth on the grounds that it is the best explanation of the 
empirical success of our best scientific theories (themselves reached through first- 
order IBEs). The reliability of IBE, however, claim the explanationists, depends 
crucially on the success of the NMA: it is only its conclusion (i.e. that we have 
reasons to think science delivers some sort of theoretical truth) that shows IBE to 
be a reliable rule of inference. In chapter 4 1 suggested that the Bayesian framework 
is flexible enough to accommodate this allegedly harmless type of circularity but 
also rigorous enough to show off its main defect, namely that in the end alleged
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“virtuous” circularity is no different from vicious circularity. Both the informal and 
the formal version of the explanationist NMA, nonetheless, presuppose an 
externalist theory of the justification of belief, which can (allegedly) resolve these 
circularity worries.
Externalist theories of justification follow Alvin Goldman’s insight that we 
should want “a theory of justified belief to specify in non-epistemic terms when a 
belief is justified” (Goldman 1979, 105; my emphasis). Goldman offers the 
following formulation of his version of externalism:
“[A] belief is justified if and only if it is ‘well form ed’, i.e. it has an ancestry 
of reliable and/or conditionally reliable cognitive operations” (ibid. 117)114. 
Goldman understands ‘reliability’ as “the tendency of a process to produce beliefs 
that are true rather than false” (ibid. 113), but leaves it an open issue whether these 
‘tendencies’ should be understood as actual long-run frequencies or as propensities 
to generate those beliefs (cf. ibid. 114). By ‘conditionally reliable cognitive 
operations’ he means those processes which yield a sufficient proportion of true 
output-beliefs given that their input-beliefs are true. Goldman introduced the 
weaker requirement of ‘conditional reliability’ in order to account for the 
possibility that a process is in fact reliable but fails to yield a high proportion of 
true output-beliefs because it is applied to false premises. In a similar vein, Psillos 
explicates externalism thus:
“[0]n [externalist] accounts, if the rule [of inference in question] is 
reliable, then it thereby confers justification on a conclusion drawn using 
this rule, insofar as the premises are true. Hence, given externalism, all we
114 Emphasis in the original.
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should require of a rule-circular argument is that the rule of inference 
employed be reliable... .”115 (Psillos 1999, 84).
On the externalist theory of justification, then, all one has to do is deny that 
one needs to know that a rule of inference is reliable in order to use it justifiably. It 
would be enough if this rule merely were reliable as a matter of fact, irrespective of 
what we think about it. With this assumption in place it follows that there are in fact 
sound foundations for our knowledge of various aspects of the world. These are 
simply the conclusions derived through some mode of inference, which, although 
not known to be reliable, actually is reliable as a matter of fact. In Psillos’ words, 
“the correctness of [such conclusions] depends on the rule being reliable, and not 
on having any reasons to think that the rule is reliable” (ibid. 84). The 
explanationist NMA becomes then a straightforward illustration of this strategy: 
from the relatively uncontroversial premise of the predictive success of science and 
through the (allegedly) objectively reliable IBE one is thereby justified to think 
science delivers (approximate) theoretical truth. Furthermore, we saw in chapter 4 
how this process can be expressed in Bayesian terms through our ‘Bayesian- 
explanationist NMA’.
The main problem with this proposed understanding of externalism is that its 
claim to solve the problem of the justification of beliefs is frankly bizarre. 
Justification of belief is an epistemic affair. On a natural understanding this means 
that in order for our beliefs to count as justified, we need to be in possession of 
good reasons, telling us that we are indeed correct in continuing to use the methods 
which generate those beliefs. Now, the externalist wants to conclude that his 
content-increasing inferences are successful and, thus, that we have, in fact, good
1,5 Emphasis in the original.
210
reasons to believe in the conclusion of those inferences. But what are the reasons 
for the success of those inferences? The externalist will respond: ‘the reliability of 
the rules employed in those inferences, which we use to infer to their conclusions’. 
The problem with this response, though, is that, by the externalist’s assumption, we 
do not have access to this reliability. We do not know, that is, whether the rules 
governing our content-increasing inferences are reliable or not. Still, the 
externalists insist that we don’t need to know this. All we need is that these rules be 
objectively reliable, irrespective of whether we have knowledge of this fact. But, 
surely, even if we de facto arrive at truths by following some method, don’t we 
need to know that this is the case in order to be justified in using this method? By 
answering this last question to the negative, externalism essentially avoids the 
whole problem of epistemology rather than offers an alternative solution to it.
It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that we are not justified in using a rule 
of inference without prior knowledge (or reliable evidence) of its reliability because 
doing so violates the natural understanding of the very notion of ‘justification of 
belief. In order to preserve the natural interpretation we must insist that knowledge 
of a rule’s reliability is required before we are justified in putting it to use. This, 
however, turns all the allegedly non-vicious circular arguments into vicious ones. If 
the only reason we can assert that a rule of inference is reliable is the conclusion of 
an argument making use of this rule, then this conclusion must be inserted as a 
premise in the argument, thus resulting in vicious premise-circularity. In our 
example of the explanationist NMA, if IBE is to receive any support from it, an 
assumption regarding the (approximate) truth of our theories must be inserted 
explicitly among its premises. But, of course, this is precisely the conclusion of the 
NMA.
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The preceding analysis centres on the inability of externalism to engage with 
the core of the problem of the justification of belief. The obvious response to the 
above criticisms is to try and bring back the agent’s knowledge into the picture by 
showing that his reasons for belief, though broadly compatible with the reliabilist 
framework, extend further than merely the objective reliability of the rule of 
inference in question. Perhaps realising the implausibility of his initial formulation, 
Psillos incorporates the following addendum to his version of externalist 
epistemology:
“All that is required is that one should have no reason to doubt the reliability 
of the rule -  that there is nothing currently available which can make one 
distrust the rule” (ibid. 85).
Clearly this proviso falls outside the scope of Psillos’ earlier formulation of 
externalism, since the agent’s state of knowledge is an integral part of the picture 
again. Its main defect, however, is that it seems to amount to no more than shifting 
the burden of proof to those unconvinced of the rule’s reliability. Shifting the onus 
is a predominantly rhetorical device. It does nothing towards providing positive 
reasons for the externalist perspective. And, of course, in the absence of those 
reasons, the onus can be easily shifted back: ‘sure’, it will be maintained, ‘we do 
not have reasons to doubt the reliability of the rule, but we have no independent 
reasons to trust the rule either. How can such an absence provide any grounds for 
justification?’
Peter Lipton has recently attempted to characterise more precisely the 
externalist’s viewpoint by invoking the following ‘tracking requirement’:
“[A] strong inductive argument is one that is both an instance of a method 
that is generally reliable and is also an argument that is counterfactually
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reliable in this instance. The premises track the conclusion, inNozick’s sense 
of the word.. . .  Slightly more generally, in a strong inductive inference, if the 
conclusion had not been true we would not have made the inference” (2000, 
184).
Lipton’s counterfactual tracking condition aspires to do what ‘naive’ externalism 
fails, i.Q. provide positive reasons for the success of particular inductive arguments. 
The simple externalist requirement that the method followed be objectively reliable 
is supplemented with the new proviso that the argument in question also be 
counterfactually reliable.
Lipton’s first explication in terms of ‘what we would not have done had the 
conclusion been false’ runs the danger of letting psychological considerations 
influence the evaluation of the truth-value of the relevant counterfactual 
conditional. It signifies, nonetheless, Lipton’s desire to let (some form of) the 
agent’s knowledge of the rule’s reliability be part of the process of justification. 
Hence, when Lipton reveals that he has in mind a more objective notion of 
counterfactual reliability, understood as the ‘circumstance’ in which “had the 
conclusion been false, the evidence would have been different” (ibid. 186), he 
seems to assume that we are also in a position to affirm the counterfactual. 
Returning to the NMA, then, Lipton would presumably assert that the inference 
from success to (approximate) truth through IBE is both an instance of a reliable 
method of inference and counterfactually reliable. In other words, had our theories 
been false, they would not have been successful and hence there would be no basis 
for any inference to any form of truth. In a sense, Lipton intends counterfaictual 
reliability as an independent signal for the objective reliability of method. With this 
signal in place (plus our ability to evaluate the counterfactual conditional) the
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externalist attempts to show that we can be in possession of strong independent 
reasons regarding the reliability of certain rules of inference, which justify the use 
we make of them.
Lipton is explicit, of course, that he has misgivings about the explanationist 
NMA considered as a meta-IBE. His worries stem from the fact that the 
explanationist NMA “fails to provide any independent or additional evidence for 
the truth of the theory or the reliability of the methods that lead to its acceptance” 
(ibid. 194) and, hence, the argument is best understood as “a summary of the first- 
order scientific evidence for our theory, rather than as a distinct but extremely 
general inference” (ibid. 197). I certainly agree with Lipton that the most sensible 
understanding of NMA is one which views it as an inference to the (approximate) 
truth of particular theories. I have also sided with those who think that the only 
way to make sense of NMA as an over-arching inference is by taking it to be a 
condensed and economical way to refer to all particular NMAs in one go -  a 
‘summary’ of these first-order NMAs as Lipton puts it. Even if the realist views the 
explanationist NMA as an IBE to the (approximate) truth of particular theories, 
however, the question what justifies these particular inferences retains its force. 
Consequently, the crucial issue becomes whether there is any independent support 
for Lipton’s counterfactual proviso that can help the externalist avoid the 
unnaturalness of his proposed theory of justification.
To answer this, we must consider the circumstances under which we may 
uncontroversially assert the counterfactual proviso Lipton proposes. John Worrall 
has rightly noted that we can uncontroversially affirm such counterfactuals if “the 
conditional is a deductive consequence of some general claim that is independently 
accepted as true” (2000b, 213). If, for example, it were the case that empirical
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success implied (approximate) truth, then we could uncontroversially assert that had 
the theory not been (approximately) true, it would not have had the success it 
actually enjoys. The whole debate on realism, though, stems from the very fact that 
success does not imply any sort of theoretical truth. If it did, the NMA would be 
unnecessary.
Alternatively, the counterfactual would be assertible on the assumption that 
what bridges the gap between success and truth (in this case IBE) is known to be a 
reliable mode of inference. For if (approximate) truth were the best explanation of 
empirical success and IBE were known to be reliable, then success plus IBE would 
entail (approximate) truth and, hence, asserting the counterfactual would be a trivial 
issue. But, of course, by the externalist’s assumption, we do not know that IBE is 
reliable. We merely use IBE in an attempt to vindicate it. Consequently, there 
appears to be no independent source of knowledge about IBE’s reliability and, 
hence, no independent source for the assertability of the relevant counterfactual. On 
the externalist approach only the very conclusion of the NMA that particular 
theories are (approximately) true can effectively decide the issue of IBE’s 
reliability, resulting once more in viciously circular reasoning.
Hence, far from being a symptom of failing to engage in depth with the basic 
assumptions underlying our methods of justifying belief, our rejection of the 
explanationist NMA and the externalist answer to relativism rest on solid 
epistemological foundations. This in turn means that externalism cannot be used to 
vindicate the constraints imposed on prior probabilities through our Shimony- 
inspired Bayesian-explanationist NMA outlined in chapter 4, and that, ultimately, 
our rejection of it was also justified.
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Finally, it should also be noted that another tenet of the explanationist NMA, 
i.e. naturalism, falls together with externalism. Naturalism is the view that “there is 
no distinctive philosophical method which is either prior to scientific method or can 
be used to resolve first-order scientific disputes” (Psillos 1999, 78). From an 
internalist perspective one can easily recognise another non-sequitur here: how can 
it be maintained that NMA makes use of scientific method, when it is this very 
method that its conclusion aims to vindicate? Clearly, naturalism also presupposes 
an externalist theory of justification of beliefs, which we have seen to fail.
Externalism, then, fails to substantiate the claim that we can evade relativism 
by giving up the internalist component o f ‘internalist foundationalism’. Might it not 
be, though, that it is foundationalism rather than intemalism which has to be 
abandoned in order to get around the relativist predicament?
5.2.3 Van Fraassen’s ‘New Epistemology’
Bas van Fraassen has attempted to overcome the relativist challenge by 
proposing an anti-foundationalist epistemology, which aims to overcome the 
alleged dead-ends of Cartesianism from a different angle. His alternative proposal, 
though, differs significantly from the externalist suggestion.
Van Fraassen attempts to motivate his epistemological views through an 
analogy drawn from jurisprudence regarding different conceptions of law. Here is 
his often-quoted idea:
“The difference [between the standard Cartesian conception of rationality and 
van Fraassen’s own conception] is analogous to that between ... the Prussian 
and the English concept of law. In the former, everything is forbidden which
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is not explicitly permitted, and in the latter, everything permitted that is not 
explicitly forbidden” (1989, 171).
The Prussian understanding of law, according to van Fraassen, is akin to the 
traditional Cartesian conception of rationality, where “what is rational to believe is 
exactly what one is rationally compelled to believe” (ibid. 171). Van Fraassen’s 
aim is to reject this view of rationality in favour a reversed conception, according to 
which “what is rational to believe includes anything that one is not rationally 
compelled to disbelieve” (ibid. 171-172). Since this reversed, ‘English’ way is 
much more liberal than its ‘Prussian’ counterpart, the label ‘voluntarism’ (which 
van Fraassen had already introduced in his (1984)) conveys the spirit of his ‘new 
epistemology’ (cf. ibid. 175).
The class of sentences we are ‘rationally compelled to believe’ is determined 
by what van Fraassen calls “rules of right reason, canons of logic in a wide sense” 
(ibid. 172), and include deductive and probabilistic logic116. However these rules 
are non-ampliative and, hence, unable to increase our knowledge. All they can do is 
adjudicate on issues of consistency, be it deductive or probabilistic. The hope, van 
Fraassen maintains, that some ampliative rules of inference will achieve this kind of 
rational compulsion is illusory. Yet this is what Cartesian epistemology requires if 
any non-analytic statement is ever regarded as truly justified, and that is why 
“traditional epistemology embodies false hopes never to be satisfied” (van Fraassen 
2000, 272).
116 Van Fraassen would also add in the list Bayesian conditionalisation, at least under the assumption 
that we are following a rule (cf. 2000,275). I have already argued at length in previous chapters that 
conditionalisation is not a logical principle even under the assumption that we follow a rule for 
belief-revision and, hence, that its inclusion in the list of logically compelling methods is erroneous.
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The rules of logic also determine what one is ‘rationally compelled to 
disbelieve’, namely contradictions and incoherent sets of degrees of belief. Note, 
though, that van Fraassen’s favoured conception of rationality now deems 
permissible not only tautologies but also synthetic propositions about the world. 
Hence, what counts as permissible under the traditional conception differs from 
what counts as permissible under van Fraassen’s. In fact, the distinction van 
Fraassen draws amounts to presenting a coherentist theory of justification, 
according to which “rationality is in some good sense empty [and] any truly
117coherent opinion is truly rational” (ibid. 275) . According to this view, any
(degree of) belief which coheres well with the rest of one’s beliefs (or degrees of 
belief in other propositions) is justifiably held by the agent. There is no need to find 
the ultimate foundations of knowledge any more. The property of coherence with 
the rest of one’s (degrees of) beliefs is enough for justification and logic and 
mathematics define adequately what the standards of coherence are. Hence van 
Fraassen’s dictum that “there is only so much method in science as there is logic 
and mathematics” (ibid. 275).
Van Fraassen, in effect, then advocates a theory of scientific rationality 
exhausted by deductive and probabilistic logic. But as we saw a little earlier, 
maintaining that scientific rationality amounts to no more than standards of 
coherence (by they deductive or probabilistic) entails relativism on substantive
M O
issues as its inevitable consequence . Indeed, on this view different agents can 
justifiably hold different degrees of belief in the same set of propositions under the 
sole constraint that those sets of degrees of belief are coherent (i.e. do not violate
117 Emphasis in the original.
1,8 For a similar line o f criticism see Psillos (2005), especially sec. 6.
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the constraints set by the axioms of probability). For example, on van Fraassen’s 
account both a Darwinian evolutionary biologist and a Creationist would count as 
rational if only they assigned their degrees of belief to evolutionary biology and 
Creationism coherently, no matter how different their credences in each were. Now, 
if we further consider the fact that, given enough ingenuity, any degree of belief in 
any synthetic proposition can be embedded within a coherent system of degrees of 
beliefs, the relativist position emerges triumphant. The coherentist criterion of 
rationality that ‘new epistemology’ puts forth proves too weak to decide between 
any mutually contradictory sets of degrees of belief to certain synthetic 
propositions. In this way, though, it ends up satisfying van Fraassen’s own 
definition of relativism, i.e. that there is no non-trivial criterion of rationality and 
that, in the end, there is no substantive (i.e. non-logical) truth except ‘truth-for- 
you’.
Consequently, i f ‘new epistemology’ wants to avoid slipping into relativism, 
it must provide us with further criteria so as to distinguish between those sets of 
degrees of belief which are ‘rational’ in the sense of coherent and those which are 
‘reasonable’, i.e. more faithful to the actual facts than others. Were some such 
distinction to be drawn, all ‘reasonable’ beliefs would be ‘rational’ but not vice 
versa.
Van Fraassen comes close to drawing this distinction by rebuffing the 
relativist threat on the following basis:
“Logically speaking there may be infinitely many coherent alternatives to our 
posterior opinion, but almost none of those will be live options for us. This is 
not an accidental feature of our situation, but integral to it, exactly because we 
have prior opinion and prior understanding, which is not laid out for us on the
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side, like a textbook, but which is already our own. ... [W]e do not have the 
wherewithal to respond in more than a limited variety of ways at any given 
time. Many of the imaginable alternatives to what seems plausible to us 
cannot be incorporated by us. At least, they cannot be incorporated in a short 
span of time, through a coherent variation on our prior opinion, while doing 
justice to our new experience. So those alternatives do not go” (2000, 278). 
Van Fraassen suggests that our prior opinions are of great epistemic significance. 
Prior opinions constrain our ways of accommodating new evidence and, hence, 
preclude serious consideration of the infinity of logically possible alternatives to 
our posterior opinion. On a Bayesian gloss, this means that some of our opinions 
are assigned high, while others are assigned low or negligible prior probability. 
Clearly, the value of the priors will crucially influence that of the posterior 
probabilities upon the accumulation of new evidence. Hence, even if there is an 
infinity of coherent alternatives to our posterior opinion, assigning negligible prior 
probability to most of those alternatives will result in negligible corresponding 
posterior values. Hence van Fraassen’s conclusion that those alternatives simply 
‘do not go’.
Despite appearances, van Fraassen’s solution is unsatisfactory. From a 
descriptive point of view it . is incontestable that we value our prior opinions 
differentially and that in practice this ranking constrains our responsiveness to new 
evidence. An adequate theory of justification, however, ought to provide us with 
something more than just a description of which beliefs we assign high and which 
low prior probabilities. It ought to give us reasons why we should assign a high 
prior probability to certain beliefs and low to others, thus determining standards of 
correctness according to which we can judge whether our actual prior probability
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ranking is ‘reasonable’. In our previous example, it should give us reasons why we 
should assign, for instance, a high prior probability to Darwinian theory and a 
negligible one to Creationism.
Van Fraassen’s assertion that ‘almost none of the infinitely many coherent 
alternatives is a live option for us’ does not provide an adequate answer to the 
normative question it is intended to address. If it is just a report of the fact that most 
people in a particular community at a particular historical time happen to assign 
negligible priors to some theories but not to others, then clearly we still need an 
argument to the effect that they are right in doing so. The issue of the justification 
of belief is, of course, normative and cannot be settled by reference to the way we 
just happen to assign our prior weights. If, on the other hand, van Fraassen suggests 
that ‘we’, i.e. the intelligent and pro-science people, have our own standards of 
correctness within our community regarding the prior weights certain theories 
deserve, then van Fraassen has simply traded ‘individual relativism’ for 
‘community relativism’. Even if it is the case that within our culture it is considered 
‘correct’ to assign, say, a negligible prior to Creationism, we know that there are 
other communities, in which the converse assignment is considered to be the 
‘correct’ one. In the absence of an argument for the objective superiority of one of 
the two assignments we can hardly claim that we have evaded the relativist 
predicament. ‘Community relativism’ differs from ‘individual relativism’ only in 
terms of how numerous those who subscribe to mutually incompatible sets of 
degrees of belief are. Since both assignments can be held with equal right, however, 
this difference fails to make ‘community relativism’ less of a relativism.
Van Fraassen realises, of course, that it is not enough merely to state matters 
of fact in order to reach normative conclusions. The wording of (part of) his
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response shows that he intends to make a stronger statement. Hence, in the previous 
quote he insists that relying on prior opinion ‘is not an accidental feature of our 
situation, but integral to it’ (my emphasis). He also refers approvingly to Russell’s 
‘colleagues on the Continent’ who, in response to the problem of our knowledge of 
the external world, “were beginning to say: we are already outside in the external 
worldl” (1989,171)119, presumably implying that our prior belief in the existence 
of the external world ought to be 1.
Still, it is rather difficult to make unambiguous sense of assertions such as the 
above. The only way to attribute clear meaning to the first one is to understand it as 
making the metaphysical, but no less descriptive, claim that it is necessary (i.e. it 
happens in all possible worlds) that we have to rely on prior opinion when 
responding to new evidence. Even if we can’t help having certain prior beliefs, 
however, this by itself is not sufficient to show that we are justified in having the 
prior beliefs we have. What is required is an explanation of what is so special about 
our particular prior opinions which makes them the right ones to have. It is clear 
that the only standard of rationality ‘new epistemology’ favours explicitly, i.e. 
coherence, fails as an explanation. By van Fraassen’s own admission, all those 
infinite alternatives are coherent alternatives. Hence, coherence cannot possibly 
provide the reason why we are right in favouring certain prior beliefs over others. 
Similar remarks apply to the dictum about Russell’s ‘colleagues from the 
Continent’. There has got to be some reason for taking the prior opinion that we are 
already outside in the external world seriously. Again, however, this reason goes 
beyond coherence, since there are (in principle, infinitely) many coherent ways to
119 Emphasis in the original.
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accommodate our sense-data without postulating the existence of a material 
external world.
The reluctance of ‘new epistemology’ to offer explicit criteria going beyond 
coherence for the determination of which prior opinions are the ‘reasonable’ ones 
becomes even more conspicuous when we consider some of van Fraassen’s central 
philosophical views; namely, his disbelief in the reality of laws of nature as well as 
his belief in constructive empiricism. Both realism about laws of nature and 
scientific realism are, by van Fraassen’s own admission120, internally coherent 
positions. It follows from this, however, that ‘new epistemology’ seems unable to 
underwrite van Fraassen’s rejection of them. Indeed, if all that matters to rationality 
is coherence, how can van Fraassen possibly argue for the superiority of his own 
views as against those equally coherent alternatives? To be sure, van Fraassen 
wants to say something more. He thinks that sound philosophical positions ought to 
belong to intellectual traditions which can be shown to “fare well under critical 
scrutiny, or else that [those positions provide] us with theoretical innovation of 
great value and promise” (ibid. 180). To the extent, however, that ‘new 
epistemology’ refuses to supplement coherence with further criteria for ‘reasonable 
opinion’, those demands fail to mark out as ‘more reasonable’ any of two (or more) 
coherent competing alternatives. Surely, if coherence is the sole requirement for 
rational opinion, then all coherent philosophical positions fare equally well under 
critical scrutiny and provide us with theoretical innovation of equally great value 
and promise.
120 Especially with respect to realism about laws van Fraassen is adamant that “if some philosophers 
believe in the reality o f laws, they are not ipso facto  irrational” (1989, 180).
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It might be counter-argued at this point that reliance on prior opinion delivers 
its normative promise only if another aspect o f ‘voluntarism’ is taken properly into 
account, i.e. that a crucial dimension of epistemic judgements is that they are “most 
like expressions of intention” (1984,254). Van Fraassen’s idea is that our decision 
to endorse any non-trivial proposition as our belief entails some sort of cognitive 
commitment to this belief. By taking a stance on some issue we expect others to 
rely on our judgements and we also express our commitment to defending these 
views in the face of criticism, thus making belief ‘a matter of the will’.
The alleged importance of this aspect of epistemic judgements with respect to 
the problem of locating the normative weight of certain prior opinions can, as far as 
I can see, be summed up in the following argument. It is highly unlikely that we 
would be willing to commit ourselves in such a strong way by endorsing certain 
judgements (in this case our prior opinions) unless we thought that these opinions 
were somehow epistemically privileged. Indeed, if we thought they were not 
privileged, we would have a very strong incentive to modify, or, at least, seriously 
qualify, our views. But in this case we would fail to rise to the occasion of our 
already expressed commitment, and this is too heavy a price to pay. This is 
because, as van Fraassen puts it, “to express anything but a full commitment to 
stand behind [our] promises and intentions, is to undermine [our] own status as 
[persons] of integrity and, hence, [our] entire activity of avowal” (ibid. 254).
I can think of three responses to this argument. First, it is not clear at all that 
this de facto commitment van Fraassen focuses on is the appropriate starting point 
for establishing the significance of certain of our prior opinions. Indeed, if 
commitment constitutes a central dimension of the epistemic weight of prior 
opinion, then the prior opinions which would come out as the ‘most reasonable’
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would presumably be those of true believers or religious fundamentalists, whose 
commitment to their views appears absolute and nonnegotiable. It is highly 
doubtful, however, that ‘new epistemology’ has intended intellectual fanaticism as 
the most effective remedy to relativism. Consequently, the sort of epistemic 
commitment van Fraassen alludes to seems to be an insufficient basis for grounding 
the epistemic significance of certain prior opinions over others.
Suppose for the sake of argument, nonetheless, that epistemic commitment 
constitutes, in fact, a central dimension of epistemic judgements and, furthermore, 
that such commitment does presuppose that we think our beliefs are epistemically 
privileged (i.e. that they deserve high prior probability). Still, -  and this is the 
second response- this by itself does not imply that these beliefs are indeed 
epistemically privileged and that we are in some sense correct in holding them. 
Hence, the epistemic significance of our prior opinions must rest on something 
other than simply our meta-belief that our prior opinions are normatively weighty -  
something that would justify this meta-belief of ours. Coherence clearly fails as a 
candidate for this ‘something else’ - for the same reasons as before: there are 
infinitely many coherent alternatives from the standpoint of which one can respond 
to new evidence.
Finally, - third response to van Fraassen’s argument- even if we assume that 
we can always perceive correctly the epistemic significance of prior opinion so that 
no epistemic commitment will (actually) be undertaken on shaky grounds, this fact 
alone hardly illuminates the reasons behind this success. All we can manage under 
this assumption is to assert that our prior opinions are always epistemically 
significant; nonetheless, we still cannot explain why prior opinion has this 
significance, as any adequate epistemology surely ought to do. And of course, for
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the same reasons as above, coherence fails once more to take the place of the 
missing explanans. Consequently, van Fraassen’s insistence that his ‘new 
epistemology’ avoids relativism by a justified reliance on prior opinion “[without 
further] constraints on rationality beyond coherence” (2000, 279) is wanting. It 
seems inescapable that any kind of justification for prior opinion has to involve 
something more than just the coherence requirement.
The only remaining line of defence for the ‘new epistemologist’ so far as I 
can see is that reliance on prior opinion is justified pragmatically. If so, then ‘new 
epistemology’ amounts to the claim that, although the canons of rationality are 
identified solely with logic and probability, relativism is defeated on pragmatic 
grounds. In fact, as well as frequent references to the American Pragmatists (cf. 
1984,235; 1989,172-173 and 2000,273-274), there is direct textual evidence that 
van Fraassen intended ‘new epistemology’ to be understood in exactly this way: 
“In opting for voluntarism or pragmatism in epistemology, one implicitly 
allows the relevance of just those critical standards that apply to other sorts of 
enterprise” (1989, 175; my emphasis).
“The other part [of his assertion that ‘it takes courage to rely on the reasoned 
opinion and skills you have developed, given the contingency of their 
conditions of applicability’] is the Pragmatist theme that epistemology cannot 
proceed in isolation from value theory -  that the epistemic enterprise cannot 
be adequately conceived without attention to the role of value judgements, 
intentions, commitments, decisions, and other aspects of praxis” (2000,273; 
my emphasis).
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Understood under pragmatist lights, ‘new epistemology’ attempts to utilise 
elements which are prominent in other areas of human activity, like values and 
commitments, and even get informed by what count as critical standards for areas 
of thought outside philosophy. As their widespread employment in everyday life 
testifies, factors like values and commitments are highly esteemed and, hence, from 
a pragmatist perspective, legitimately inform our philosophical considerations. 
Consequently, prior weighting of opinion presumably receives its justification from 
a blend of such factors and then goes on to constrain the infinity of coherent 
alternatives to posterior opinion and, thus, defeat relativism.
The main problem with this pragmatist twist is that pragmatism has always 
seemed a most un-philosophical position. Perhaps the central reason for embarking 
on the philosophical quest to find adequate standards of justification is the fact that 
we want to examine whether widely held everyday beliefs are justifiably held or 
not. These beliefs refer to all of values, commitments, decisions and alleged critical 
standards encountered in various domains of praxis and the aim of the 
philosophical endeavour is precisely to investigate the extent to which common 
habits and preconceptions are in fact supported by strong theoretical reasons. It is 
mysterious how an allusion to those very beliefs we are, ultimately, aiming at 
vindicating can contribute anything to the process of vindication, unless, of course, 
viciously circular reasoning is implicitly accepted as legitimate.
It seems, then, that ‘new epistemology’ and coherentism underwrite a 
conception of rationality which is too weak adequately to counter the relativist 
challenge. It follows from this that coherence alone is insufficient to constrain the 
prior probabilities we assign to our theories. Instead of providing a solution, ‘new 
epistemology’ has simply restated the problem. Hence, neither intemalism nor
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foundationalism has been shown to be especially responsible for the apparent force 
of the relativist position. And this takes us back where we started, i.e. to ‘internalist 
foundationalism’. The inevitable question which arises, then, is: ‘does this mean 
that relativism in the end wins the day?’
5.2.4 Back to ‘Internalist Foundationalism’
So far my argument has been mainly defensive. Its aim has been to 
demonstrate that denying either the internalist or the foundationalist component of 
‘internalist foundationalism’ will not get us anywhere close to overcoming the 
relativist predicament. At the same time, however, the preceding discussion has 
brought out the main virtues of the traditional understanding of rationality -  these 
virtues tell strongly in favour of the employment of the traditional understanding to 
meet the relativist challenge. The first virtue relates to the fact that from an 
internalist point of view alone can we ever hope to solve the problem of the 
justification of belief. This is because only the internalist perspective explicates in a 
natural way the conditions that must be met, if our beliefs are to count as justified. 
Non-internalist views simply evade the problem, thus rendering intemalism the sole 
appropriate epistemological standpoint from which to approach the issue of 
justification.
Foundationalism, on the other hand, owes its a priori intuitive appeal mainly 
to logic and this in two ways. First of all, the very process of constructing sound 
arguments requires that the premises of a valid argument are true. If this condition 
is satisfied, our argument establishes the truth of its conclusion and, in this sense, it 
is normatively binding. Furthermore, it is evident that in such a case our true 
premises are the foundations of our inference. It is a short (and obvious) step to
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generalise this process and demand that all knowledge is derived from strong 
foundations (in the guise of true first principles or low-level observation 
statements). Secondly, and relatedly, this is the form that all axiomatic systems 
have taken since antiquity, starting with Euclidean geometry. Being considered 
models of rigorous thinking resting on strong and self-evident foundations (i.e. 
axioms), it is no wonder that a similar system was hoped to be had for empirical 
knowledge too.
Consequently, ‘internalist foundationalism’ is not just the ‘second best’ 
option, to be preferred only because of the failure of externalist or anti- 
foundationalist theories of justification. It is supported by positive arguments on its 
own right. These are that 1) it only explicates in a natural way the central issues 
involved in the vexing problem of the justification of belief, and, 2) it is inspired by 
sound logical reasoning aimed at delivering conclusions with full normative import.
Nonetheless, this intuitively plausible method of justification has long been 
accused of embodying ‘false hopes never to be satisfied’, to use van Fraassen’s 
words. The reason for this is, of course, the infinite regress noted earlier. To repeat 
briefly, suppose proposition^ is based on another proposition B , which serves as its 
foundation. Surely, then, one needs some justification for this more basic 
proposition 5, which can only take the form of an even more basic proposition C. 
Proposition C in its turn, though, owes its foundational merit to an even more basic 
proposition D and so on and so forth ad infinitum. Clearly, if this regress argument 
invalidates the traditional conception of rationality and my criticism of the various 
alternatives in the previous couple of sections is correct, relativism emerges 
victorious.
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There are 2 ways to attempt to free oneself from an infinite regress. The first 
is to axiomatically put an end to it by declaring some stage of the process as our 
unquestionably secure basis. The second is to claim that circular reasoning is 
entirely acceptable and try to provide reciprocal support to the claims we seek 
justification for. In our example, this line of reasoning would commit one to the 
claim that, say, proposition A is based on proposition B , which in its turn receives 
support from proposition^ itself. Crucial to the relativist’s argument is the premise 
that neither option succeeds in salvaging ‘internalist foundationalism’ and, hence, 
both options fail to yield adequately justified beliefs. It is arguable nonetheless, that 
proclaiming certain beliefs as in need of no further defence differs from circularity 
in some important ways. If it turns out that these differences have epistemic 
significance, we might be able to come up with a credible case against relativism.
Throughout this essay I have been critical of circular ways of reasoning. The 
reason for this is not logical but philosophical. A viciously circular argument, 
though valid, fails to support the truth of its conclusion because it only helps to 
reassert the truth of what is already explicitly accepted as true. I have also been 
critical of attempts to present a form of circularity that is allegedly non-vicious. 
Under some natural epistemological assumptions, alleged non-vicious circularity 
can be shown to be just concealed vicious circularity. Consequently, the relativist is 
right that circularity cannot be a way out of the regress.
Axiomatically asserting certain fundamental beliefs, on the other hand, does 
not engage in any kind of wow-reason-giving form of argumentation since it does 
not engage in any form of argumentation at all. By taking a stance on some 
fundamental issue one is not presenting an argument but only making an assertion. 
It should be stressed, of course, that this ‘axiomatic proposal’ applies exclusively to
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the very fundamental building-blocks of knowledge. It should not to be understood 
as encouraging the dogmatic endorsement of any ‘high-level’ belief; rather, it is a 
positive suggestion regarding the affirmation of certain initial assumptions, without 
which the process of rational argumentation about the epistemic status of our ‘high- 
level’ opinions cannot even get off the ground. Even so, the relativist argues that 
merely taking a stance on an issue is not sufficient for the justification even of our 
very fundamental beliefs. Anyone can assert that some fundamental view or 
another is in need of no further support on purely subjective grounds. It seems to 
follow from this that the axiomatic way out of the regress can be of no consolation 
to the rationalist. After all, rationalism is supposed to underwrite the conviction that 
theoretically informed discourse is the sole appropriate ‘rational’ means for the 
resolution of disagreement. How can mere assertion not only serve but, ultimately, 
lie at the very heart of this conviction?
Questions of this sort have caused widespread dismay at the prospects of an 
‘axiomatic resolution’ of relativist worries, as testified by the recent drive towards 
alternative theories of justification, such as the externalist and circularist ones I 
have been criticising. The general impression from the recent literature is that an 
epistemology resting on axiomatically asserted foundations is just an outmoded 
relic of dashed Cartesian hopes. Is there any way of countering this?
The axiomatic variant o f ‘internalist foundationalism’ is a coherent position. 
‘Internalist foundationalism’ merely requires that our beliefs be ‘derived from some 
other beliefs which are known to be true and, hence, can function as safe 
foundations for further inferences’. There is no mention of the way we can come to 
know the truth of our foundational beliefs. Argumentation suggests itself as a 
possibility, but surely ‘internalist foundationalism’ does not commit one to the view
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that it is the only possible way. In fact, if it did commit one to such a view, then the 
regress argument would be enough to discredit ‘internalist foundationalism’ 
conclusively. The main issue is whether, within the context o f  ‘internalist 
foundationalism ’, the axiomatic response to the issue of the justification of belief is 
a plausible answer. In other words, whether there are circumstances under which 
we can deem our foundational beliefs justified though they have been asserted 
without further argument.
If my arguments against the viability of the alternative epistemologies 
examined are sound, we have to choose between two equally consistent views: an 
axiomatic variant of ‘internalist foundationalism’ and a form of relativism 
regarding substantive issues (henceforth referred to as ‘empirical relativism’). 
‘Empirical relativism’ too can be formulated as a consistent position, despite the 
common assertion that relativism is a self-undermining doctrine. All one needs to 
do in order to avoid the alleged self-undermining is specify the scope of what one is 
relativist about, making sure this class excludes the relativist assertion itself. For 
example, ‘empirical relativism’ can avoid self-undermining by declaring that 
contradictory views on empirical issues are equally legitimate but also that 
‘empirical relativism’ itself, i.e. the thesis that ‘contradictory views on empirical 
issues are equally legitimate’, is not an empirical matter121. Thus formulated, there 
remains no fundamental theoretical incoherence in the relativist ideology.
121 This solution amounts to nothing more than applying the type-theoretic answer to the various 
self-referential problems, which arose with particular vigour during the debates in the foundations of 
logic and mathematics at the beginning o f the 20th century, to the issue o f relativism. Formulated 
this way, the relativist challenge acquires its sharpest form and provides a severe test for the 
axiomatic solution. It also avoids dubious pronouncements, which, if anything, compromise its 
credentials from the outset. A typical example o f this is Bloor (1991), who writes: “[The sociology
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It is difficult to deny that prima facie this situation presents us with a rather 
depressing dilemma, given our pre-theoretic intuitions and expectations. Indeed, 
choosing between ‘empirical relativism’ and ‘axiomatic internalist 
foundationalism’ seems like a choice between two unwelcome options. Still, that 
they are both unwelcome does not necessarily mean that they are equally 
unwelcome. Might it be the case, then, that, despite both options being bad, one of 
them is sufficiently better than the other to underwrite a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of justification? Unsurprisingly, I have no telling argument to offer as a 
resolution. I can only re-emphasize what friends of the axiomatic stance have 
stressed in defence of an optimistic view of knowledge. Their argument is based on 
two pillars: the realisation of the fact that, on mature reflection, no more than a 
‘dogmatic’ assertion of the bedrocks of our knowledge can be reasonably expected 
to provide an answer to the relativist challenge -  all other options being worse 
and/or attempts to disguise the fact that an axiomatic stance has in fact been taken. 
And, on a more positive note, the assertion that this situation is sufficient to support 
an optimistic view of knowledge. Despite the inconclusiveness of their reasons, I 
still think that the plausibility argument to follow amounts to a serious case against 
‘empirical relativism’.
Just as relativism can take many different forms, the ‘axiomatic solution’ too 
has been employed on many different levels. Starting with logic cum empiricism, 
Popper notes:
of scientific knowledge] would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be 
applicable to sociology itself’ (7). One is left wondering about the kind o f philosophical gain a 
relativist can expect from explicitly relativising his own position.
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“The rationalist attitude is characterised by the importance it attaches to 
argument and experience. But neither logical argument nor experience 
can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to 
consider argument or experience, and who therefore adopted this attitude 
already, will be impressed by them... But this means that whoever adopts 
the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or 
unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an 
adoption which may be called ‘irrational’” (1945, vol. 2, 230-231)122. 
According to Popper, it is impossible to argue persuasively for the rationalist 
attitude, which in his conception consists in logic and some basic empiricist 
epistemological assumptions. These assumptions have to be taken at faith, on pain 
of infinite regress or circularity. True, there has been a lot of discussion lately 
regarding the way our basic inferential rules get vindicated. In chapter 3 I spent 
some time reviewing so-called rule-circular attempts at vindicating deductive logic, 
which also provide the motivation for rule-circular defences of scientific realism. 
By now it should be obvious that critics of circular arguments are not impressed by 
such attempts even at the most fundamental level of logic. Our basic rules of 
inference can’t be vindicated by any argument; on the contrary, as Popper surely 
correctly claims, they are accepted as needing no further defence, thus constituting 
our most fundamental axioms.
Let’s grant for the sake of argument that our relativist is willing to accept 
deductive logic as a ‘given’, since investigating the problem of ‘deductive
122 Worrall (1999, 350), who cites this quote from Popper approvingly, notes that the term 
‘arational’ conveys the essence o f Popper’s proposal much better than the term ‘irrational’ Popper 
originally used.
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relativism’ would take us far afield. Is the situation different for induction? Lakatos 
(1968, 1974) suggests that it is not. In his attempt to bridge the gap between 
Popperian falsificationism and the (desirable) affirmation that as scientific 
knowledge grows, it takes us closer to the truth, Lakatos explicitly proposes the 
acceptance of a fallible ‘inductive principle’ on a priori grounds:
“[T]he truth of an inductive principle must be established a priori, because its 
function is to be the premise in a proof or justification” (1968b, 186)
“It should be stressed that in my usage ‘inductive principle’ is ... any 
principle claimed to be a priori true which implies a confirmation function -  
whether the latter is probabilistic or not” (ibid. 187, fn. 1).
He is also adamant that his motivation is primarily meta-philosophical:
“By refusing to accept a ‘thin’ metaphysical principle of induction, 
Popper fails to separate rationalism from irrationalism, weak light from 
total darkness. ... With a positive solution of the problem of induction, 
however thin, methodological theories of demarcation can be turned from 
arbitrary conventions into rational metaphysics” (1974, 165).
Whether we are Popperians or not, Lakatos’s analysis suggests that affirming some 
fallible ‘inductive principle’ is our only hope of overcoming the relativist 
challenge. Lakatos agrees with Hume, of course, that there can be no demonstration 
of such a principle from indubitable axioms on pain of regress. He refuses,
123 Emphasis in the original. We should note at this point Lakatos’ assertion that his solution “should 
be a cause neither for sceptical resignation nor for apriorism” (1974, 163; my emphasis). By 
‘apriorism’, however, he seems to have in mind grand a priori philosophising seeking to find 
indubitable first principles (he cites Kant as an example) rather than an a priori affirmation o f a 
weak ‘inductive principle’ on the basis o f our generally reliable ‘inductive intuition’.
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however, to side with the Humean pessimist, who thinks that “the combination of 
total lack of proof and strong assent [indicate] mere animal belief’ (ibid. 163). 
‘Inductive intuition’ underwrites an ‘inductive principle’, which is generally 
reliable and can be perceived to be so124.
One illustration of the implications of Lakatos’ ‘inductive principle’ is 
provided by the classic philosophical problem regarding the existence of a material 
external world. It is now a commonplace that no philosopher has ever managed to 
provide anything like a proof of the existence of a material external world from 
indubitable first principles. At the same time, though, it is arguable that no one can 
provide a better case than G. E. Moore’s ‘proof in his ‘Proof of an External 
World’, at least when his argument is properly analysed. As is well known, 
Moore’s ‘proof starts with the premises a) ‘Here is a hand’ and b) ‘Here is 
another’, to conclude c) ‘Two human hands exist’. But (c) is (allegedly) already 
enough to prove that there are things external to us (since ‘human hands’ by 
definition refers to things external to our minds) and, hence, that scepticism 
regarding the external world is defeated (Moore 1939, 145-146).
The reason why this ‘proof was never taken seriously as a real proof was, of 
course, that, although a valid inference, Moore’s argument seems question-begging 
(cf. Stroud 1984, 86). Since Moore takes human hands to constitute things by 
definition external to us, the relativist will respond that Moore’s conclusion merely 
re-asserts what he has implicitly accepted as true in his premises, i.e. that there are
124 John Worrall agrees that there is “no way o f arguing for our basic methodological principles that 
has any claim to logical priority. Assuming that they do indeed lead to the right division between 
black and white cases, we ju st assert them without argument’ (1989b, 384; my emphasis). He also 
reports that “Lakatos used to say (only half-jokingly) [that] there comes a point when a rationalist 
must get out his machine-gun to defend rationality” (ibid. 384)!
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things external to our minds. In reality, however, Moore is doing nothing of this 
sort. His ‘proof essentially amounts to the suggestion that we are entitled to assert 
without any further argument the existence of things external to our minds on the 
basis of common sense alone, and that it follows from this ‘bare truth’ that the 
relativist is deluded in denying its special status. Indeed, it is doubtful if there is 
anything else except common-sensical considerations that anyone can cite against 
the relativist in support of the existence of a material external world .
Similar considerations apply when it comes to the truth of scientific theories. 
The NMA is a reason-giving argument for our belief that scientific theories are 
approximately true descriptions of the unobservable reality. Its success 
presupposes, as we have seen, a priori assumptions in favour of our theories -  
assumptions that a Bayesian reconstruction, I argued, makes transparent. These 
assumptions transcend the evidence supporting our theories because they are 
logically prior to it. Very much like Moore’s case, only an axiomatic assertion of 
the presumption in favour of our theories can render the NMA an effective 
argument. Such a presumption, though, is similarly non-evidential: its assertion is 
dictated by our fundamental ‘inductive intuition’ and can be based on no further 
argument on pain of regress.
125 In fact, direct textual evidence that Moore simply asserted the existence o f a material external 
world without further argument can be found in the way he expresses his conviction that he knows 
his premises: “I certainly did at the moment know that which I expressed by the combination of  
certain gestures with saying the words ‘There is one hand and here is another’... How absurd it 
would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! 
You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am standing up and talking -  that perhaps after 
all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am!” (1939, 146-147; emphasis in the original).
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So, what is the significance of these cases of ‘dogmatism’-at-work for the. 
‘intuitive’ NMA and its prospects for overcoming the relativist predicament? One 
thing the foregoing examples establish is this: if one is already convinced of the 
universal validity of logic and, primarily, the existence of an ‘inductive principle’ 
yielding justified beliefs about basic issues, like the existence of a material world, 
on axiomatic grounds, one is thereby not justified in rejecting the ‘intuitive’ NMA 
just because it also takes certain assumptions as ‘given’. Obviously, accepting the 
validity of logic and the existence of a material external world does not commit one 
to scientific realism. It does commit one, though, to the view that basic deductive or 
inductive assumptions, assertible only a priori, can function as an effective defence 
against relativism. Hence, one’s reasons for not adhering to scientific realism 
cannot be that NMA employs unquestionable assumptions simpliciter but only that 
it employs the wrong unquestionable assumptions.
Arguably, though, this does not take us very far. It only amounts to the truism 
that one shouldn’t complain about the unquestionable character of certain 
assumptions of the NMA when one already employs other content-increasing 
inferences with similarly unquestionable presuppositions. This attitude, however, 
already assumes that our ‘axiomatic solution’ can be effective against relativism. 
What about the relativist who rejects the view that axiomatically asserted beliefs 
can ever be justified and, thus, believes that the ‘axiomatic solution’ is generally 
ineffective against relativism? Can we expect to convince him of the ability of 
‘dogmatism’ to overcome the relativist challenge? Obviously not. The relativist 
will never become convinced o f the merits o f  the axiomatic variant o f  ‘internalist 
foundationalism \ What is consoling, though, is that this is as it should be. We 
should never have expected that we would be able to convince the relativist of the
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invalidity of his view! ‘Empirical relativism’, as I remarked earlier, is an internally 
coherent position. We would be able to provide a knock-down argument against the 
relativist only if we could somehow demonstrate the inconsistency of his views. We 
have already accepted, though, that his views are consistent. It follows, then, that 
our hopes for offering a definitive refutation of the relativist attitude have been 
overly optimistic.
Consequently, we now know 1) that the relativist will never get convinced by 
our arguments, and 2) that this is a result we should have anticipated. That we 
should have anticipated this situation, however, seems to be epistemically 
significant in an important way. It points to the idea that convincing the relativist 
should not be our central concern. The value of taking the relativist position 
seriously and analysing its logical structure cannot be that doing so allows us to 
eventually refute it once and for all. On the contrary, its significance lies in this: the 
analysis of relativism serves as a means for the articulation of a sophisticated rival 
epistemology, which aims at explaining our commonsensical optimistic conclusions 
about our knowledge of the world. Relativism serves the aim of making this rival 
elaborate: it exposes possible defects, points to issues that have to be tackled and 
forces us to construct a logically rigorous conception, so that it is effectively 
responsive to criticism.
This rival, I have been arguing, takes its most effective form in the guise of 
the axiomatic variant o f ‘internalist foundationalism’. ‘Internalist foundationalism’ 
asserts that knowledge claims regarding certain propositions are justified only 
insofar they have been derived from other foundational beliefs known to be secure. 
The ‘axiomatic’ element enters the scene when it comes to affirming these ultimate 
building blocks of our system of knowledge. On pain of regress, argumentation
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must stop at some point. Those basic beliefs of ours must be taken as ‘given’, on 
the basis of our intuition, be it deductive or inductive. Furthermore, this view of 
knowledge does not violate empiricism in any way. It merely fills the gaps 
empiricism inevitably leaves behind. Experience is still central on this view; what is 
acknowledged, nonetheless, is the commonplace that experience alone, though 
necessary, is not sufficient to settle epistemic questions transcending its boundaries. 
Our non-empirical help is required before we can draw any credible conclusion 
about certain matters of fact.
Summing up our plausibility case for the axiomatic variant of ‘internalist 
foundationalism’: compared to extemalism and anti-foundationalism, ‘internalist 
foundationalism’ presents a logically rigorous, transparent and intellectually honest 
alternative, which brings to light the fundamental presuppositions of empirical 
knowledge. Instead of trying to hide the inevitability of these presuppositions 
behind circular reasoning, it affirms this inevitability and accepts it as a 
fundamental limitation imposed to us by logic. Having revealed those 
presuppositions, the axiomatic dimension o f ‘internalist foundationalism’ allows us 
to affirm the dictates of common sense on strong intuitive grounds, thus 
contradicting relativism. As I remarked earlier, the relativist is not expected to 
concur and convert. But this is not the crucial issue. The crucial issue is whether we 
have managed to articulate a plausible alternative to the relativist position, to which 
my answer is affirmative.
These sentiments are further reinforced by the fact that the ‘axiomatic 
response’ to relativism seems straightforwardly to explain some of the features that 
made van Fraassen’s pragmatist epistemology so appealing, while at the same time 
avoiding its problems. All of us in everyday life accept unquestioningly many
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propositions about various issues, which, intuitively, hardly deserve any further 
investigation. Contra van Fraassen’s pragmatism, I have argued that this matter of 
fact has no epistemic significance by itself, and, hence, that it cannot inform our 
philosophical considerations. It points, nonetheless, to a crucial feature of the 
‘axiomatic response’ to relativism, i.e. that there are issues about which we feel this 
way precisely because we can affirm, on a priori grounds, the right answer. 
Perhaps this is van Fraassen’s real thought, at least to the extent he wants to combat 
relativism on normative grounds. If this is so, however, we have already moved 
away from the weak criterion of rationality favoured by his ‘new epistemology’, 
namely coherence, towards a more robust foundationalist theory of knowledge.
I conclude, then, that the circle which led us back to ‘internalist 
foundationalism’ does not condemn us to relativism. I do not claim to have 
demonstrated that relativism is an untenable doxastic attitude. I believe I have 
shown, nonetheless, 1) that a more optimistic epistemology can be consistently 
articulated in the vein of the traditional conception of rationality, and 2) that this 
epistemology is a plausible rival to the relativist position.
5.2.5 ‘Axiomatic Constraints’ on Prior Probabilities or Why the ‘Intuitive* 
NMA Does Not Surrender to Relativism
I argued earlier that the relativist threat does not arise as a consequence of 
endorsing Subjective Bayesianism. On the contrary, it centres on the more general 
problem of vindicating our content-increasing inferences, a problem inevitably 
reflected in the Bayesian approach but universal to all approaches. In the previous 
section I defended one such way of vindicating our inductive inferences. I 
suggested that relying on our ‘inductive intuition’ is not only a plausible method, it
241
in fact is the only method through which we can consistently answer the relativist 
challenge on normative grounds. Many have felt that something stronger should be 
said and have revised their conception of epistemology accordingly. Sadly, their 
revisionist attempts have been unsuccessful. I have tried to argue, nonetheless, that, 
fortunately, no such revisions were required in the first place. If I am right, we can 
still claim that our inductive inferences are justified. But if we can do this, we can 
also claim that certain prior probability distributions are more ‘reasonable’ than 
others. This is because prior probabilities encapsulate the inductive assumptions 
one must affirm in order to perform any content-increasing inference. 
Consequently, if some inductive inferences can be deemed ‘more reasonable’ than 
others, then so is the case for the prior probability assignments, which codify the 
inductive assumptions those ‘more reasonable’ inferences necessarily presuppose.
The superior status of certain inductive inferences relative to others derives, 
according to the axiomatic variant of ‘internalist foundationalism’, from our 
reliable ‘inductive intuition’. It is only with its help that we can reliably infer to 
certain hypotheses transcending the data. The reliability of our ‘inductive intuition’, 
however, can only be asserted on a priori grounds on pain of regress or circularity. 
On the assumption that such an assertion is permissible, it is not hard to find, a 
probabilistic rendering. Our reliable ‘inductive intuition’ allows us to correctly 
assign higher prior probability to certain hypotheses over others and in this way 
allows the data to turn the balance decisively in favour of some hypotheses over 
others. Maybe we would like to say something more about the reasons that this 
assignment is the correct one. For better or for worse, it seems that nothing more 
can be said. It is only our intuition that can perform the function of constraining the
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prior probability of certain hypotheses and, hence, allow the data to favour certain 
beliefs over others.
The ‘intuitive’ NMA exemplifies this process. It only explicitly asserts the 
non-empirical presuppositions, which have to be in place in order for the argument 
to have any normative import. These presuppositions take the form of an optimistic 
presumption about our theories on the basis of their a priori virtues -  essentially 
simplicity and unificatory power. Such a presumption transcends the evidence in 
favour of our theories and in a sense goes beyond the dictates of empiricism. 
Ignoring this presumption, however, results in invalid reasoning -  indeed this was 
the main lesson of the discussion of the ‘Base-Rate Fallacy’. Consequently, any 
logically clear-headed defence of realism must affirm this optimistic presumption in 
favour of simple, unified theories. The grounds of this affirmation, in turn, can be 
no other than our ‘inductive intuition’ on pain of circularity or regress. Hence, only 
the ‘intuitive’ NMA fully respects our logical situation. It is worth noting that Peter 
Lipton, though no great friend either of NMA or intemalism, reached a strikingly 
similar conclusion through his criticism of one of van Fraassen’s sceptical
1 *)(sarguments against the realist thesis :
“[T]he realist must say that scientists do have the knack of thinking of the 
truth. This ability is, from a certain point of view, somewhat surprising, but it 
remains in my view far more plausible than the extreme ignorance,
126 In his (1993) Lipton is responding to van Fraassen’s argument from ‘underconsideration’, i.e. the 
thesis that the scientists’ ability to rank scientific theories according to their explanatory merit does 
not suffice for the optimistic inference to the approximate truth o f the one ranked the most 
explanatory.
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substantive and methodological, that a coherent critic must embrace” (1993, 
106).
The wording of Lipton’s remark is revealing. On the realist view, the scientists’ 
‘knack of thinking of the truth’ can best be explicated in terms of what a reliable 
‘inductive intuition’ dictates. And the only way to defend the reliability of intuition 
is through a plausibility argument, precisely as I suggested in the previous section. 
Perhaps unwittingly, Lipton himself points our attention to (and also embraces) the 
only defensible version of NMA, i.e. the ‘intuitive’ version embedded into the 
traditional context of Cartesian rationality.
In chapter 4 1 suggested that the scientists’ ‘knack of thinking of the truth’ is 
most faithfully captured from within the framework of Subjective Bayesianism. 
The assignment of a high prior probability to the (approximate) truth of our current 
(particular) scientific theories expresses this optimistic presumption, which is 
dictated by our ‘inductive intuition’. On the assumption that my defence of the 
normative import of ‘inductive intuition’ succeeds, however, we also see that the 
‘axiomatic’ character of these prior assignments is no obstacle to thinking of them 
as carrying normative force, since they can now be viewed as conveying what our 
normatively effective intuition mandates. Hence, the idea that ‘inductive intuition’ 
imposes reasonable ‘constraints’ on prior probabilities, constraints which can 
neither be given nor need further defence. Though different assignments are 
logically possible, some of them are the correct ones. I understand that many feel 
that a more compelling argument should be offered for the preferability of certain 
prior distributions over others. On mature reflection, however, nothing more can be 
said in a defensible way.
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The ‘mild’ nature of such intuitively underwritten constraints is also the main 
reason why I don’t think that my proposal takes us outside the spirit of Subjective 
Bayesianism in particular. Earlier in this chapter I argued that a sensible construal 
of Subjective Bayesianism is not committed to the view that standards of 
probabilistic coherence exhaust the correct theory o f ‘scientific rationality’. Since 
the fundamental constraints that it imposes on degrees of belief are logical in 
nature, Subjective Bayesianism is not a priori inconsistent with further non-logical 
constraints, provided, of course, that these constraints are argued for in a non 
question-begging way. All this is respected in my approach; what is added is a 
‘mild’ presumption towards certain beliefs based on a non-logical, but still a priori 
assertible, ‘inductive principle’. For better or for worse, our Bayesian 
reconstruction of the debate has made it clear that the only non question-begging 
way to defend this principle is through resort to intuition. Such a ‘mild’ (but, I 
suggested, sufficient) defence of ‘inductive rationality’ makes no reference to 
strong, allegedly logical, principles (like the Principle of Indifference) or systematic 
theories of objective chance (like the frequency interpretation). It only affirms 
positively certain considerations dictated by reliable inductive common-sense, in 
perfect accord with the logical constraints on rational belief set by the axioms of the 
probability calculus.
Finally, it should be noted that the argument in this section is not intended as 
an argument for realism but only as an argument for the claim that the ‘intuitive’ 
NMA carries normative weight and, hence, does not surrender the case to the 
relativist. It may of course happen that full-blown realism loses out on plausibility 
grounds and that a more modest stance, like structural realism or even constructive 
empiricism, captures the appropriate doxastic attitude towards our best scientific
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theories. We saw in chapter 4, for example, that the ‘pessimistic induction’ might 
force us to revise our plausibility judgements in the face of the history of science. 
This is still an open possibility but it is consistent with my purpose to defend the 
normative import of the ‘intuitive’ NMA, irrespective of whether it ends up 
defeating all possible counter-arguments. All I wanted to argue for was the thesis 
that plausibility considerations, after all things are considered, can ‘constrain’ prior 
probabilities and, thus, avoid relativism.
5.3 Conclusion
In sum: it in no way follows from the decision to reconstruct the realism 
debate from the Subjective Bayesian perspective that we are somehow falling back 
on relativism, thus transforming all competing considerations into equally 
legitimate claims. The problem of relativism is a general epistemological problem 
and has to be countered on general epistemological grounds. A careful look at the 
assumptions supporting the relativist challenge, however, reveals that only from the 
standpoint of traditional Cartesian epistemology can we hope to come up with a 
normatively effective response to it. Furthermore, the only viable response within 
the Cartesian context must in the end allude to some ‘inductive principle’ dictated 
by our normatively effective ‘inductive intuition’. It has been argued that 
Subjective Bayesianism is in a position to capture the normative import of this 
‘axiomatic’ solution to relativism, as evidenced by our Bayesian reconstruction of 
the ‘intuitive’ NMA.
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Conclusion: The End for Philosophy?
In conclusion, I think that the Bayesian and the realist should be friends. The 
realist will find the Bayesian framework a very useful tool through which he can 
express his views and arguments with great clarity. The language of probability 
allows the realist to supersede the sloppy terminology of ‘theory acceptance’ and 
focus accurately on the epistemic dimension of the inference to the (approximate) 
truth of our best scientific theories. A formal-probabilistic rendition of this 
inference, however, does not reveal major logical flaws in the informal statement of 
the problem. On the contrary, it helps illuminate the real character of the 
(defensible version of the) realist No-Miracles argument as a plausibility claim and, 
in this way, resolve a long-standing disagreement within the realist camp. 
Regrettably, the same cannot be claimed for the debate as a whole: Bayesianism 
will not resolve the question whether realism or some other doxastic attitude is the 
appropriate one to maintain towards our theories. Still, it contributes a lot towards 
making clear what the logic of the problem is, and how various considerations can 
influence one’s attitude relative to the question of realism. I would argue that this 
qualification renders the Bayesian approach neither useless nor redundant. Instead, 
it points to the essentially open-ended character of all philosophical problems, a
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feature which also explains the feelings of ‘ennui’ often expressed with regards to 
the prospects of an uncontroversial resolution.
Bayesianism, on the other hand, has many dimensions itself, intricately inter­
connected, which are further illuminated by its application to the problem of 
realism. More particularly, there are two issues which must be distinguished when 
one applies Bayesianism to a non-trivial issue like that of realism. The first refers to 
the probabilistic logic of the problem. It is uncontroversial that any probabilistic 
argument (or statement) must respect the constraints set by the axioms of the 
probability calculus if it is to count as probabilistically valid (or coherent). The 
second, and more controversial, issue relates to the actual value the elements 
encountered in those axioms (and theorems) should acquire (especially the prior 
probabilities in Bayes’ theorem). Unlike the first issue, this second problem is 
substantive. It refers to the question of which is the correct value to be assigned to a 
certain hypothesis or piece of evidence rather than to the various relations which 
must be satisfied if various probabilistic assignments are to be integrated into 
coherent sets of degrees of belief.
A careful appreciation of these points hides important consequences for the 
assessment of the most controversial version of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, i.e. 
Subjective Bayesianism. The ‘received view’ on Subjective Bayesianism, which I 
outlined sketchily in Chapter 1, allegedly precludes any further constraints on prior 
probability assignments beyond those dictated by the axioms of probability. 
Construed in this way, however, Subjective Bayesianism seems to scotch all 
prospect of an objective account of scientific reasoning, despite our strong 
intuitions to the contrary. This feature is taken to be the main shortcoming of this 
interpretation of the calculus.
248
Through the application of Bayesian Confirmation Theory to the problem of 
realism I have tried to motivate a different view of Subjective Bayesianism. This 
alternative picture can be summarized in the following points: 1) Subjective 
Bayesianism is first and foremost a theory about the logic of probabilistic 
reasoning; 2) as such, it does not commit one to the view that logic exhausts the 
content of ‘scientific rationality’; 3) it follows from this that Subjective 
Bayesianism is not a priori inconsistent with further (non-logical) constraints on 
prior probabilities. My defense of a (moderately) optimistic foundationalist 
epistemology aimed to show how such constraints may be accepted and why they 
do not violate the character of Subjective Bayesianism, re-construed in the way I 
suggested. The conclusion is that there are benefits for both sides. The Bayesian too 
is expected to use his involvement into the realism debate as an opportunity to 
elaborate his appreciation of the nature of Bayesian Confirmation Theory in general 
and Subjective Bayesianism in particular beyond the somewhat simplistic picture 
conventional wisdom has drawn for him.
Intuition: The End for Philosophy?
My proposed re-evaluation of Subjective Bayesianism claims that Bayesian 
personalism is consistent with further (non-logical) constraints on prior 
probabilities. All that it requires is that such constraints be argued for on 
independent grounds. A central theme of the present essay is that this last problem 
is in fact much deeper than the problem of choosing one’s interpretational stance 
towards the probability calculus. The real problem we have to face up to is the way 
we can hope to justify our content-increasing inferences and thus avoid conceptual
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relativism. Constraining the prior probabilities is only another reflection of this 
fundamental epistemological predicament.
The problem of relativism and consideration of the ways it might be 
overcome, however, brings with it one final serious difficulty. It is a central tenet of 
this essay that the relativist challenge can only be countered from the standpoint of 
traditional foundationalist epistemology. The problem of the justification of belief, 
which lies at the heart of the relativist thesis, can be answered only if the demands 
set by what I called ‘internalist foundationalism’ are met. This is because only 
‘internalist foundationalism’ explicates in a natural way the conditions that must be 
satisfied in order for our beliefs to count as justified. Granting that ‘internalist 
foundationalism’ offers the proper way to justified belief, however, involves, on 
pain of regress, admitting the fundamental building-blocks of our edifice of 
knowledge axiomatically, i.e. on the basis of intuition rather than argumentation. 
The ‘intuitive’ No-Miracles argument, for example, was deemed the only 
defensible version of the realist claim on the grounds that only it does justice to the 
fundamental epistemological demands set by ‘internalist foundationalism’ and, 
hence, that only it rests on strong epistemological foundations. I argued further that 
Subjective Bayesianism is in a position to accommodate such axiomatic constraints 
on prior probabilities in perfect accord with its fundamental principles.
The natural question which arises at this point is the following: how much 
philosophical solace can this allusion to intuition offer us? If our hopes to answer 
the relativist challenge ultimately lie in its axiomatic denial on our part, is that not 
equivalent to saying that we have simply failed to answer to the relativist? Or, at 
any rate, that philosophy is not adequately equipped to provide that answer? If 
anything, philosophy has incorporated through the years mankind’s hope that all
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problems can be resolved through rational argumentation. Does not our allusion to 
intuition mark the end for philosophy as the vehicle for the critical, argumentative 
resolution of all intellectual disputes?
I think that the answer to the above questions can be naturally extracted from 
the character of my defence of the ‘axiomatic resolution’ of the relativist challenge. 
I have not simply assumed that rational argumentation has to be based on 
unquestionable foundations. To the contrary, this thesis was the result of a detailed 
analysis of the conditions for justified belief and the logical structure of our 
argumentative attempts to acquire such belief. It is certainly true that, ultimately, I 
don’t share the view that all intellectual disputes are open to an argumentative 
resolution. This opinion, however, is not an arbitrary stipulation. Rather, it is the 
conclusion of an argument, which has also served as a reductio of this widespread 
but untenable presumption.
The hope that rational argumentation can effectively decide all intellectual 
disagreements is no doubt a noble remnant of the Enlightenment and, perhaps, a 
spontaneous sentiment of the empirically-oriented modem thinker. Still, clear­
headed conceptual and logical analysis shows that this hope inevitably remains 
unfulfilled. Rational argumentation has limits, which take the form of the basic 
presumptions one must take for granted even in order to start reasoning. Insisting 
on finding further arguments for the assertability of those basic propositions will 
take us nowhere close to fulfilling our goal on pain of regress. At some point 
argumentation must stop. At this point, only ‘dogmatic’ affirmation based on 
reliable intuition can take over, at least so long as we wish to combat relativism in a 
coherent, logically rigorous and normatively effective way.
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There is no doubt that many think that something stronger should be said if 
our case against the relativist were to count as successful. I, too, wish that 
something stronger could be said. Unfortunately, nothing can. My defense of the 
‘axiomatic resolution’ of relativism, essentially on the basis of common sense, 
aimed to show that, it still suffices as an alternative. One should be careful, 
however, when evaluating this claim. The ‘axiomatic resolution’ of relativism does 
not amount to a demonstration of the impossibility of a relativist viewpoint, since 
we have explicitly admitted that the relativist position can be formulated in a 
consistent manner. All I am proposing is a less direct answer, which highlights the 
possibility of the construction of a rigorous rival objectivist epistemology based on 
the dictates of common sense as its ultimate foundation.
So, is this not simply a re-description of the ‘end of philosophy’? Even if 
philosophical thinking itself has historically been motivated by the hope that all 
disputes admit of an argumentative resolution, there is nothing that guarantees that 
this hope will be fulfilled. Through the discussion of the problem of relativism I 
have argued that, in fact, we now know that this hope cannot be fulfilled. Need this 
fact have damning consequences for philosophy? I think not. It does point, 
however, to an alternative view of philosophy, an alternative way of appreciating 
its value. Philosophy is not valuable just because it brings our hopes regarding the 
foundational merits of human knowledge to fruition. In other words, its value does 
not depend on the condition that, in the end, it must allow us to make the strong 
claims to knowledge, which have motivated our investigation in the first place. 
Quite to the contrary, the value of philosophical thinking is independent of its end 
result. It derives from the fact that philosophical analysis is performed with an eye 
to conceptual clarity and logical rigor, both necessary elements of any meaningful
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investigation. In short, philosophy is valuable because it constitutes a rigorous 
method for the treatment of certain foundational questions. Consequently, even if 
the verdict of this investigation turns out to be different from what we had hoped or 
expected, this is neither a reason for despair nor a sign that the method of 
investigation is worthless.
In our case, the pursuit of a probabilistic reconstruction of the realism debate 
has served as the starting point for a better appreciation of the No-Miracles 
argument for realism. I have sided with those who think that the argument is 
ultimately based on our ‘inductive intuition’ and, on this basis, I also offered an 
explanation of the feelings o f‘ennui’ recently expressed in the literature regarding 
the prospects for a definitive resolution of the controversy. I don’t think that these 
conclusions, with the central role they attribute to intuition, take anything away 
either from the realist cause or philosophy in general. To the extent that such an 
analysis respects logical and conceptual rigor, the mature, open-minded and self- 
conscious researcher should welcome its results as a valuable addition to the long 
series of attempts aiming to capture the nature and character of human knowledge.
253
Bibliography
Achinstein, P. (2001) The Book o f  Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bar-Hillel, M. (1980) ‘The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments’, Acta 
Psychologica 44: 211-233.
Bloor, D. (1991) Knowledge and Social Imagery, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition.
Boyd, R. (1973) ‘Realism, Underdetermination and a Causal Theory of Evidence’, 
N o u s l : 1-12.
Boyd, R. (1984) ‘The Current Status Scientific Realism’ in J. Leplin (ed.) Scientific 
Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press (1984).
Braithwaite, R. B. (1953) Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Carnap, R. (1950) The Logical Foundations o f Probability, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. (1968a) ‘On Rules of Acceptance’ in Lakatos (1968a).
Carnap, R. (1968b) ‘Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition’ in Lakatos (1968a).
Casscells, W., Amo Schoenberger and Thomas B. Graboys (1978) ‘Interpretation 
by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results’, New England Journal o f  
Medicine 299: 999-1001.
Christensen, D. (1991) ‘Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs’, The Philosophical 
Review 100: 229-247.
Christensen, D. (1996) ‘Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic 
Consistency for Partial Believers’, Journal o f  Philosophy 93: 450-479.
Day, T. and H. Kincaid (1994) ‘Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its 
Place’, Synthese 98: 271-295.
254
De Finetti, B. (1931) ‘Probabilism’, English translation in Erkenntnis 1989, 31: 
169-223.
De Finetti, B. (1937) ‘Foresight: its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources’ in H. E. 
Kyburg, Jr. and H. E. Smokier (eds.) Studies in Subjective Probability, New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Demopoulos, W. and M. Friedman (1985) ‘Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of 
Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest’, Philosophy o f  
Science 52: 621-639.
Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, John Cottingham (ed.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996).
Dorling, J. (1992) ‘Bayesian Conditionalisation Resolves Positivist/Realist 
Disputes’, Journal o f Philosophy 89: 362-382.
Douven, I. (1999) ‘Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent’, Philosophy 
o f Science 66, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of 
the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers: S424- 
S435.
Douven, I. (2002) ‘A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability’, 
British Journal for the Philosophy o f Science 53: 391-410.
Douven I. (2005) 'Wouldn't it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism' 
(Review Symposium on the second edition of Inference to the Best 
Explanation, with James Ladyman, Igor Douven and Bas van Fraassen), 
Metascience 14: 338-343.
Douven, I. and T. Williamson (2007) ‘Generalising the Lottery Paradox’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy o f  Science 57: 755-779.
255
Duhem, P. (1906) The Aim and Structure o f  Physical Theories, transl. P. Wiener, 
NJ: Princeton University Press (1982).
Earman, J. (1992) Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination o f  Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Feyerabend, P. (1962) ‘Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism’, in Realism, 
Rationalism and Scientific Method. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981).
Friedman, M. (1974) ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’, Journal o f  
Philosophy 71:5-19.
Foley, R. (1992) ‘The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of 
Belief, American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 111-121.
Galavotti, M. C. (1989) ‘Anti-realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno De 
Finetti’s Subjectivism’, Erkenntnis 31: 239-261.
Gillies, D. (2000) Philosophical Theories o f  Probability, London: Routledge.
Goldman, A. (1979) ‘What Is Justified Belief?’ in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the 
Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press (1992).
Good, I.J. (1962) ‘Subjective Probability as the Measure of a Nonmeasurable Set’ 
in E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski (eds.) Logic, Methodology and 
Philosophy o f Science, Proceedings o f  the 1960 International Congress, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Goodman, N. (1954) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Hajek, A. (1998) ‘Agnosticism meets Bayesianism’, Analysis 58: 199-206.
Hardin, C. and A. Rosenberg (1982) ‘In Defence of Convergent Realism’, 
Philosophy o f Science 49: 604-615.
256
Harman, G. (1965) ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, The Philosophical 
Review 74: 88-95.
Hempel, C. G. (1960) ‘Inductive Inconsistencies’, Synthese 12: 439-469.
Hempel, C. G. (1965) Aspects o f Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press.
Howson, C. (1973) ‘Must the Logical Probability of Laws be Zero?’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy o f  Science 24: 153-163.
Howson, C. (2000) Hume’s Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howson, C. (unpublished) ‘Some Formal Analogies Between Logic and 
Probability: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, BSPS Presidential Address 
2005.
Howson, C. and P. Urbach (1993) Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 
La Salle: Open Court, 2nd edition.
Jaynes, E.T. (1957) ‘Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics’, The Physical 
Review 106: 620-630.
Jaynes, E.T. (1968) ‘Prior Probabilities’, Institute o f  Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4: 227 
241.
Jaynes, E.T. (1973) ‘The Well-Posed Problem’, Foundations o f  Physics 3: 477- 
493.
Jeffrey, R.C. (1965) The Logic o f Decision, Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press.
Joyce, J.M. (1998) ‘A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Philosophy o f  
Science 65: 575-603.
Kaplan, M. (1981) ‘A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance’, Journal o f  
Philosophy 78: 305-330.
257
Ketland, J. (2004) ‘Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification’, British Journalfor the 
Philosophy o f  Science 55: 287-300.
Keynes, J. M. (1921) 4^ Treatise on Probability, London: McMillan.
Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement o f Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kyburg, H. (1961) Probability and the Logic o f Rational Belief, Middletown CT: 
Wesleyan University Press.
Kyburg, H. (1968) ‘The Rule of Detachment in Inductive Logic’ in Lakatos 
(1968a).
Kyburg, H. (1970) ‘Conjunctivitis’, in M. Swain (ed.) Induction, Acceptance and 
Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Lakatos, I. (ed.) (1968a) The Problem o f Inductive Logic Vol. 2, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company.
Lakatos, I. (1968b) ‘Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic’ in Mathematics, 
Science and Epistemology: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lakatos, I. (1974) ‘Popper on Demarcation and Induction’ in The Methodology o f  
Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1981) ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’ in Papineau (1996).
Levi, I. (1967) Gambling with Truth, New York: Knopf.
Levi, I. (1974) ‘On Indeterminate Probabilities’, Journal o f  Philosophy 71: 391- 
418.
Lewis, D. (1980) ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’ in Lewis (1986b).
Lewis, D. (1986a) ‘Postscripts to ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” in 
Lewis (1986b).
258
Lewis, D. (1986b) Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Lewis, D. (1994) ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind 103: 473-490.
Lewis, P. (2001) ‘Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy’, Synthese 129: 371- 
380.
Lipton, P. (1993) ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’ in Papineau (1996).
Lipton, P. (2000) ‘Tracking Track Records’, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume, 74: 179-206.
Lipton, P. (2002) ‘Review of Colin Howson’s Hume’s Problem: Induction and the 
Justification o f  Belief”, British Journal for the Philosophy o f Science 53: 
579-583.
Lipton, P. (2004) Inference to the Best Explanation, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2nd edition.
Lipton, P. (2005) 'Wouldn't it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism: 
Author’s Response' (Review Symposium on the second edition of Inference 
to the Best Explanation, with James Ladyman, Igor Douven and Bas van 
Fraassen), Metascience 14: 353-361.
Locke, J. (1690) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Lyon, D. and P. Slovic (1976) ‘Dominance of Accuracy Information and Neglect 
of Base Rates in Probability Estimation’, Acta Psychologica 40: 287-298.
Magnus, P.D. and Callender, C. (2004) ‘Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy’, 
Philosophy o f Science 71, 320-338.
259
Maher, P. (1986) ‘What is Wrong with Strict Bayesianism?’, PSA: Proceedings o f  
the Biennial Meeting o f the Philosophy o f  Science Association, Vol. 1: 
Contributed Papers, pp. 450-457.
Maher, P. (1990) ‘Acceptance without Belief, PSA: Proceedings o f the Biennial 
Meeting o f  the Philosophy o f  Science Association, Vol. 1: Contributed 
Papers, pp. 381-392.
Maher, P. (1992) ‘Acceptance in Bayesian Philosophy of Science’, PSA: 
Proceedings o f the Biennial Meeting o f  the Philosophy o f  Science 
Association, Vol. 2: Symposia and Invited Papers, pp. 153-160.
Maher, P. (1993) Betting on Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Makinson, D. (1965) ‘The Paradox of the Preface’, Analysis 58: 205-207.
Maxwell, G. (1962) ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’ in H. Feigl and 
G. Maxwell (eds.) Foundations o f  Space-Time Theories, Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press.
Maxwell, G. (1970) ‘Theories, Perception and Structural Realism’ in R. Colodny 
(ed.) The Nature and Function o f Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press.
Miller, D. (1974) ‘Popper’s Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude’, British Journal 
for the Philosophy o f  Science 25:166-177.
Monton, B. (1998) ‘Bayesian Agnosticism and Constructive Empiricism’, Analysis 
58: 207-212.
Moore, G. E. (1939) ‘Proof of an External World’ in Philosophical Papers, 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959.
260
Moser, P.K. and J. Tlumak (1985) ‘Two Paradoxes of Rational Acceptance’, 
Erkenntnis 23: 127-141.
Musgrave, A. (1988) ‘The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism’ in Essays on 
Realism and Rationalism, Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi.
Musgrave, A. (2006) ‘Responses’ in Colin Cheyne and John Worrall (eds.) 
Rationality and Reality: Essays In Honour o f  Alan Musgrave, Dordrecht: 
Springer.
Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure o f Science, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Nickles, T. (1973) ‘Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction’, Journal o f  
Philosophy 70: 181-201.
Okasha, S. (2000) ‘Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation’, 
Studies in History and Philosophy o f  Science 31: 691-710.
Papineau, D. (1993) Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell.
Papineau, D. (ed.) (1996) The Philosophy o f  Science, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Poincare, H. (1905) Science and Hypothesis, repr. New York: Dover, 1952.
Pollock, J. (1995) Contemporary Theories o f  Knowledge, New Jersey: Rowan & 
Littlefield.
Popper, K. R. (1945) The Open Society and its Enemies, 2 vols. London: 
Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1959) The Logic o f Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, 2nd 
edition, repr. by Routledge (2002).
Popper, K. R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations, 3rd rev. ed., London: RKP 
(1969).
Popper, K.R. (1983) Realism and the Aim o f Science, London: Routledge.
261
Psillos, S. (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London: 
Routledge.
Psillos, S. (2002) ‘Simply the Best: A Case for Abduction’ in A.C. Kakas and F. 
Sadri (eds.) Computational Logic: From Logic Programming into the 
Future, LNAI2408, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Psillos, S. (2004) ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism’ in F. Stadler 
(ed.) Induction and Deduction in the Sciences, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.
Psillos, S. (2005) ‘Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of Van Fraassen’s 
New Epistemology’, in Bradley Monton (ed.) Images o f Empiricism, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Psillos, S. (2006) ‘Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism’, in Colin 
Cheyne and John Worrall (eds.) Rationality and Reality: Essays In Honour 
o f Alan Musgrave, Dordrecht: Springer.
Putnam, H. (1975) ‘What is Mathematical Truth’ in Philosophical Papers: Vol. 1: 
Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsey, F.P. (1922) [1989] ‘Mr Keynes on Probability’, British Journal for the 
Philosophy o f Science 40: 219-222.
Ramsey, F.P. (1926) ‘Truth and Probability’ in D.H. Mellor (ed.) F. P. Ramsey: 
Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990).
Reichenbach, H. (1949) The Theory o f Probability, Los Angeles: University if 
California Press.
Rosenkrantz, R. D. (1981) Foundations and Applications o f  Inductive Probability, 
Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview.
Ryan, S. (1996) ‘The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency’, Synthese 109: 121-141.
262
Salmon, W. (1990) ‘Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets 
Tom Bayes’ repr. in Papineau (1996).
Schaffner, K. (1967) ‘Approaches to Reduction’, Philosophy o f  Science 34: 137- 
147.
Schick, F. (1986) ‘Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps’, Journal o f  Philosophy 83: 
112-119.
Shimony, A. (1970) ‘Scientific Inference’ in R.G. Colodny (ed.) The Nature and 
Function o f  Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Skyrms, B. (1987) ‘Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics’, Philosophy 
o f Science 54: 1-20.
Smart, J. J. C. (1963) Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: RKP.
Stroud, B. (1984) The Significance o f  Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Teller, P. (1973) ‘Conditionalisation and Observation’, Synthese 26: 218-258.
Teller, P. (1976) ‘Conditionalisation, Observation and Change of Preference’ in W. 
Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.) Foundations o f  Probability Theory, 
Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories o f  Science, Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company.
Tichy, P. (1974) ‘On Popper’s Definition of Verisimilitude’, British Journalfor the 
Philosophy o f Science 25: 155-160.
Van Cleve, J. (1984) ‘Reliability, Justification and the Problem of Induction’, 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 555-567.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
263
Van Fraassen, B.C. (1983) ‘Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal 
Probability’ in R. S. Cohen and L. Laudan (eds.) Physics, Philosophy and 
Psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1984) ‘Belief and the Will’, Journal o f  Philosophy 81: 235- 
256.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1985) ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’ in P.M. 
Churchland and C.A. Hooker (eds.) Images o f  Science, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Van Fraassen, B.C. (1989) Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Fraassen, B.C. (1998) ‘The Agnostic Subtly Probabilified’, Analysis 58:212- 
220.
Van Fraassen, B.C. (2000) ‘The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 253-280.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (2006) ‘Structure: Its Shadow and Substance’, British Journal 
for the Philosophy o f Science 57: 275-307.
Von Mises, R. (1928) Probability, Statistics and Truth, New York, Dover 
Publications Inc., 2nd edition (1961).
Walley, P. (1991) Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, London: 
Chapman and Hall.
Williamson, J. (1999) ‘Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy o f Science 50: 401-416.
Williamson, J. (2006) ‘Philosophies of Probability: Objective Bayesianism and its 
Challenges’ in A. Irvine (ed.) Handbook o f  the Philosophy o f  Science 
Volume 9: Philosophy o f Mathematics, North Holland/Elsevier [Also
264
available on-line at http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/2004/ 
philprob.pdf].
Williamson, J. (2007) ‘Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical 
Constraints to Objective Probabilities’ in William L. Harper and Gregory R. 
Wheeler (eds.) Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor o f  Henry E. 
Kyburg Jr., London: College Publications [Also available on-line at 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/ secl/philosophy/j w/2005/motivating.pdf].
Worrall, J. (1984) ‘An Unreal Image’, British Journal for the Philosophy o f  
Science 35: 65-80.
Worrall, J. (1985) ‘Scientific Discovery and Theory Confirmation’ in J. Pitt (ed.) 
Change and Progress in Modern Science, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Worrall, J. (1988) ‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology’, British Journal for the 
Philosophy o f  Science 39: 263-275.
Worrall, J. (1989a) ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds’, repr. in 
Papineau (1996).
Worrall, J. (1989b) ‘Fix it and be Damned: A Reply to Laudan’, British Journal for  
the Philosophy o f Science 40: 376-388.
Worrall, J. (1994) ‘How to Remain Reasonably Optimistic: Scientific Realism and 
the ‘Luminiferous Ether” , D. Hull and M. Forbes (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. 1, 
East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 334-342.
Worrall, J. (1999) ‘Two Cheers for Naturalised Philosophy of Science’, Science 
and Education 8: 339-361.
Worrall, J. (2000a) ‘Kuhn, Bayes and ‘Theory-Choice: How Revolutionary Is 
Kuhn’s Account of Theoretical Change?’ in R. Nola and H. Sankey (eds.), 
After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000).
265
Worrall, J. (2000b) ‘Tracking Track Records: Relying on Meta-Induction?’, 
Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 74: 179- 
206.
Worrall, J. (2002) ‘New Evidence for Old’ in P. Gardenfors, J. Wolenski and K. 
Kijania-Placek (eds.) In the Scope o f  Logic, Methodology and Philosophy o f  
Science ’, Vol. 1, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2002).
Worrall, J. (2007) ‘Miracles and Models: Why Reports of the Death of Structural 
Realism May Be Exaggerated’ in A. O’Hear (ed.) Philosophy o f  Science: 
Royal Institute o f Philosophy Supplement 61, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Worrall, J. (forthcoming) ‘Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy o f  Science.
Worrall, J. and E. Zahar (2001) ‘Appendix IV: Ramseyfication and Structural 
Realism’ in E. Zahar, Poincare’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to 
Phenomenology, Chicago: Open Court, 2001.
Zahar, E. (1983) ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Invention?’, British Journal 
for the Philosophy o f Science, 34: 243-261.
Zahar, E. (2001) Poincare's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to
Phenomenology, Chicago: Open Court.
266
